Taylor Rogers

This interview, conducted over several months between Lauren Guilmette and Taylor (“Tay”) Rogers, in conversation with Amy Marvin, Qrescent Mali Mason, and Kelly Gawel, examines the creation and impact of a film that Rogers produced as part of their doctoral research in Continental philosophy. The film’s creation process is, itself, of interest to contemporary Continental philosophy: this process was collaborative, emergent, and based on music that Rogers composed. In the interview, the film’s philosophical import is explored, from its connections to canonical figures like Nietzsche and Lugones to emerging feminist voices in philosophy of humour, trans studies, critical race studies, and themes related to embodiment, grief, affect, and relational ontologies. Readers are introduced to research-creation as an arts-based practice of research that holds great, often untapped value for philosophical inquiry.

This interview, conducted over several months between Lauren Guilmette and Taylor (“Tay”) Rogers, in conversation with Amy Marvin, Qrescent Mali Mason, and Kelly Gawel, examines the creation and impact of a film that Rogers produced as part of their doctoral research in Continental philosophy. The film’s creation process is, itself, of interest to contemporary Continental philosophy: this process was collaborative, emergent, and based on music that Rogers composed. In the interview, the film’s philosophical import is explored, from its connections to canonical figures like Nietzsche and Lugones to emerging feminist voices in philosophy of humour, trans studies, critical race studies, and themes related to embodiment, grief, affect, and relational ontologies. Readers are introduced to research-creation as an arts-based practice of research that holds great, often untapped value for philosophical inquiry.

This article explores the affective dimension of resilient epistemological systems. Specifically, I argue that responsible epistemic practice requires affective engagement with nondominant experiences. To begin, I outline Kristie Dotson's account of epistemological resilience whereby an epistemological system remains stable despite counterevidence or attempts to alter it. Then, I develop an account of affective numbness. As I argue, affective numbness can promote epistemological resilience in at least two ways. First, it can reinforce harmful stereotypes even after these stereotypes have been rationally demystified. To illustrate, I examine the stereotype of Black criminality as it relates to false confessions. Second, it can encourage “epistemic appropriation”, which I demonstrate by examining the appropriation of “intersectionality” and #MeToo by white culture. Finally, I conclude that resisting harmful resilience requires affective resistance, or efforts that target numbness via different kinds of affective engagement. I consider Kantian “disinterestedness” as a candidate.

In order to address questions about how to conceptualize and resist epistemic oppression most effectively, this essay develops a critical engagement with Kristie Dotson’s “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.” Relying on a conceptual clarification of what is meant by “shared epistemic resources,” I argue against Dotson’s distinction which finds some instances of epistemic oppression to be “reducible” to the unequal distribution of social and political power, and some to be distinctively epistemic, and thus “irreducible” to these factors. Rather, I maintain the most effective conceptualization of the phenomenon will find that all of its forms have a distinctive epistemic dimension that must be contended with; they are thus irreducible in Dotson’s sense. In other words, the critical interrogation of governing norms will be necessary for resistance in all three cases. I briefly consider the import of my view by looking at epistemic oppression amidst the presidency of Barack Obama.