Teddy Duncan Jr.

Meat is the essential object dislodged in human-animal relations: in its commonplace, everyday ubiquity and distanced violence, it defies the innocuous or protective-paternalistic stance that we ordinarily take towards animals. Through looking at meat’s status as a fundamental and visceral part of human-animal relations—particularly its commodification and consumption—this book exhibits how animals fit into human discursive practices and how this discursive position determines our perspective of animals and, subsequently, our treatment of them. By treating modernity as a distinct stage of meat production, this work examines the meat-commodity in all its contemporary specificity as an economic, linguistic, philosophical, psychoanalytic, and material object. Using theoretical prisms that have been largely overlooked in animal studies, such as Marxian analysis and Lacanian-Žižekian psychoanalysis, and rejecting popular approaches, such as analogical thinking and effacement of human-animal difference, this book offers new insights into the meat-commodity—and new ways to orient ourselves towards animal life and death.

In Rita Indiana’s novel, Tentacle, the future of the Dominic Republic is postulated as bleak and dystopian: a nuclear ecological disaster has nearly ruined the ocean, colorism and racism are pervasive, Haitians are indiscriminately executed due to an unnamed “virus” (Indiana 3), and historical class divisions, as well as wealth inequalities, are maintained. The various issues that Indiana’s future-oriented Dominican Republic is facing emerge from political contingencies: they are the result of clear choices facilitated by the political leaders of the Dominican Republic. Yet, while the text renders historical reality as contingent and liable to change, it also explicitly points out the limits of individual agency and action. Tentacle demonstrates the politico-ontological dismissal of subjects that is enacted through necropolitics. The text also recognizes the contingent nature of political formation and necropolitics, and by doing so, implicitly contests the essentialization of formerly colonized countries such as the Dominican Republic. Ultimately, I argue that the precarity of the political subject and the material-political-reality are not depicted in Tentacle as necessary or inevitable parts of some dialectic process of progression, but rather as potentially preventable or intervenable processes that evade individual agency.

In Animals, Ethics, and Us, Dr. Madeleine L.H. Campbell offers insight into the moral landscape of human-animal relations through a specific ethical framework that rejects the rights of non-human animals, opting instead for a “qualified utilitarian approach” (2019, 9). For Campbell, animal ethics should not be bound to animal rights or the autonomy of individual animals; she asserts that animal rights should not factor into the moral consideration of animals at all. Since she does not confer animals a moral status or form of rights and instead relies on the utilitarian approach, Campbell attempts to locate the justifying logic of necessity (or non-necessity) in each of these issues and demonstrate how the human use of animals in a particular situation is, or is not, legitimate. There are some notable issues with this approach: Campbell’s moral framework can essentially justify anything done to animals—if it is ‘beneficial’ to humans in any capacity. In this review, I briefly summarize her argument and its applications, then delve into some criticisms of her views.

This paper is a two-part project. First, I reject the analogous relationship between the Holocaust and slaughterhouses (found in the anti-meat novel The Lives of Animals) and cross-species analogical thinking entirely; instead, I opt for modes of analysis that can examine the specific circumstances of animals within slaughterhouses. Secondly, I assert that a socio-economic Marxist analysis is the best prism in which to recognize the suffering of pre-slaughter animals and the causation of their suffering (the ostensibly necessary circulation and production of the meat-commodity).

I will look at and discuss the ideological-subject position of the ‘sympathetic’ slave-owner by employing Žižek ’s specific conception of ideology across two varying slave-narratives. I attempt to uncover how this ideology operates within the social-material reality in the texts Our Nig and Minnie's Sacrifice and the ways that the authors employed tropes in depicting this particular archetypal figure in slave-narratives. These charachter's exhibit an ideology remarkably aligned with Žižek ’s: that a certain non-knowledge of the proper logic of an ideological reality is what sustains it. This suggests not only that such an archetypal figure exists across slave-narratives, but also that they deploy a communal ideology that attempts to conflate unwillingness with inability. They enable the perpetuation of the institution by their unwillingness to reject the economic benefits of slavery, which they conceive of as an inability.