• University of Helsinki
    Department of Philosophy (Theoretical Philosophy, Practical Philosophy, Philosophy in Swedish)
    Academy of Finland Research Fellow
University of Helsinki
Department of Philosophy (Theoretical Philosophy, Practical Philosophy, Philosophy in Swedish)
PhD, 2014
Helsinki, Southern Finland, Finland
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
  •  461
    Non-naturalism – roughly the view that normative properties and facts are sui generis and incompatible with a purely scientific worldview – faces a difficult challenge with regard to explaining why it is that the normative features of things supervene on their natural features. More specifically: non-naturalists have trouble explaining the necessitation relations, whatever they are, that hold between the natural and the normative. My focus is on Stephanie Leary's recent response to the challenge…Read more
  •  360
    Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 243-259. 2017.
    This is a draft of a chapter for the Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by David Plunkett and Tristram McPherson. I offer an overview of hybrid views in metaethics, with main focus on hybrid cognitivist views such as those defended by Daniel Boisvert and David Copp, and on hybrid expressivist views such as those defended by Michael Ridge and myself.
  •  108
    Moral Fetishism Revisited
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1): 307-315. 2004.
    In this paper the 'moral fetishism' argument originally presented by Michael Smith against moral judgment externalism is defended. I argue that only the internalist views on the relation of moral judgment and motivation can combine two attractive theses: first, that the morally admirable are motivated to act on the reasons they take to ground actions' being right, and second, that their virtuousness need not be diminished by their acting on their thinking something right. Lastly, some possibilit…Read more
  •  57
    Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2): 233-255. 2015.
    Many philosophers believe that judgments about propositional attitudes, or about which mental states are expressed by which sentences, are normative judgments. If this is so, then metanormative expressivism must be given expressivist treatment. This might seem to make expressivism self-defeating or worrisomely circular, or to frustrate the explanatory ambitions central to the view. I argue that recent objections along these lines to giving an expressivist account of expressivism are not successf…Read more
  •  55
    How Norms (Might) Guide Belief
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3): 396-409. 2015.
    Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide belief formation. Plausibly, if belief nor…Read more
  •  37
    Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4): 437-460. 2016.
  •  34
    Name der Zeitschrift: SATS Jahrgang: 14 Heft: 2 Seiten: 119-141
  •  18
    Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5): 943-955. 2017.
    I explore the prospects of capturing and explaining, within a non-cognitivist framework, the enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires of N that, if N believes that she herself ought to perform an action, φ, N intends to φ. Capturing this principle involves making sense of both the possibility and irrationality of akrasia – of failing to intend in accordance with one’s ought thought. In the first section, I argue that the existing non-cognitivist treatments of en…Read more
  •  16
    Expressivism and Moore's Paradox
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1): 1-6. 2014.
    No abstract.
  •  12
    Relational Expressivism and Moore's Paradox
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2): 1-8. 2015.
    No abstract.
  •  3
    Believing in Expressivism
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8. 2013.
  •  2
    Non-naturalism—roughly the view that normative properties and facts are sui generis—may be combined either with cognitivism or with non-cognitivism. The chapter starts by explaining how the metaphysically necessary connections between the natural and the normative raise an explanatory challenge for realist non-naturalism, and how it is not at all obvious that quasi-realism offers a way of escaping the challenge. Having briefly explored different kinds of accounts of what it is to have thoughts c…Read more