Tenzin C. Trepp

Dissociative psychoactive substances (such as ketamine and PCP) present a challenge to standard models of altered states of consciousness. Unlike classical hallucinogens which enrich or distort conscious content, dissociatives induce a peculiar fragility in the construction of one’s world-model – a breakdown of the high-level coherence that ordinarily binds perception, selfhood, and meaning. This paper develops a Cognitive Constructivist framework to argue that dissociation is best understood as a selective impairment of global world-model maintenance, rather than a mere perceptual suppression or hallucination. We contrast dissociative states with the tightened models of anxiety and the loosened models of psychedelic hallucinosis, proposing a taxonomy of altered states in terms of model dynamics: tightening, loosening, and destabilization. We explore how normal perception and self-experience depend on energetically costly top-down integration, and how NMDA-antagonist dissociatives disrupt this process – weakening long-range neural integration and thalamocortical coordination without extinguishing basic sensory consciousness. The phenomenology of dissociation (e.g. loss of meaning, depersonalization, “empty” awareness) is examined in light of this framework, revealing that awareness can persist even as the “world” (the unified field of meaningful experience) collapses. Philosophical implications are drawn for theories of consciousness and self: dissociative states illustrate consciousness separated from both narrative content and stable self-model. We argue that while dissociation might superficially resemble a mystical “pure consciousness,” it in fact represents an unstable minimal modeling that lacks the meta-awareness and integration of genuine contemplative states. Clinically, reconceptualizing dissociative anesthesia and rapid-acting antidepressant use (e.g. ketamine for depression) as world-model interruptions suggests the need for careful therapeutic integration. Rather than insight or content-driven therapy, dissociative interventions may work by resetting rigid pathological models – a destabilization that must be followed by deliberate reconstruction of meaning. We conclude that dissociative catalysts, far from revealing an alternate reality, expose the fragile and effortful nature of constructing the reality we take for granted.

We argue that a distinctive form of intersubjective experience – shared minimal-dual awareness (MDA) or “intercorporeal present” – can be jointly enacted by individuals. In this mode, two embodied persons co-engage in a present-centered attentional field such that each person’s habitual self-narrative falls silent, while a mutual salience‐space forms between them, yet without erasing their separateness. This is not mere empathy or coordination, but a qualitatively different we-consciousness grounded in ongoing embodied coupling. We situate the proposal at the intersection of analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and neuroscience. First, we review Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeality – the primordial bodily basis of social understanding – and Scheler’s taxonomy of shared affect (emotional contagion, vicarious feeling, and fellow-feeling). This motivates a three-layer taxonomy of we-consciousness: (1) coordination-we (joint actions, turn-taking), (2) affective-we (shared mood/attunement via contagion or sympathy), and (3) presence-we – a hypothesized mode where two minds dwell together in a bare joint field of awareness with reduced self-centered processing. Next, we extend Existential Realism (ER) – a present-centered metaphysics – and a retrieval model of minimal-dual awareness to the social domain. ER holds that only the present exists, while past and future remain causally real but not co-present. The retrieval hypothesis (adapted) suggests that as personal narrative-thinking subsides, a pre-narrative “relational reality” can intensify in interactive contexts. We thus define the intercorporeal present as a shared experiential mode where (i) individual self-referential narration is backgrounded and (ii) embodied coupling organizes attention and meaning, without erasing alterity. We argue that shared MDA is neither a fusion of minds nor mere mind-reading. It avoids the “fusion fallacy” – two subjects do not collapse into one – by preserving the other’s distinct presence even as self-boundaries soften. It also avoids an inference model: shared presence does not primarily operate via explicit theory-of-mind inference but through direct embodied resonance. We introduce the concept of “resonant alterity”: an encounter where the other’s full alterity is alive, yet the usual self-centered narrative does not dominate the relational space. Resonant alterity marks a co-experienced “we” that is real and structured, rather than an abstract fusion or illusion. To ground this phenomenology in the brain, we sketch a neurophenomenological model. Within each person, shared MDA should correlate with reduced default-mode/self-narrative activity and enhanced present-oriented sensory integration (supported by meditation studies showing DMN reduction under mindfulness). Between persons, it predicts selective inter-brain coupling: enhanced synchrony in networks for joint timing, attention, and sensorimotor mirroring (rather than global coupling everywhere). Crucially, our discriminant signature is a “coupled clarity” regime: rising cross-brain synchrony coinciding with dropped self-narrative markers. For example, dyads in shared MDA should show higher coherence in attention/salience circuits (e.g. PFC/TPJ) while EEG/DMN indices of inner chatter fall. We then outline an experimental program. Using dual-EEG/fNIRS hyperscanning combined with micro-phenomenological interviews in dyads, we would compare: (a) solo vs co-presence MDA (Minimal-Dual Awareness) to isolate shared effects, (b) a dyadic MDA condition (e.g. silent mutual gaze or jointly attending meditation) versus a coordination control (e.g. synchronized tapping). We hypothesize that only dyadic MDA elicits the signature (“P1–P4”): greater selective inter-brain synchrony and reduced self-referencing than controls. Subjective reports of a shared “field” should correlate with neural coupling in salience/timing networks, not merely mimicry metrics. Long-term practice partners should show stronger coupling, but even strangers should show these effects if true MDA is achieved. Finally, we address objections. The “fusion” worry (experience is private) is answered by emphasizing relational structure over ontological merge. The “inference” worry is met by noting immediate embodied resonance (as Merleau-Ponty and Scheler suggest). The risk of neural reductionism is defused by a neurophenomenological stance: we use brain data to constrain, not replace, first-person descriptions. We also discuss ethical implications: shared presence might adopt trust and reduce instrumentalizing others, but it does not guarantee virtue; boundaries and consent remain crucial. In conclusion, we propose that an intercorporeal present – a collective, present-focused awareness – is a plausible and distinctive form of we-consciousness. It invites a rethinking of social cognition as including a pre-narrative, embodied “co-presence” mode. If validated, this would extend both phenomenology and neuroscience by showing that the realm of the present (Existential Realism’s ontological core) admits not just private awareness but shared experiential fields.

Affordances are often thought of as action possibilities inherent in the environment, but this paper argues that they are better understood as constructed normative solicitations: what an object or interface is for shows up immediately in perception as an invitation or “to-be-done”, generated by predictive, embodied, and socially scaffolded cognition. We propose a realistic constructivism in which teleological meaning (the for-ness of things) is not a hidden essence nor a purely subjective projection, but a stabilized pattern of norms that guide action and are sustained by social practices. Human–computer interfaces (UI/UX) are examined as a case of metaphysical engineering: designers deliberately shape users’ action space by materializing certain affordances (and not others), effectively encoding normative expectations into the artifacts. We introduce the Normative Affordance Field (NAF) model to analyze how interface elements serve as “public priors,” guiding attention (salience), permissible actions, defaults, effort costs, and feedback. This design lens reveals how stable affordances become part of the practical ontology of users – real in the way that roles and rules are real – and carries ethical implications. The paper synthesizes insights from ecological psychology, enactivism, and predictive processing to show that normativity, not intrinsic essence, underpins teleological perception. It concludes that interface design is a form of norm governance: an ethical enterprise of shaping what users perceive as possible, permissible, and desirable in action.

Hegel’s philosophy presents self-consciousness, negation, and social recognition as the driving forces of mind’s development and the pinnacle of Spirit’s self-realization. In this view, the narrative, self-relating subject is not a defect but the crowning achievement of reality coming to know itself. By contrast, contemplative traditions and certain phenomenological models treat the narrative, autobiographical self as a contingent construct—one that can be dissolved or retrieved back into a more primary mode of awareness. This raises a direct challenge to Hegel’s claim that mediation through conflict and self-reference is necessary for genuine knowledge. There exists a stable mode of consciousness – a present-grounded, minimal-dual awareness – that serves as a counter-example to Hegelian dialectical necessity. In this minimal-dual mode, the mind operates without constantly positing and negating a self; knowing is possible without the continuous narrative or the clash of opposites that Hegel deems essential. The Retrieval Hypothesis is introduced to capture this idea: what we call “higher” or more enlightened cognition may be achieved not by adding layers of mediated self-reflection, but by returning to a more basic form of awareness that was always already present. This reframes spiritual or cognitive development as a retrieval of primordial presence rather than an ascent to ever-more-mediated self-consciousness. The paper proceeds in three steps. (i) First, an immanent critique of Hegel’s account of subjectivity and dialectical mediation is undertaken, reconstructing Hegel’s position at its strongest and then probing its internal tensions. (ii) Second, a phenomenological contrast is drawn using reports and analyses from contemplative practice – illustrating what a minimal-dual, present-focused awareness is like and how it unsettles Hegel’s framework. (iii) Third, a bridge to philosophy of mind and cognitive science is built, integrating research on the minimal vs. narrative self, contemplative neuroscience (e.g. default-mode network attenuation), and predictive processing accounts of self-modeling. This interdisciplinary approach shows how the contemplative model can be articulated in a philosophically rigorous manner and how it interfaces with empirical findings. This is not a simplistic “Hegel is refuted” claim, but rather a proposal for a revised map of mind and Spirit. Hegel’s dialectic is acknowledged as a powerful tool for making sense of experience under certain conditions (particularly a mind divided against itself). However, it is argued that dialectical self-consciousness is a local and conditioned form of knowing rather than the universal and final form. In the revised picture, the dialectical, self-negating journey is repositioned as a means appropriate to an estranged or narratively-entangled mind – a means that can be transcended or “deactivated” when the mind rests in a minimal-dual present awareness. Absolute knowing, on this view, would no longer be the triumphant completion of the dialectic but the point at which dialectical striving dissolves because the mind is no longer split by the subject–object divide. In short, Hegel’s vision of Spirit is broadened: conflictual mediation is one instrument of finite cognition, but not the whole of knowing. The paper concludes that by recognizing the reality of minimal-dual awareness, we can transform the Hegelian dialectic from an existential destiny into a contingent strategy – one that is invaluable for certain human projects (science, ethics, social life) but not the summit of consciousness as such.

Human cognition does not passively mirror reality; it actively constructs models that organize perception, guide action, and shape moral judgment. This paper examines how such constructive processes can become pathological when they generate dehumanizing representations of others. Drawing on cognitive constructivism, social psychology, neuroscience, and social epistemology, it argues that dehumanization is best understood as a breakdown in reciprocal modelhood: the failure to recognize others as co-equal centers of agency and perspective. The analysis distinguishes adaptive cognitive simplification—an unavoidable feature of categorization—from rigid, self-sealing models that resist revision, suppress feedback, and erase interpersonal symmetry. Dehumanizing constructions are shown to display characteristic markers of model pathology, including inflexibility, closed feedback loops, loss of self–other reciprocity, and collective reinforcement through echo chambers and memetic amplification. These dynamics help explain how constructed realities can legitimize cruelty while remaining internally coherent to their adherents. Against relativistic interpretations of constructivism, the paper develops a form of constraint realism: although all knowledge is constructed, it remains bounded by shared biological capacities, empirical feedback, and interdependence. These constraints provide normative grounds for distinguishing viable from pathological models. The paper concludes by proposing an ethic of epistemic responsibility centered on maintaining revisability, anomaly-sensitivity, and recognition of others as fellow model-builders. In doing so, it positions cognitive constructivism not merely as a theory of knowledge, but as a framework for diagnosing and counteracting one of the central moral failures of modern societies: the systematic construction of realities that deny human dignity.

We examine the claim that a minimal-conceptual, “bare” awareness underlies ordinary experience, and whether this pre-conceptual awareness (PCA, or minimal-dual awareness) should be understood primarily as an earlier, biologically rooted developmental baseline, or as a disclosure of a deeper ontological reality. The Retrieval hypothesis treats PCA as a cognitive–neural default mode that can be regain via contemplative practice – essentially a practical baseline of the mind – whereas the Revelation hypothesis treats PCA as an existentially fundamental sphere (akin to “being as presence”) that the brain can glimpse but not fully produce. We argue that these readings are not mutually exclusive but serve different explanatory roles. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, neuroscience, and metaphysics – as well as reflective analysis of Plotinian and Eckhartian notions of return and ground – we show that PCA can coherently be both earlier in function and deeper in meaning. In particular, we distinguish explanatory versus ontological indexical uses of “priority” or “ground,” emphasizing that neuroscience may explain the how (the mechanisms by which baseline consciousness arises) while metaphysics may describe the meaning (the way presence is disclosed). We propose a “dual-aspect” framework: evolution and development shape a baseline mode of functioning, yet that baseline mode also affords a mode of experience closer to what is described as the ground of being. We outline testable implications of this view and respond to objections (reductionist, inflationary, or category-mistake) to show how the dual description avoids both triviality and mystification. By uniting retrieval and revelation as complementary perspectives, we suggest a unified ontology in which the ever-present “now” is both an early developmental datum and a window into unconditioned presence.

Shared reality is often presumed to mirror an objective world, but this paper argues instead that it is co-constructed through active cognitive processes of alignment and mutual calibration. Drawing on cognitive constructivism—the view that minds build internal models rather than passively reflect external inputs—we propose that shared reality emerges dynamically from iterative adjustments between individuals. We synthesize evidence from psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience to show how perception itself is a predictive, constructive act, and how social interactions like dialogue and joint attention extend this constructivism interpersonally. Key mechanisms discussed include assimilation and accommodation of mental schemas, feedback loops of repair in conversation, mutual modeling of perspectives, linguistic alignment and anchoring, and the stabilization (and occasional recalibration) of shared models over time. In each domain, we highlight how individuals actively negotiate and synchronize their “worlds” with others. Shared reality thus appears not as a static agreement on an external truth, but as an ongoing achievement – a flexible mental “world” built and maintained collaboratively. We conclude by considering implications for cognitive science and philosophy: this constructivist lens reframes cognition as fundamentally interactive and world-building, reshaping notions of intelligence, agency, and what it means to “know” reality together.

Meditation practice is reconceptualized here as a signal-processing optimization in the brain, increasing synchronization and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in neural dynamics. Drawing on predictive coding and the Free-Energy Principle (Friston, 2010) – which posits that the brain minimizes surprise (prediction error) to achieve efficient perception – we frame advanced meditation as a high-gain attentional control system that aligns internal predictive rhythms with external sensory input. Unlike earlier accounts emphasizing dissolution of the self-model, this report adopts an engineering perspective. We replace reliance on Metzinger’s self-model theory with a Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET) framework of timing, and introduce the Pacemaker-Accumulator model to explain how meditative focus might refine the “clock” of consciousness. In our model, meditation induces a predictive regression – the brain reduces the depth of counterfactual modeling, restricting predictions to the immediate present. This yields a high-fidelity, high sample-rate experience of the “now,” analogous to increasing the frame rate of consciousness. Neurobiologically, we propose that meditation retunes the brain’s error-monitoring circuits. The Salience Network – anchored in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior insula – normally flags surprising or salient events. During deep meditation, we predict diminished activity in these regions, reflecting a “zero-error” predictive state in which internal models so precisely anticipate incoming stimuli that salient surprises rarely occur. At the oscillatory level, we highlight alpha–gamma phase synchrony as a mechanism for minimizing model–perception mismatch: slower alpha rhythms provide timing windows in which high-frequency gamma bursts carry precise sensory information. Tight coupling of these frequencies could reduce prediction errors by aligning top-down predictions (alpha) with bottom-up signals (gamma). Prior EEG studies indeed show that long-term meditators develop high phase synchrony and neural coherence, especially in the alpha band. We anchor our empirical approach in the classic auditory oddball paradigm, predicting that experienced meditators in meditation will exhibit attenuated mismatch responses (smaller Mismatch Negativity [MMN] amplitudes) and faster adaptation to novel stimuli compared to controls. In essence, meditation is hypothesized to optimize the brain’s information processing: boosting SNR, synchronizing internal and external timing, and maximizing the temporal integration window for metacognitive precision.

In a world understood through Existential Realism (ER) – where only the present moment truly “exists” – and under Minimal-Dual Awareness (MDA) – a mode of consciousness with reduced self–other splits and narrative thought – a puzzle arises: What grounds our obligations, commitments, and ethical agency when the “story-self” dissolves? We propose that ethical authority is rooted in the relational reality of the present. Instead of appeals to future plans or past identities, our normativity derives from a disciplined, non-evasive contact with whatever exists now – notably others’ suffering, dependence, and vulnerability. This yields a novel normative model we call “Ephemeral Virtue,” a present-responsive virtue-ethics. It establishes a third mode of moral cognition, distinct from both consequentialism (utility aggregation) and deontology (rule-obedience), characterized by minimal-dual responsiveness: action guided by immediate perception and few ego-distortions, aiming spontaneously at non-harm, honesty, and proportionate care. We show that mainstream moral theories (Kantian, utilitarian, contractarian, even care ethics) implicitly rely on a diachronic narrative self – and explore how commitments, blame, and justice can be re-interpreted and re-grounded when narrative constraints relax. We develop a taxonomy of present-centered virtues (e.g. non-evasion, attunement, impartial benevolence) that flourish in the moment. Finally, we connect this framework to moral psychology and neuroeconomics, proposing testable hypotheses: for example, that MDA (or mindfulness-like) states will reduce activity in the Default Mode Network (a neural correlate of narrative self), and correspond with greater prosocial behavior in economic games. We outline experimental designs – combining psychometric measures of present-awareness (e.g. nondual awareness scales), behavioral tasks (e.g. moral dilemmas, trust games), and neural metrics (fMRI DMN connectivity) – to investigate these predictions. By doing so, this paper aims to (i) offer a rigorous normative theory of “ephemeral virtue”, (ii) expose the hidden narrative-dependence in ethical thought, and (iii) chart a path toward empirical study of moment-based moral cognition.

Cognitive development has long been understood through the lens of constructivism, a perspective in developmental psychology advanced by figures like Jean Piaget and Jerome Bruner. Constructivism holds that learners actively build their own mental models of the world by interacting with their environment, revising their understanding through processes of assimilation and accommodation. This view emphasizes the mind’s active role in structuring knowledge, yet traditionally it treats cognition in relative isolation from the biological substrate. In other words, classical constructivist theories often posit a disembodied mind – focusing on how experience shapes thinking but giving comparatively little attention to the neural structures that enable and constrain those cognitive processes. As a result, purely cognitive constructivism may underplay the biological constraints and affordances provided by a developing brain. This paper aims to enrich the constructivist account by firmly situating cognition within its neural context, arguing that cognitive growth is a co-development of mental constructs and neural architecture. By integrating insights from neuroscience – especially the framework of neuroconstructivism – we can better understand how the brain’s plasticity, maturation, and interactions with the environment jointly shape the trajectory of cognitive development. The thesis advanced is that human cognition emerges from the dynamic interplay between neural constraints and experiential plasticity, such that learning and brain development are fundamentally intertwined processes. To support this thesis, we draw on contemporary neuroconstructivist theory and evidence. The discussion begins by revisiting the foundations of cognitive constructivism and its limitations when considered alone. We then introduce neuroconstructivism as an extended framework that incorporates neural development into our understanding of learning. The core mechanisms bridging brain and cognition – neural plasticity, developmental constraints, and progressive specialization of brain function – are examined in detail. The essential role of environmental input is considered, highlighting how enriched versus deprived conditions can dramatically alter neural and cognitive outcomes. We then explore the integrated co-development of brain and cognition, including illustrative phenomena such as the brain’s internal storytelling and self-mapping functions that bind experience to neural activity. Further, we discuss the predictive nature of the brain, looking at theories of predictive coding and the role of the Default Mode Network (DMN) as a neural workspace for constructing and refining internal models of the world. Finally, we consider practical implications of this integrated view: how it can inform educational design and therapeutic interventions, and what parallels it suggests in fields like artificial intelligence. We also address challenges in uniting cognitive and neural perspectives and reflect on ethical considerations in applying neuroscientific insights to learning and development. Through this multifaceted analysis, the paper aims to demonstrate that by rethinking constructivism through neuroscience, we arrive at a more comprehensive and biologically grounded understanding of cognition as a developing system of mind-in-brain.

Emerging research in contemplative science and psychedelic neuroscience suggests that deeply entrenched patterns of selfhood and cognition—often associated with mental disorders like depression—can be profoundly altered through both meditative practice and pharmacological intervention. This paper presents a neuroconstructivist framework for understanding how deep meditation and dissociative catalysts (exemplified by the NMDA-antagonist ketamine) synergistically suspend the ‘constructed self’ and give rise to a temporally minimal mode of awareness preceding conceptual structuring. We begin by outlining the problem of cognitive rigidity and the notion that the self is a construct generated by top-down predictive processing. In this view, the brain is a prediction machine that filters incoming sensory data through entrenched priors, creating a coherent self-model that can become maladaptively inflexible in conditions like treatment-resistant depression. We then describe how both intensive meditation and ketamine can deconstruct this self-model: deep meditation via focused attention and minimal-dual awareness training that quiets self-referential networks, and ketamine via pharmacological inhibition of neural predictive pathways. A detailed neurobiological analysis of ketamine is provided, highlighting its unique mechanisms (NMDA receptor antagonism, glutamate surge, BDNF-mediated synaptic plasticity) and contrasting them with classical psychedelic 5-HT2A agonists. We propose a “double inhibition” model wherein the combination of ketamine and meditation leads to an amplified suspension of top-down mechanisms (“ego dissolution”) through concurrent silencing of the Default Mode Network (via meditative absorption) and NMDA-receptor blockade (via ketamine). Neural oscillatory signatures (notably increased frontal theta and gamma coupling) common to both subanesthetic ketamine states and deep meditative states are discussed as markers of this low-construction conscious state. We further present comparative tables of neural and phenomenological features across normal waking consciousness, deep meditation, and the meditative-ketamine synergy. Finally, the paper explores clinical implications for treating cognitive rigidity and “stuck” self-schemas in conditions like refractory depression and PTSD. We introduce Ketamine-Assisted Contemplative Therapy (KACT) as a potential approach, wherein ketamine’s neuroplastic “window” of 24–72 hours (opened by rapid BDNF upregulation) is harnessed by contemplative practices to instill new, healthier cognitive patterns. Ethical and philosophical considerations are addressed, including the management of ego dissolution experiences, the necessity of skilled guidance and integration, and the insight into minimal-dual awareness as both a therapeutic end and a challenge to our understanding of self. We conclude that the strategic coupling of pharmacological dissociative resets with disciplined contemplative training offers a novel, synergistic pathway to ‘unlearn’ maladaptive constructs and re-enter a minimally constrained mode of present experience.

Most theories of time conflate ontological existence with structural reality. They then pose the familiar question: whether the past or the future is existent. Existential Realism (ER) rejects this conflation by distinguishing existence from temporal reality: only the present exists, while past and future remain real as structured temporal states within the framework. This paper extends the ER logical program by developing a branching-time semantics that represents: (i) an open future as a structured space of real possibilities, (ii) the transition from possibility to actuality as history resolution within a branching-time structure, (iii) the persistence and irreversibility of past reality, and (iv) agency in branching time via standard STIT (“seeing to it that”) machinery. We define ER–BT frames that preserve the Prior–Ockhamist tradition of evaluation at moment–history pairs while adding an ER layer that distinguishes three time-indexed modal statuses for events: modal (future-real), existent (present), and past-real. We then integrate STIT choice functions and independence constraints and prove model-theoretic non-collapse results showing that ER–BT preserves openness. These results support a non-eternalist interpretation without commitment to modal realism or block instantiation, at the level of the formal model. This paper extends the two-tier framework introduced in Formal Logic for Existential Realism by providing an axiomatized system, ER–BT frame semantics, and selected meta-theoretic results (including soundness and partial completeness).

Most contemplative practices emphasize receptive awareness: remaining open to whatever arises and allowing the present to reveal itself. This paper introduces and defends a complementary but structurally distinct mode of presence: deliberate intensification of the present through affective commitment. Drawing on phenomenology, cognitive science, and introspective practice, the paper distinguishes Scan (receptive monitoring) from Push (active present-entry), arguing that sustained minimal-dual presence can arise not only through non-interference but through continuous, gentle insistence on full participation in the current moment.

We challenge the common view that relativity and quantum formalisms compel a static block-universe ontology. Instead, we show that Existential Realism (ER) – can be formulated as an ontological extension of the specific physical models studied here, leaving empirical predictions unchanged so long as the added ER structure remains empirically idle. First, we clarify that the mathematical formalism of physics is neutral: one can impose a preferred foliation or an existence predicate without changing the equations. Second, we explicitly construct ER-compatible models for Minkowski spacetime (special relativity) and a finite-dimensional quantum system. In these Minkowski-spacetime and finite-dimensional quantum toy models, we show that the standard relativistic dynamical laws, Born-rule calculations, and unitary evolution between measurements are preserved, while the ER additions remain extra ontological structure. More precisely, we have constructed models that are empirically equivalent and dynamically identical while differing in their ontological assignments, thereby demonstrating underdetermination in a model-theoretic sense. We conclude that relativity and quantum theory, in the model presented here, do not logically force eternalism, leaving ER as a viable alternative ontology.

This paper explores how meditation serves as a tool to modulate and reconfigure the cognitive boundary between the subjective self and objective reality. By integrating Cognitive Constructivism (CC)—which views the mind as a "prediction machine" that constructs experienced reality—with Existential Realism (ER)—which emphasizes the primacy of the immediate "now"—the study examines the deconstruction of internal mental models. A mixed-methods neurophenomenological approach is proposed, combining micro-phenomenological interviews with psychophysiological measures like EEG, fMRI, and Heart Rate Variability (HRV). Evidence suggests that expert meditators exhibit significantly reduced activity in the Default Mode Network (DMN), particularly the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), which correlates with a decrease in self-referential narrative and the dissolution of spatial self-boundaries. Phenomenological reports further validate these findings, describing transitions into states of Bare Existence or contentless consciousness where the distinction between "I" and "it" collapses. Ultimately, the paper argues that meditation is both a deconstructive and existential procedure that reveals the contingency of the self-model while deepening contact with present-constrained existence.

This paper develops a cognitive-constructivist account of consciousness focusing not on what consciousness does but on how it presents. Building on an Interpreter–Navigator model of mind, we argue that phenomenal experience (qualia) serves as a user interface (UI): a presentational format optimized for direct usability by an embodied agent. The central claim is that feeling is the utility format of information once it becomes globally relevant for action, evaluation, and control. We propose that conscious experience is structured as felt presence rather than abstract code because such a format is required by the organism’s architecture and needs. This perspective reframes long-standing debates about qualia, representation, and the “hard problem” of consciousness. Instead of treating consciousness as a mirror of reality or an inexplicable byproduct, we present it as the experiential interface through which a constructed world-model becomes livable and steerable for the agent. We compare this account to Global Workspace Theory, predictive processing models, illusionism, and higher-order thought theories, and we draw out implications for artificial intelligence, ethics, and the nature of selfhood. In resolving why globally integrated information must appear as qualitative experience, the paper aims to dissolve the mystery of qualia while affirming their reality and importance as the agent-facing format of cognition.

Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive constructivism fundamentally transformed our understanding of how children develop knowledge. It proposes that cognitive growth is a progressive, stage-like process in which each new level of thinking builds upon earlier foundations, reflecting a gradual evolution from simple sensorimotor interactions to complex abstract reasoning. This paper re-examines Piaget’s core mechanisms of cognitive development—assimilation, accommodation, and equilibration—in light of contemporary insights from developmental neuroscience and cognitive science. We integrate biological, developmental, social, and cultural perspectives to demonstrate how cognition emerges through a dynamic interaction between the mind and the environment, highlighting that learning is an active process of adaptation akin to biological evolution. Beyond Piaget’s original scope, we explore extensions of cognitive development into language acquisition, moral reasoning, and identity formation, illustrating the interplay between cognitive maturation and social context. Finally, we discuss educational applications of constructivist principles, address key critiques of stage theory, and outline how modern interdisciplinary research continues to refine our understanding of cognitive growth.

Contemplative traditions often celebrate experiences of “pure” or non-dual awareness as insights into an ultimate reality beyond conceptual grasp. This paper offers a grounded alternative: such Bare Awareness or minimal-dual experiences are best understood not as ineffable metaphysical revelations, but as contingent phenomena constrained by procedural access (skills and practices) and bodily–attentional dynamics. Drawing on epistemology, phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, and contemplative studies, we argue that these introspective insights are a form of procedural knowledge—accessible only through trained psychophysiological practices—rather than propositional truths expressible in language. We replace absolutist terminology (e.g. “non-dual,” “pure consciousness”) with pragmatic terms like Bare Existence, Present-Constrained Experience, and Bare Awareness to emphasize the grounded nature of these states. After outlining the phenomenology of Bare Awareness and its emergence via specific attentional and bodily conditions, we discuss why such insights resist conventional explanation (the transparency of experience and minimal subject–object structure) and examine the limits of propositional description. Objections concerning subjectivism or anti-scientific bias are addressed by demonstrating how first-person methods can be rigorously integrated with third-person neuroscience. The result is a framework for integrating phenomenology and cognitive science in contemplative research, treating introspection as a trainable skill that can illuminate consciousness without invoking mysticism. By demystifying profound contemplative experiences, we aim to make them a legitimate subject of philosophical and scientific inquiry, showing that one can be awed by “Bare Awareness” while remaining firmly within a naturalistic, evidence-based perspective.

Contemporary accounts of mystical “non-dual” or minimal-dual consciousness often describe a state beyond the ordinary subject–object framework. In this paper we propose a novel parametric introspection framework, according to which such a breakthrough is not achieved by doctrinal affirmation or mere insight into metaphysics, but by driving specific introspective parameters to critical values. We identify three core variables – Intensity of attentional engagement, Cycle Frequency of introspective process, and total Duration of practice – and propose a simple model (I × F × D ≥ T) for when a stable reduction of the subject–object structure (“groundless” awareness) becomes likely. We situate this theory at the confluence of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind, contemplative science, and cognitive neuroscience. We draw on Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on intentionality and embodiment, James and Zen analyses of “pure experience,” and analytic critiques of introspection (Dennett, Metzinger) to clarify the status of the proposed framework. We also review empirical meditation research (default-mode network suppression, EEG complexity, neurophenomenology) that maps onto these parameters. We contrast our process-based, functional approach to traditional mystical metaphysics. The formal I × F × D ≥ T model is examined for its conceptual utility and limitations, and its relation to dynamical systems (attractor landscapes, complexity theory) is explored. Finally, we discuss implications for theories of selfhood, the practice of contemplation (e.g. meditation pedagogy), and the role of introspection in philosophy. In sum, we advocate a scientifically disciplined model of practical minimal-dual insight as a self-organizing cognitive event, rather than an ontological revelation.

This paper develops a comparative philosophical analysis of minimal-duality and “bare” consciousness as introspective limit-concepts—notions that emerge when reflexive awareness approaches the edges of self-representation and differentiation. By examining selected traditions (Neoplatonism, Advaita Vedānta, Mahāyāna Buddhism, Taoism, and Kabbalah) as illustrative case studies rather than an exhaustive canon, we argue that these traditions display striking structural convergences even as they diverge in doctrinal content. When reflective inquiry exhausts the subject–object structure of experience, many cultures articulate a concept of bare existence, bare presence, or bare awareness at the threshold of the sayable. Our comparative framework remains open-ended: it is designed to incorporate additional traditions (e.g. Sufism, apophatic Christian theology, Dzogchen, Kashmir Śaivism, and various indigenous cosmologies), without collapsing their differences into a single homogenized narrative. In making this analysis, we employ phenomenological, metaphysical, and psychological approaches, carefully distinguishing convergent structural insights from divergent metaphysical commitments. For Neoplatonism, we replace terms like “soul” with the Greek psyche and “mystical” with “ecstatic” in the Plotinian sense (ek-stasis, a standing outside ordinary cognition), to maintain precision and avoid unwarranted religious or absolutist connotations. Emphasizing bare existence, bare presence, and bare awareness as present-constrained variants of minimal-dual consciousness, we propose that introspective limits give rise to families of ultimate concepts across cultures. The conclusion reflects on the philosophical implications of these limit-concepts for contemporary debates on mind and reality, advocating a pluralistic approach that honors both the shared boundary-experience and the irreducible particularity of each tradition’s insights. Footnotes provide primary textual evidence (from Plotinus’ Enneads, Upanishads, Buddhist sūtras, Taoist and Kabbalistic writings, etc.) and engage relevant scholarship. In sum, this study offers an open cartography of the “unsayable,” mapping how different traditions navigate the paradoxical presence of an inexpressible, minimal-dual awareness at the limits of thought.

Debates in temporal ontology—most prominently between presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory—are often conducted via intuitive and linguistic contrasts that leave the underlying structural commitments underspecified. Existential Realism (ER) proposes a two-tier distinction: existence is present-bound, while reality extends beyond the present to include (at least) causal traces of the past and structured anticipations of the future. This paper offers a model-theoretic comparison of ER with its major rivals within a single, shared fixed-domain semantic environment. We introduce a unified first-order tense language with an ER-style existence predicate and a reality predicate; define a neutral class of temporal frames; characterize presentism, eternalism, growing-block theory, and ER as subclasses determined by explicit frame conditions; and prove representation results. We then establish separation results showing that ER is frame-theoretically distinct from presentist, eternalist, and growing-block rivals, and prove that the reality predicate R cannot be conservatively eliminated over ER frames. A key technical component is a non-definability result (with an explicit countermodel) showing that ER’s reality predicate is not eliminable in favor of tense and existence alone, together with a bisimulation-based robustness discussion. Series note. This installment extends the two-tier framework and logical core of Formal Logic for Existential Realism by treating temporal ontologies as frame classes and proving comparative model-theoretic results, while taking soundness/completeness/conservativity results from the core system as background.

Existential Realism (ER) proposes a two-tier ontology: only the present exists, yet the past and the future are real. This thesis arises from the diagnosis that in debates on the ontology of time, “existence” and “reality” are often implicitly identified, thereby making presentism and eternalism appear as competing positions that merely disagree about the extension of a single ontological predicate. ER instead separates a narrow, present-bound predicate of existence from a broader notion of reality that allows non-present entities to count as real when, for instance, they existed in the past or will exist in the future, allowing these to participate in time-directed deductions. This paper develops the core system ERL (Existential-Realism Logic): a classical first-order linear temporal logic, in the Prior tradition, enriched with two distinguished unary predicates E (“exists now”) and R (“is real”). ERL is (i) syntactically defined with precision, (ii) given a model-theoretic semantics via Kripke-style ER-frames, (iii) axiomatized through a Hilbert-style system, and (iv) supported by metalogical results establishing soundness and outlining a canonical completeness program. Where strong completeness requires additional standard assumptions (such as Henkinization or generalized models), this is made explicit. Further central technical results include: conservativity over classical first-order linear temporal logic without E/R; an explicit Barcan profile (Barcan schemas hold for unrestricted quantifiers under constant domains, but may fail for existence-restricted quantifiers ∀ᴱ/∃ᴱ); and non-reducibility results (E is not definable, over the class of ER-models, using purely temporal operators; R cannot be forced as a definitional derivative of E together with temporal operators). The overall aim is to demonstrate that ER constitutes a logically stable and metalogically respectable position within established modal-temporal traditions, without unnecessarily over-engineering the formal system. Soundness is proven; completeness is outlined via a canonical-model strategy but left for full technical development in subsequent work.

Institutions like money, law, and metrics feel as solid and objective as any natural feature of the world, yet they are undeniably human-made. This paper advances the thesis that institutions are not merely agreements layered atop individual cognition, but function as public cognitive scaffolding—durable collective structures that stabilize shared meanings, train attention, and pre-structure perception and agency. Bridging social ontology and cognitive science, the argument builds on constructivist theories of mind and society to show how “yesterday’s shared meanings” become materialized and entrenched as today’s taken-for-granted reality. Through a stepwise model of externalization, routinization, internalization, and enforcement, we illustrate how simple agreements grow into cognitive environments that shape what people notice, value, and do. Three case studies—money, law, and metrics—demonstrate how institutional scaffolds make certain ways of thinking easy and others nearly unthinkable, thereby engineering an intersubjective objectivity that can both empower and confine. Normative implications are drawn for the design of “healthy” institutions that balance stability with revisability. Objections concerning psychologism, relativism, and circularity are addressed, defending the view that institutional facts achieve their hardness through maintained intersubjective commitments. In conclusion, institutional objectivity is reconceived as engineered intersubjectivity under continuous maintenance, a perspective that opens new directions for understanding social reality as a cognitive ecosystem.

Human cognition does not passively mirror reality; it actively constructs a world through perception and social interaction. Using a cognitive constructivist framework, this paper investigates how shared reality and intersubjectivity emerge from dynamic processes of calibration between minds. We synthesize evidence from psychology (e.g. shared reality theory, conversational alignment), neuroscience (e.g. predictive coding, neural coupling), and systems theory to argue that perception and communication function as iterative model-building processes. Mechanisms such as mismatch detection, conversational repair, mutual monitoring, and institutionalization continually align individuals’ internal models via assimilation and accommodation. We show how feedback loops and error signals drive joint meaning-making, from moment-to-moment adjustments in dialogue to the crystallization of group beliefs. Philosophically, this constructivist perspective blurs the boundary between subjective and objective: what we take as “reality” is an adaptive, co-constructed model grounded in social agreement. We discuss the epistemological implications of viewing cognition as world-building rather than world-reflecting, and consider broader impacts on cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

This paper develops an extension of Existential Realism, a philosophical framework that distinguishes existence (what concretely is in the present moment) from reality (the broader causal–structural domain that includes past events, causal relations, informational traces, and structured future possibilities that are real but not presently existent). We synthesize core ideas from the original Existential Realism framework—ontological emergence, entanglement, temporal asymmetry, dimensional collapse, and the notion of a “dimensionless source”—and push them into new conceptual terrain. Time is placed at the heart of ontology: the present moment is the locus of existence, continually generating new actuality from prior reality. Past and future are real (with causal efficacy and structure) yet lack present existence. We explore how this two-tiered temporal ontology can accommodate key features of modern physics and metaphysics. In particular, we argue that ontological emergence at each moment provides a genuine arrow of time and a solution to the puzzle of how determinate events arise from an indeterminate backdrop. Quantum entanglement and nonlocal correlations, far from undermining a temporally oriented realism, instead hint at a deeper layer of unity “beneath” spacetime—a layer we articulate as a dimensionless source of reality. The dimensionless source is defined as a non-spatiotemporal relational structure encoding the informational constraints under which spatiotemporal events emerge through sequential actualization. It contains the informational constraints and lawful relations governing the generation of successive present states of the universe. We propose that spacetime and its separations emerge from this atemporal, aspatial ground, such that phenomena like entanglement and wavefunction collapse reveal the traces of a more fundamental order where spatial distance and temporal succession are secondary. Throughout, we connect these ideas to contemporary debates in quantum foundations (e.g. the measurement problem and objective collapse theories), philosophy of time (presentism, eternalism, and the reality of becoming), and speculative metaphysics (structural realism and process ontology). The result is a comprehensive, present-centered realist ontology that aims to reconcile the lived reality of time’s flow with the insights of modern physics, suggesting new avenues for understanding causality, identity, and agency in a dynamic universe.

Recent work in quantum gravity and quantum information theory has intensified a long-standing suspicion: relativistic spacetime may not be fundamental but an emergent, higher-level structure arising from deeper, non-geometric order. This paper develops the ontological implications of that suspicion within Existential Realism (ER), a present-centered framework that distinguishes existence (what is concretely present) from reality (the broader temporal-causal and informational structure that includes past traces and future-directed constraints). The central claim is conditional and methodological: if spacetime (and perhaps even temporal ordering) is emergent in the sense increasingly entertained across holography, tensor-network models, causal set theory, and other pre-geometric approaches, then ER’s own realism about temporal structure presses one step further: what grounds the structure of “reality” itself? In response, I propose a layered ontology in which ER’s reality is not the base layer but is grounded in an Ontic Meta-Origin (OMN): a non-spatiotemporal relational order that (i) instantiates no metric geometry, (ii) instantiates no definite temporal ordering, and (iii) nevertheless constrains the emergence of regimes that behave as spatiotemporal. The proposal is not offered as a new physical theory. It is offered as an ontological framework meant to be hospitable to multiple physical programs while clarifying the sense in which “pre-spatiotemporal” can be made coherent without smuggling in hidden geometry. The paper articulates (a) how dimension can be treated as a scaling property of relational organization, (b) why stable dimensional “phases” can be expected, and (c) what ER gains—conceptually and methodologically—by extending its ontology “downward” from existence → reality → Ontic Meta-Origin (OMN).

This paper critically evaluates Existential Realism (ER) by testing whether its distinctive ontology of present instantiation provides genuine explanatory advantages over block-based accounts of spacetime. Rather than asking whether ER is conceptually distinguishable from eternalism or structural realism, the analysis focuses on a stronger criterion: explanatory necessity. Five domains commonly invoked in debates about temporal ontology are examined as diagnostic tests—relativity, modal openness of the future, thermodynamic asymmetry, the ontological status of the past, quantum actualization, and temporal phenomenology. In each case the central question is whether ER explains the relevant phenomena more effectively than a block ontology supplemented with standard physical or probabilistic structure. The analysis finds that while ER offers a coherent framework that aligns naturally with certain intuitions about temporal becoming, its explanatory advantages remain unclear. Many of the phenomena ER aims to illuminate can be accounted for within block-based models without introducing additional ontological primitives. The result is not a refutation of ER but a reframing of the debate: the key challenge for ER is to demonstrate a domain in which the ontology of becoming delivers explanatory leverage that cannot be replicated by block ontology. Until such advantages are clearly articulated, the explanatory economy of block-based accounts remains a significant competing consideration.

This paper offers a contemporary reinterpretation of Plotinus’s doctrine of emanation by translating the metaphysical sequence One → Nous → Psyche into an ontological–phenomenological account of human experience. The Plotinean One is refigured as the Ontological Now: the immediate, objective presence of reality as experienced under maximal present-constraint, with minimal conceptual and narrative mediation. Nous is interpreted as the shared human archetype, encompassing biological, cognitive, and symbolic structures that universally organize perception and meaning. Psyche is understood as the narrative self, in which personal history, language, and cultural context generate an individualized sense of identity and a subject–object divide. By integrating insights from phenomenology, cognitive science, and depth psychology, the paper reframes emanation not as a supernatural cosmology but as a layered process of mediation through which presence becomes meaning and meaning becomes personal story. The analysis further explores the Plotinean return (epistrophē) as a phenomenological reversal: a movement of introspection and de-mediation that increases present-constraint, reducing narrative mediation within experience. This reinterpretation situates Plotinus within contemporary debates on consciousness and selfhood, suggesting that ontological grounding in the present has implications for metaphysics, psychology, and contemplative practice.

Cognitive constructivism holds that cognition is not a passive mirroring of the world but an active process of constructing internal models of reality. This paper explores proto-cognition—the earliest manifestations of cognitive processes in organisms lacking complex nervous systems—as the evolutionary foundation of that constructivist principle. Drawing on a comparative constructivist perspective, which distinguishes immediate sensory input from stored traces and anticipatory cues, we argue that even the simplest life forms engage in primitive “world-building” behaviors. From honeybees communicating abstract spatial information to slime molds solving mazes, simple organisms demonstrate environmental modeling, memory, and decision-making capacities once thought to require large brains. We review evidence across animals, plants, and microorganisms to reveal a deep continuity: the basic construction of a subjective world is a universal strategy of life, differing only in degree between bacteria and humans. Recognizing proto-cognition enriches cognitive constructivism by extending its scope down the evolutionary ladder. It underscores that cognition’s essence lies in actively structuring reality at all levels of complexity, and it challenges anthropocentric benchmarks that traditionally separated “intelligent” minds from mere biological reaction. We conclude that cognition should be viewed as a continuum emerging from life’s earliest adaptive responses, and we suggest integrating proto-cognitive phenomena into a multi-level constructivist theory of mind.