Taufiqurrahman Taufiqurrahman

Evidence-based policymaking (EBP) relies on an epistemological assumption that evidence from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) is the finest evidence for policy formulation, while expert testimony is the poorest one. This paper argues that while RCTs are a valuable source of empirical evidence for policy interventions, they are not sufficient on their own to support evidence-based policy formulation. Through the lens of the INUS framework of causation, we demonstrate that the effectiveness of a policy is influenced by a complex interplay of contextual factors, which RCTs alone cannot capture. We advocate for the integration of contextual and qualitative knowledge, including testimonies from experts and community members, to supplement RCT findings. This additional knowledge provides insights into the social, cultural, and subjective dimensions of the target population, addressing motivations, preferences, and other factors that can significantly impact policy success. By comparing reductionist and non-reductionist perspectives on the use of testimony in evidence-based policy, we argue for a balanced approach that values credible testimonies as essential to understanding context. Ultimately, this paper underscores the importance of a multifaceted evidence approach in crafting effective, context-sensitive public policies.

Panpsychism has recently emerged as a promising approach to addressing the hard problem of consciousness. This view posits that consciousness is both fundamental and ubiquitous. A recurring argument in its favour is the simplicity claim—that panpsychism is the simplest theory compared to its alternatives. However, the specific criteria for judging panpsychism as the simplest among competing theories remain underexplored by both its advocates and critics. This paper seeks to identify these criteria and assess the simplicity of panpsychism in relation to other metaphysical theories of consciousness. Through a comparative analysis, the paper argues that panpsychism is neither inherently simpler nor more complex than rival theories. The monistic version of panpsychism, for instance, entails a simpler ontological commitment than functionalism, the most widely accepted theory of consciousness. However, when ideological commitments are factored into the evaluation, even monistic panpsychism loses its purported simplicity advantage, let alone the dualistic versions of the theory.

Some academics and state officials in Indonesia argue for the adoption of Pancasila as a scientific paradigm for the country's scientific endeavours. They believe that using Pancasila as a foundation could give Indonesian science a distinct and unique character. However, this article seeks to reevaluate the feasibility of Pancasila as a scientific paradigm. By reviewing the literature on Pancasila and the philosophy of science, it arrives at the conclusion that Pancasila cannot serve as a scientific paradigm, either in a narrow or comprehensive sense. Two primary reasons support this conclusion. Firstly, Pancasila lacks the necessary characteristics of a well-established scientific achievement. As a result, it cannot function as a scientific paradigm in the narrow sense defined by Kuhn. Secondly, Pancasila carries theological baggage that surpasses science’s capacity to accommodate it. This aspect prevents Pancasila from becoming a comprehensive scientific paradigm. Consequently, I propose that Pancasila is more suitable as an axiological basis for science, rather than a scientific paradigm. Unlike a scientific paradigm, this axiological foundation does not fall within the epistemic scope of science.

Whether Edmund Husserl is a realist or idealist or metaphysically neutral is still often debated among his commentators. Instead of making an over-generalized claim about Husserl’s thought, this study only focuses on intentionality theory to know toward which Husserl is metaphysically committed in that theory. This study, therefore, aims to metaphysically reconstruct Husserl’s theory of intentionality and then prove that the theory is realist, not idealist nor metaphysically neutral. By using the textual analysis method, this study finds four important points in Husserl’s works regarding intentionality theory. Firstly, in the Husserlian framework of intentionality, consciousness always intends its objects through the mediation of a certain meaning. Secondly, objects toward which consciousness is directed are transcendent and independent from consciousness. Thirdly, a single object can be intended by consciousness through different meanings according to the perspective that determines the intention. Therefore, fourthly, Husserl’s theory of intentionality can be categorized as one version of perspectival realism.

Artikel ini bertujuan untuk merekonstruksi pemikiran Martin Heidegger tentang bahasa dalam bingkai ontologi fundamental. Ontologi fundamental adalah kritik Martin Heidegger terhadap mainstream metafisika Barat yang cenderung onto-teo logis dan bercorak subjektif. Menyangkal kecenderungan onto-teo-logis dan meminggirkan subjektivisme dari metafisika, ontologi fundamental ini akhirnya ditandai oleh keduniawian (worldliness/Weltlichkeit) dan pasivitas aktif manusia. Metafisika-puitika sebagai kelanjutan proyek ontologi fundamental Martin Heidegger dalam konteks bahasa juga dicirikan oleh keduniawian dan pasivitas aktif manusia. Ciri-ciri tersebut terwujud dalam: pertama, keterkaitan bahasa—yang pada hakikatnya puitis—dengan kebermukiman manusia di bumi; dan kedua, pemahaman manusia terhadap makna Ada yang dimediasi oleh bahasa (puisi) dimungkinkan jika dan hanya jika manusia pasif sekaligus aktif.