Tempest Henning

In this chapter, José Medina and Tempest Henning examine the role that bodily testimony can play in social and political epistemology. They develop an account of how to understand the testimonial force and content of non-verbal communicative acts, such as gestures and facial expressions, that depends on three features: the communicative context, the embodied positionality of the communicator, and the communicative uptake that the audience gives, or fails to give, to the expressive behavior of the body. In particular, Medina and Henning argue that under conditions of racial oppression, all racialized bodies—non-white as well as white—are epistemically valued in different ways and thus receive different kinds of communicative uptake. At the same time, Medina and Henning argue that bodily group testimony is well suited for cultivating in-group communicative solidarity and for giving center-stage to in-group members in testimonial dynamics, and so bodily communication can be used in resistant testimony.

Ad hominem arguments are typically viewed as fallacious within dominant white Western argumentative frameworks, where personal attacks are discouraged in favor of addressing the argument itself. In this paper, I argue the nuanced use of abusive ad hominem arguments within African American Argumentation (AAA) is a counterexample to this view. While Western contexts often deem abusive ad hominem as fallacious due to its perceived lack of argumentative value, AAA emphasizes the interpersonal dynamics and cultural context, where personal attacks convey significant communicative and cultural meanings. Signifyin, a practice characterized by playful yet crude personal attacks, exemplifies how abusive ad hominem serves constructive purposes and contains logical content. These attacks, far from being merely vicious, function to affirm solidarity, highlight inconsistencies and reinforce argumentative stances. I argue abusive ad hominem within AAA should not be viewed solely as detrimental to argumentation. Instead, it plays a crucial role in the communicative process by signaling deeper meanings and intentions, challenging the traditional white Western assumption that abusive elements are inherently fallacious and the dismissal of AAA practices as fallacious undermines the epistemic contributions of African American communities.

This paper analyses some of the rhetorical and linguistic features of two judges' summations to two different juries in a criminal case that was tried twice in the Tasmanian Criminal Court. In the first trial, the jury failed to reach a verdict upon a number of counts in the indictment. In the second trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The purpose of this paper is to cast light upon how the linguistic and rhetorical features observed in the summations lent colour or weight to a particular interpretation of the events tried. The paper argues that the judge's summing up is part of the persuasive process of the criminal trial and that judges do present a version of the facts to the jury, deploying various language strategies to construct and communicate that version. The analysis focuses solely upon the judges' summing up of the evidence and the facts. It does not deal with directions or determinations concerning the law. Three major differences between the summations are considered: their distinct thematic approaches to the factual issues, the disparate levels of assistance they provide to the jury in assessing the evidence and their relative comprehensibility. The different thematic approaches produced disparate choices concerning the evidence -- its selection for consideration and its evaluation. The approach in the first summation resulted in an analysis of the evidence that favoured the accused. In the second summation, the thematic approach facilitated a more critical appraisal of the accused's case and a more favourable assessment of the complainant's version of events. The summations also provide differential levels of assistance and achieve differential levels of comprehensibility. The first summation provides relatively little guidance to the jury in evaluating significant items of evidence. In contrast, the second trial summation gives a more directional appraisal. It also achieves a greater level of clarity in the communication of key ideas than the first summation. Both distinctions are attributed to the discourse structures of the summations and to the second summation's reliance upon such organisational and rhetorical devices as repetition, enumeration and rhetorical questions. They are also attributed in part to the comparative syntactic simplicity of the second summation's sentences. It is the conclusion of this paper that the trial judge's linguistic, discourse construction and rhetorical skills are central to the clarification or obfuscation of the facts and issues in a case. How judges say what they say is significant at two levels of sense construction -- at the level of what Bernard Jackson calls “signification” and at the level of communication.

While much has been written regarding the harms of Digital Blackface, within this paper I argue that Digital Blackface is harmful on an argumentative level, as opposed to merely socio-political. My position is that the usage of Black GIFs/memes should be curtailed by non-Black and non-users of African American Argumentation (AAA). Rather than offering socio-political reasons members of these groups ought not to use Digital Blackface, I utilize the Pragma-Dialectical model of argumentation. My argument hinges on Black GIFs/memes utilized by non-Blacks and non-AAA users violating two Pragma-Dialectical rules: 1 – the starting point rule and 2 – the usage rule.

In light of the January 6, 2021, insurrection on the Capitol, this article considers the Second Amendment as an example of how Black women are quasi-citizens within the United States. I focus on the Second Amendment to not only give an account of the historical and contemporary ways guns are used to terrorize Black women but to also show the jeopardization possessing and carrying firearms pose to Black women in both individuated and systemic cases. By turning to the Second Amendment, Black women’s status as citizens illuminates a liminal space where they are simultaneously inside the category of citizens but functionally excluded. Given the unjust foundations of the Second Amendment, I view Black women brandishing firearms as possibly an act of civil disobedience.

This paper examines the argumentative retort “Just Google it” in response to cases of epistemic exploitation. Critical assessments of the reply often examine the phrase from an argumentation theory standpoint, which views it as at best rude and at worst a violation of argumentative norms. However, these critiques ignore one of the functions of the term—to avoid epistemic exportation. The response may be a useful tool for Black individuals to offload some epistemic burdens concerning racial arguments, but due to racially biased search engine algorithms, the phrase has the high potential to exacerbate racial disagreements. Directing disagreeing interlocutors to “Google” anti-Black oppression and having them self-research unjust institutions runs the substantial risk of reinforcing an interlocutor’s original stance, due to the ways in which search engine algorithms utilize word embedding. Rather than using the phrase “Just Google it,” this paper concludes with a few alternative suggestions to combat epistemic exploitation.

This paper critically examines non-adversarial feminist argumentation model specifically within the scope of politeness norms and cultural communicative practices. Asserting women typically have a particular mode of arguing which is often seen as ‘weak’ or docile within male dominated fields, the model argues that the feminine mode of arguing is actually more affiliative and community orientated, which should become the standard within argumentation as opposed to the Adversary Method. I argue that the nonadversarial feminist argumentation model (NAFAM) primarily focuses on one demographic of women’s communicative styles – white women. Taking an intersectional approach, I examine practices within African American women’s speech communities to illustrate the ways in which the virtues and vices purported by the NAFAM fails to capture other ways of productive argumentation.

Despite non/minimal adversarial feminist argumentation models heavily critiquing rude, hostile, uncooperative argumentative practices, I argue that these models slip easily into instances of ‘white talk’ when white individuals are engaged with BIPOC on matters concerning racial injustices. While these models address overt aggression, a more nuanced modification is needed for the models to handle cases of white passive aggressive argumentative tactics. Moreover, I also argue that given the language and argumentative ideology within academia, ‘white talk’ cannot be addressed by BIPOC without ‘argumentative smothering.’ Building heavily from Dotson’s conception of ‘testimonial smothering,’ I argue argumentative smothering occurs when an interlocutor heavily modifies their argumentative practices due to an oppressive environment in an attempt to situate their argument in such a way that it will be receptive and ‘acceptable’ to the other interlocutor and/or audience.