Teppo Eskelinen

This article applies the approach of utopian studies to analyse the potential extent and justifiable limits to democratic practice within workplaces. Democracy is approached as an ideal, unattainable as such but showing direction for change. It is also seen as a virtue of potentially all human communities, not limited to those currently recognised as political. Furthermore, democracy is taken as the norm for organisation, limitations to which need to be specifically justified. Being open to the existence of legitimate limitations and acknowledging that such limitations vary between different contexts, the approach therefore provides a basis for studying the legitimate extent of democracy. From this basis, a framework for analysing the extent of democratic practice is developed, based on the categories of the scope of democracy, inclusion, hierarchies, and participation. While this framework is relevant for analysing democratic practice in general, the article shows how it can be applied to the specific context of the workplace.

_The article discusses the meaning of “ethical” in the context of ethical goods. Terms like “ethical” or “responsible” have assumed new meanings when used to indicate the quality of a product or material. In the article, we analyse the transformed notion of “ethical”, its limits and extensions, using the case of cobalt mining and electronics as an illustrative example. As a non-substitutable material needed by the booming electronics industry and mined in horrendous conditions, the use of cobalt brings forth difficult questions about responsibility. We approach this question from the perspective of the meaning of “ethical” cobalt, and thereby ethical laptops. We use data collected in the context of a CSO project focused on “ethical laptops” and a literature review, and place this in the context of applied ethics. In conclusion, we show how the notion of “ethical products” is complicated by the various possible meanings of responsibility and difficult choices between disengagement from unethical practices and deeper engagement for changing these practices__._ _Keywords:_ Ethical trade, Global value chains; Ethical theory; Developing countries; Electronics; Stakeholders.

This paper offers an analysis of how normative theories on global poverty make assumptions regarding the geography of global poverty and global power constellations. I follow some recent global developments relevant to these assumptions, and ask whether normative theorizing should react to these developments. I argue that while accounts of global justice are not explicitly committed to any particular empirical ideas, the global justice discourse reflects the specific socioeconomic and geopolitical context in which it emerged, and that this context is currently giving way to a somewhat different reality. I suggest some preliminary starting points for a normative theory which would reflect the contemporary conditions more accurately. These starting points include shifting the focus of theorizing from relations between rich and poor countries to inequalities on various levels, and the notion of a complex institutional site of global justice.

The Millennium Development Goals were effective from 2000 to 2015. Statistics show that most of the goals were met, and particularly success in the goal of reducing extreme poverty gained wide recognition. Despite the strong ethical language related to poverty reduction, there has been little analysis of the ethical significance of the MDG achievements. Since statistical and ethical definitions and representations of poverty never completely overlap, conclusions concerning ethical progress are not directly available from the statistics. This article shows how this ethical significance can be analysed and what kinds of controversies and uncertainties relate to the issue. As part of this analysis, utilitarian issues, population ethics, and the social aspect of poverty are discussed. Keywords: poverty, Millennium Development Goals, statistics, ethics, poverty line

Most of the ethical literature on extreme poverty suggests, that some, if not most, of the incomes of the residents of rich countries ought to be donated to the global poor. Yet complying with this ethical demand becomes increasingly more difficult as the changes in lifestyle in the (post)industrial north demand ever more consumption in order to obtain the necessities for survival in such societies. In this article, I will discuss Peter Singer's famous arguments for the ethical duty to donate one's possessions, and elaborate the conception of needs prevalent in both Singer's theory and the theories of many of his critics. My argument is that we have to recognise a category of needs called 'social necessities' that are neither luxuries nor basic needs. This leads to two main conclusions: first, the space for ethical deliberation on whether to donate to life-saving purposes is socially conditioned; and second, ethical strategies of redistribution ought to be accompanied with institutional changes, which also concern the conditions in wealthy countries.

This article focuses in the allocation of financial risks from the viewpoint of social justice. In contemporary society, finance and the related risk allocation patterns have become highly important in determining the social positions of individuals. Yet it is somewhat unclear how ‘financial risks’ should be understood in normative theory and to what extent their allocation is a specific problem of justice. This article consists of a definition of this category and a typology of three different and distinctive perspectives to financial risks and social justice, out of which a synthesis is drawn. The contribution of the article is to propose a normative basis for a research programme on risks and justice in the society of high financialisation.

The matter of the nature of the duties of the rich to alleviate (and ideally, to abolish) suffering caused by extreme poverty has been widely debated in contemporary political philosophy and practical ethics. Typically, two questions are raised: first, do the rich have negative or positive duties; and second, on this basis, how should they act? In this paper, I will argue that the abolishment of extreme poverty cannot take place without a functional institutional structure in poor countries. Thus notions of distribution which merely refer to the duty of charitable giving, without taking into account the malfunctions of the existing institutional structure in the poor countries, potentially lead to recommending dysfunctional policies. This reality needs to be taken into account in political philosophy. Yet I also argue that, despite the importance of the institutional basis, the present global order allows and incentivizes harming the global poor. This is done exactly by affecting the (broadly understood) institutional structure of poor countries. To support this argument, I will analyse in detail Mathias Risse's argument against Thomas Pogge's notion of harming the global poor. I will show that while the basis of Risse's argument is correct, he fails to realize that his argument leads to quite similar conclusions about harming as Pogge's argument does.

This article focuses on the justification of taxation, in other words the principled rather than the technical aspect of taxation. We first show how democracy is on the one hand required for legitimate taxation, and how on the other hand democratic communities are dependent on taxation, and argue there is no vicious cirle. We then present a typology of ways of justifying taxation, according to which taxation can base its legitimacy on (1) meeting basic needs, (2) financing public goods, (3) redistribution, or (4) (dis-)incentivising certain types of conduct. We then discuss the applicability of each of these types of justification on the global level, arguing that all of them do apply to the global level. The article further concludes that different normative justifications guide us towards different designs of taxation in practice, so the background justification has to be made clear, especially when designing new taxation systems.

Modern society is characterised by the constant production, commodification, and distribution of risks, which has also become an increasingly important political issue. Given the commodification and the resulting distributability of risks, risks have become an issue of distributive justice instead of mere reason for precautionary concerns. This is particularly pronounced in the case of financial risks. In this article, we analyze how choices related to distributive justice inform the systems of risk distribution. Our main aim is to apply the Rawlsian notion of “division of moral labor” in the context of financial risks. By an analysis of the scope of financial risks, we will show that the libertarian choice of division of moral labour rests on an unnecessarily narrow idea of the scope of the distribution of risks.

In this article, I discuss the location of the sources of global poverty and injustice. I take it as granted that the members of the globally lowest income group live in unacceptable conditions and suffer from injustice. Yet the source of this injustice is a debatable question. Often the existing global institutions are seen as major causes behind this injustice. By taking the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations as a practical example, I aim to show that blaming the institutions as such can lead to misguided conclusions. The WTO, in fact, is quite just if one merely analyses its institutional structure. I argue that the major source of injustice are rather the prevailing power structures and the conduct of individual governments within this institutional framework, in other words the metaprocedural unfairness in the trade negotiations. I further argue that applications of Rawlsian theory of justice tend to be misleading at the global institutional level, as they focus disproportionately on the institutional structure, and tend to underestimate the relevance of the conduct of governments and the existing power structures, which allow powerful countries to use the institutional framework unjustly in their favour