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275A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional ObjectsGrazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1): 73-86. 1975.This paper explores the view that there are such things as (nonexistent) fictional objects, and that we refer to such objects when we say things like "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective", or "Conan Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes". A theory of such objects is developed as a special application of a Meinongian Ontology.
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Billingham and Buridan on the foundations of syllogistic reasoningIn Christoph Kann, Benedikt Löewe, Christian Rode & Sara Liana Uckelman (eds.), Modern views of medieval logic, Peeters. 2018.
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38 The Power of Medieval LogicIn Charles Bolyard & Rondo Keele (eds.), Later Medieval Metaphysics: Ontology, Language, and Logic, Fordham University Press. pp. 188-205. 2013.
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93A course in semanticsMIT Press. 2019.An introductory text in linguistic semantics, uniquely balancing empirical coverage and formalism with development of intuition and methodology. This introductory textbook in linguistic semantics for undergraduates features a unique balance between empirical coverage and formalism on the one hand and development of intuition and methodology on the other. It will equip students to form intuitions about a set of data, explain how well an analysis of the data accords with their intuitions, and exte…Read more
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47Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague (review)Journal of Philosophy 72 (7): 196-203. 1975.
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3Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics (review)Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207): 262-265. 2002.
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50A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional ObjectsGrazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1): 73-86. 1975.This paper explores the view that there are such things as (nonexistent) fictional objects, and that we refer to such objects when we say things like "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective", or "Conan Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes". A theory of such objects is developed as a special application of a Meinongian Ontology.
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21X*—Worldly Indeterminacy of IdentityProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1): 171-192. 1995.Terence Parsons, Peter Woodruff; X*—Worldly Indeterminacy of Identity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 171–192
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35Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond by Richard Routley (review)Journal of Philosophy 80 (3): 173-179. 1983.
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15Russell's Early Views on DenotingIn D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 17--44. 1988.
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178Frege's Hierarchies of Indirect Senses and the Paradox of AnalysisMidwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1): 37-58. 1981.
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47On the consistency of the first-order portion of Frege's logical systemNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (1): 161-168. 1987.
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258Bhartrhari on what cannot be saidPhilosophy East and West 51 (4): 525-534. 2001.Bhartṛhari claims that certain things cannot be signified--for example, the signification relation itself. Hans and Radhika Herzberger assert that Bhartṛhari's claim about signification can be validated by an appeal to twentieth-century results in set theory. This appeal is unpersuasive in establishing this view, but arguments akin to the semantic paradoxes (such as the "liar" paradox) come much closer. Unfortunately, these arguments are equally telling against another of his views: that the tha…Read more
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55Underlying states and time travelIn Achille Varzi, James Higginbotham & Fabio Pianesi (eds.), Speaking of Events, Oxford University Press. 2000.I begin by sketching a theory about the semantics of verbs in event sentences, and the evidence on which that theory is based. In the second section, I discuss the evidence for extending that theory to state sentences, including copulative sentences with adjectives and nouns; the evidence for this extension of the theory is not very good. In the third section, I discuss new evidence based on considerations of talk about time travel; that evidence is apparently quite good. I conclude with a probl…Read more
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10The Treatise on Univocation is an early work on the fallacy called univocation. This fallacy is a kind of ambiguity due to the shifted reference of words in a sentence when the ambiguity does not fall under the well-known Aristotelian kinds (equivocation, composition and division, . . .). Examples include the shift of reference of common terms due to tense and modality; e.g. the shift whereby the reference of 'giraffe' is extended to past or future giraffes when the tense of the sentence 'A gira…Read more
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14Meinong und die GegenstandstheorieGrazer Philosophische Studien 50 145-161. 1995.It is tempting to think that Meinong overlooked the "specific/nonspecific" distinction. For example, 'I am looking for a grey horse' may either mean that there is a specific horse I am looking for, or just that I am grey-horse-seeking. The former reading, and not the latter, requires for its truth that there be a grey horse. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether it is defensible to maintain Meinong's theory here: to take nonspecific reading of any verb concerning a possibly non-exi…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy |