Tero Tulenheimo

Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) var en av de allra främsta kyrkoledarna i stormaktstidens Sverige. Han innehade diverse positioner: professor i matematik, hebreiska och dogmatik i Uppsala, hovpredikant hos kung Gustaf II Adolf och biskop i Västerås. År 1610 öppnade han ett privatkollegium anslutet till Uppsala universitet. Kollegiet upphörde i maj 1613 när Rudbeckius lämnade universitetet. Under dess tre läsår skrevs sammanlagt 89 studerande in vid privatkollegiet. Det finns 35 tryckta dissertationer som försvarades av en privatkollegieelev under Rudbeckius presidium. Av dessa ventilerades 32 i privatkollegiet och tre vid universitetet. Några studenter försvarade flera dissertationer. Antalet respondenter till de nämnda 35 dissertationerna var 29. I föreliggande artikel presenterar jag systematiskt biografisk information om dessa 29 personer. Fokus ligger på deras akademiska studier, släktförhållanden och sociala relationer. Respondenters dedikationer i dissertationer utgör en viktig källa till information som annars skulle vara svår att fånga.

The Swedish Lutheran theologian and bishop Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) formulated twelve arguments for the immortality of the soul in two distinct but interrelated dissertations, De animae immortalitate and Propositiones de animae humanae immortalitate, debated respectively in November 1611 in Uppsala and in September 1626 in Västerås. I present the arguments and discuss them critically. Further, I demonstrate that Rudbeckius’s source for his discussion is the commentary on Aristotle’s De anima written by the Jesuit philosopher and theologian Franciscus Toletus (1532–1596), first published in Venice in 1574. Finally, I take up a dissertation authored by Rudbeckius’s student Olaus Gabrielis Felstadius (ca 1590 – ca 1620), De origine et immortalitate animae, debated in June 1611 in Uppsala. Felstadius’s treatment is also shown to be dependent on Toletus’s commentary.

I discuss the views on logic held by three early Nordic neo-Aristotelians — the Swedes Johannes Canuti Lenaeus (1573–1669) and Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646), and the Dane Caspar Bartholin (1585–1629). They all studied in Wittenberg (enrolled respectively in 1597, 1601, and 1604) and were exponents of protestant (Lutheran) scholasticism. The works I utilize are Janitores logici bini (1607) and Enchiridion logicum (1608) by Bartholin; Logica (1625) and Controversiae logices (1629) by Rudbeckius; and Logica peripatetica (1633) by Lenaeus. Rudbeckius’s and Lenaeus’s books were published much later than they were prepared. Rudbeckius wrote the first versions of his books in 1606, and the material for Lenaeus’s book had been prepared by 1607. Bartholin calls the treatment of the nature of logic the “first doorkeeper of logic”. To compare the views of the three neo-Aristotelians on this topic, I systematically investigate what they have to say about second notions, the subject of logic, the internal and external goal of logic, and the definition of logic. I also compare their approaches with those of Jacob Martini (teacher of Rudbeckius and Bartholin) and Iacopo Zabarella (an intellectual predecessor of all three).

The Swedish Lutheran theologian and bishop Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) formulated twelve arguments for the immortality of the soul in two distinct but interrelated dissertations, De animae immortalitate and Propositiones de animae humanae immortalitate, debated respectively in November 1611 in Uppsala and in September 1626 in Västerås. I present the arguments and discuss them critically. Further, I demonstrate that Rudbeckius’s source for his discussion is the commentary on Aristotle’s De anima written by the Jesuit philosopher and theologian Franciscus Toletus (1532–1596), first published in Venice in 1574. Finally, I take up a dissertation authored by Rudbeckius’s student Olaus Gabrielis Felstadius (ca 1590 – ca 1620), De origine et immortalitate animae, debated in June 1611 in Uppsala. Felstadius’s treatment is also shown to be dependent on Toletus’s commentary.

The democratic decision-making method determines a collective decision on the basis of individual votes of all adult citizens, each vote having the same weight. Jason Brennan (2016) argues that the decisions of individual voters in state-level elections tend to be epistemically defective (avoidance of serious knowledge-acquisition, biased reasoning) and maintains that voters are rational in not doing anything about it, since reducing one's epistemic defects would not augment the chances of one's vote becoming decisive. Yet, incompetently made collective decisions can hardly provide a good means for attaining the outcomes that citizens desire. Democracy appears to fail as an instrument. We ask whether the problems that Brennan identifies occur even in small municipalities. We argue for a negative answer, making use of insights gained through interviews conducted in municipalities with 300 to 500 inhabitants situated in the Åland Islands. Here, a single vote can be decisive. When voting, the inhabitants wish to delegate municipality-political responsibility to someone they trust. They do not reason in terms of society-level outcomes; due to limited resources, the elected representatives even could not undertake any large-scale initiatives. There is very little electoral competition, but inhabitants can contribute to decision-making in many ways. There prevails a balance between democratic participation and informed decision-making. The equilibrium could easily break down: smaller population size would lead to dysfunctionality, augmenting the size might affect negatively the trust between decision-makers and inhabitants, and increased resources could lead to decisions the inhabitants could not control.

In two interdependent dissertations published in 1611 and 1621, the Swedish theologian and bishop Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) takes up the question of whether the world is eternal. He formulates a number of alternative philosophical arguments in order to justify a negative answer. Without noticing this, he employs two mutually independent notions of eternity. I comment on five of Rudbeckius’s arguments from a systematic point of view. The arguments make use of explicit reasoning about infinite cardinalities, including the use of explicit assumptions regarding arithmetic operations applied to infinite quantities. It is observed that each argument has its origin in medieval scholastic philosophy or is adapted from texts written by Roman authors. The affinity of Rudbeckius’s approach to the scholastic tradition gets highlighted: he is convinced that reason and revelation are not mutually exclusive sources of knowledge: certain theologically relevant propositions can even be proven by philosophical arguments.

My framework offers a novel semantic analysis of sentences that ascribe to an agent a mental state having an intentional object. Making use of the analysis of intentional states presented in Sect. 4.7, I discern in Sect. 6.2 four senses of the notion of intentional object and indicate how mental states involving different types of objects of thought can be uniformly represented in my semantic framework: propositional thoughts, plural thoughts, thoughts with an indeterminate object, singular thoughts, and thoughts representing specific physical objects.

Elizabeth Anscombe took there to be three salient features of intentional objects: indeterminacy, sensitivity to the way in which they are described, and possible non-existence [1, pp. 159, 161, 171]. Relatedly, Tim Crane speaks of accuracy, aspect, and absence as features of intentional states [18, pp. 455–6]. In Edmund Husserl’s theory of intentional relations, these or similar features have been termed indeterminacy of characterization, conception-dependence, and existence-independence of intentional relations; cf. [113, pp. 11–7].

Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) var en av de främsta kyrkoledarna i stormaktstidens Sverige. Under studietiden i Wittenberg influerades han av ”luthersk skolastik”, enligt vilken förnuft och uppenbarelse är förenliga som kunskapskällor och logik är ett instrument för teologi. I boken visar Tero Tulenheimo hur Rudbeckius lade vikt vid logik som stöddisciplin för teologi. Inledningsvis behandlas frågan om omfattningen av Rudbeckius teologiska produktion. Här argumenterar Tulenheimo emot Bengt Hägglunds tes, enligt vilken Rudbeckius skulle ha författat en viktig opublicerad handskrift om dogmatik. Med hänvisning till Rudbeckius publicerade dissertationer lyfter Tulenheimo fram Rudbeckius reflektioner över språkanvändning, diskussion om förnuftsargument för uppenbarelsesanningar samt begreppsanalytiska frågeställningar.

In 1992, Bengt Hägglund put forward a thesis according to which a codex in his possession is based on material Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) authored in 1611, maintaining that the codex gives us information about Rudbeckius's lectures on _loci theologici_ in Uppsala during the years 1611–1613 and that it reveals to us characteristic features of Rudbeckius's thinking about dogmatics. Hägglund published the codex in 2001. I point out, first, weaknesses in Hägglund's argumentation. Second, I present indirect evidence against his thesis employing the two series of Rudbeckius's published dissertations on dogmatics (1611–1613, 1620–1644) and his own comments about his lectures. Third, I indicate that three parts of the codex that are particularly important for Hägglund's argumentation stem from other authors: the introductory part on the nature of theo­logy, as well as the chapter on _locus de ecclesia_, have their origin in Jesper Brochmand's _Universae theologiae systema_ (1633), while the conclusion is taken from a dissertation that Balthasar Meisner published in 1614. The codex does not allow us to access a work Rudbeckius would have authored in 1611: it contains too many parts he cannot have authored then. In particular, the introduction and the conclusion of the codex do not tell us anything about Rudbeckius's characteristic thoughts on dogmatics. Hägglund's main reason for thinking that the codex is a transcript of Rudbeckius's work from 1611 is a date mentioned at the end of locus of the church. As it happens, this locus is borrowed from Brochmand, not from Rudbeckius.

We take up Jason Brennan’s critique of democracy as formulated in his monograph _Against Democracy_ (2016) and discuss the arguments that Åsa Wikforss presents against Brennan’s views in her book _Därför demokrati_ (2021). Both authors grant the importance of knowledge for political decision-making, but they differ in their respective understandings of what counts as knowledge and they draw very different conclusions from the relevant knowledge requirement. Our general aim is to detect problems in democracy as well as in attempts to criticize democracy. We also briefly consider Brennan’s positive proposal to replace democracy by “epistocracy”, a form of government according to which only those citizens are entitled to vote who are “competent” in a sense to be discussed. Our aim is not to propagate any particular form of government. We merely wish to help the reader to recognize that democracy in particular involves a whole lot of assumptions that are in need of a better justification than what is normally provided.

I discuss the views on logic held by three early Nordic neo-Aristotelians — the Swedes Johannes Canuti Lenaeus (1573–1669) and Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646), and the Dane Caspar Bartholin (1585–1629). They all studied in Wittenberg (enrolled respectively in 1597, 1601, and 1604) and were exponents of protestant (Lutheran) scholasticism. The works I utilize are Janitores logici bini (1607) and Enchiridion logicum (1608) by Bartholin; Logica (1625) and Controversiae logices (1629) by Rudbeckius; and Logica peripatetica (1633) by Lenaeus. Rudbeckius’s and Lenaeus’s books were published much later than they were prepared. Rudbeckius wrote the first versions of his books in 1606, and the material for Lenaeus’s book had been prepared by 1607. Bartholin calls the treatment of the nature of logic the “first doorkeeper of logic”. To compare the views of the three neo-Aristotelians on this topic, I systematically investigate what they have to say about second notions, the subject of logic, the internal and external goal of logic, and the definition of logic. I also compare their approaches with those of Jacob Martini (teacher of Rudbeckius and Bartholin) and Iacopo Zabarella (an intellectual predecessor of all three).

In this article, I present a formal semantic framework that renders explicit how to reconcile the condition that a proposition about a contingent future event is true at a moment t0 with the idea that at t0, this proposition is ‘truth-maker indeterminate’: a state of affairs making it true will obtain later on, though no such state of affairs obtains at t0. The semantics I formulate employs ‘open temporal models’. They represent the passage of time by a specific component termed time-resource, which acts on durations construed as model-external inputs. A model does not by itself specify which course of events gets actualized in a given duration depending on the latest moment that has already got actualized. A time-resource merely represents schematically the dependence between a moment t and a course of events that gets actualized in a time-span of a given length counted from t; until that much time has indeed passed, it is not fixed which course of events actually extends t. Further, I introduce evaluations as a fine-grained tool for studying truth-conditions of tensed formulas, and I use this tool to define the notion of truth-maker. I define what it means that a truth-maker will obtain but does not, and what it means for a truth-maker to be determinate. It is proven that my semantic analysis retains the desirable link between determinacy and historical necessity—namely, a truth-maker of a proposition being determinate entails that the proposition is historically necessary.

I argue that the semantics of sentences expressing future contingent propositions is best viewed as being based on a clear distinction between a time at which a proposition is true and a time at which a state of affairs that makes it true gets actualized. That a prediction is true here and now means that its truth-maker gets actualized later. This is not to say that if a contingent proposition p concerning the future is true at t, it acquires the truth-value true at t only retrospectively, at a later moment. Nor must this be seen as suggesting that it is a settled, unpreventable fact at t that p is true at t. It just means that the reason for its present truth is something that happens later on: the future happens to evolve in such a way as to make a truth-maker of p obtain. In this case, then, it can be said that at t, p is truth-maker indeterminate, or that it has an indeterminate truth-maker. I develop a formal semantics based on this analysis in the follow-up article ‘A Formal Framework for Future Contingents’. Here, I lay down the conceptual framework and indicate Boethius and Abelard as precursors of the view I wish to defend.

This book develops a novel generalization of possible world semantics, called ‘world line semantics’, which recognizes worlds and links between world-bound objects (world lines) as mutually independent aspects of modal semantics. Addressing a wide range of questions vital for contemporary debates in logic and philosophy of language and offering new tools for theoretical linguistics and knowledge representation, the book proposes a radically new paradigm in modal semantics. This framework is motivated philosophically, viewing a structure of world lines as a precondition of modal talk. The author provides a uniform analysis of quantification over individuals (physical objects) and objects of thought (intentional objects). The semantic account of what it means to speak of intentional objects throws new light on accounts of intentionality and singular thought in the philosophy of mind and offers novel insights into the semantics of intensional transitive verbs.

Johannes Rudbeckius, one of Sweden’s most influential figures in theology, pedagogy, and church-state relations in the 17th century, published two books on logic: Logica ex optimis et præstantissimis autoribus collecta & conscripta and Controversiæ logices vel potius earum epitome. In this paper, I present and critically discuss Rudbeckius’s view on the nature of logic as it can be reconstructed from these two works. This requires, in particular, identifying the larger intellectual framework within which Rudbeckius operated. The single most important philosopher having affected Rudbeckius’s ideas on logic is Jacopo Zabarella, which leads me to consider at some length the views on logic that Zabarella puts forward in his De Natura Logicæ.

Propono hic conversionem in linguam Anglicam conclusionis Collegii Logici, anno 1608–1609 semestri studiorum spatio hiberno a Johanne Rudbeckio Wittenbergæ habiti. Hic commentarius prooemium in conversionem est. Rudbeckius primus Suecus erat, qui librum didacticum de logica publicavit. Maiorem partem libri iam anno 1606 scripserat, cum Mathesis Professor Upsaliensis esset, sed Logica ex optimis et præstantissimis autoribus collecta & conscripta non ante annum 1625 edita sit. Cum Johanne Canuti Lenæo, collega suo, Rudbeckius primas partes agebat in inducenda in Sueciam scholastica Lutherana, cuius rei scopus defensio erat fidei Lutheranæ per logicam et metaphysicam Aristotelicam. In primo capite condiciones conclusionis Rudbeckii commentor. Secundum caput brevem Rudbeckii vitæ descriptionem offert. Tertium quartumque capita de scripto converso et de ipsa conversione observationes quasdam continent.This note is an introduction to the English translation of the concluding speech of the Collegium Logicum that Johannes Rudbeckius taught in Wittenberg during the winter semester 1608–1609. Rudbeckius was the first Swede to publish a textbook on logic; his Logica ex optimis et præstantissimis autoribus collecta & conscripta appeared in 1625. The first version of the textbook was completed already in 1606 when Rudbeckius was professor of mathematics at Uppsala University in Sweden. Together with his colleague Johannes Canuti Lenæus, Rudbeckius played a key role in the introduction of Lutheran scholasticism in Sweden; this was a movement within the Lutheran Church whose aim was to defend the Lutheran faith by making use of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics. In Section 1, I comment on the context of Rudbeckius’s discourse. Section 2 offers a short biography of Rudbeckius. Sections 3 and 4 contain, respectively, some remarks about the text translated and about the translation itself.

The present paper provides novel results on the model theory of Independence friendly modal logic. We concentrate on its particularly well-behaved fragment that was introduced in Tulenheimo and Sevenster (Advances in Modal Logic, 2006). Here we refer to this fragment as ‘Simple IF modal logic’ (IFML s ). A model-theoretic criterion is presented which serves to tell when a formula of IFML s is not equivalent to any formula of basic modal logic (ML). We generalize the notion of bisimulation familiar from ML; the resulting asymmetric simulation concept is used to prove that IFML s is not closed under complementation. In fact we obtain a much stronger result: the only IFML s formulas admitting their classical negation to be expressed in IFML s itself are those whose truth-condition is in fact expressible in ML

When discussing knowledge, two relations are of interest: justified doxastic accessibility \ , she is in \ ) and justification equivalence \ exactly the same justified beliefs that she has in \ ). Speaking of compatibility with the agent’s justified beliefs is potentially ambiguous: either of the two relations \ or \ can be meant. I discuss the possibility of identifying the relation of epistemic accessibility \ , she is in \ ) with the union of \ and \ . Neither Gettier’s examples nor the ‘fake barn’ cases contradict this identification. However, the proposal leads to justification equivalent scenarios being symmetric with respect to knowledge: we cannot know a true proposition in a scenario if it is false in a justification equivalent scenario. This analysis may appear to render non-trivial knowledge impossible. This conclusion follows if the extra premise is granted that for all relevant true propositions there is a justification equivalent scenario in which the proposition is false. I provide a meaning-theoretic argument against this premise. I conclude by pointing out problems that would ensue from giving up the proposed connection between \ , \ and \ and allowing asymmetry of justification equivalent scenarios relative to knowledge

Typical applications of Hintikka’s game-theoretical semantics give rise to semantic attributes—truth, falsity—expressible in the $\Sigma^{1}_{1}$-fragment of second-order logic. Actually a much more general notion of semantic attribute is motivated by strategic considerations. When identifying such a generalization, the notion of classical negation plays a crucial role. We study two languages, $L_{1}$ and $L_{2}$, in both of which two negation signs are available: $\rightharpoondown $ and $\sim$. The latter is the usual GTS negation which transposes the players’ roles, while the former will be interpreted via the notion of mode. Logic $L_{1}$ extends independence-friendly logic; $\rightharpoondown $ behaves as classical negation in $L_{1}$. Logic $L_{2}$ extends $L_{1}$, and it is shown to capture the $\Sigma^{2}_{1}$-fragment of third-order logic. Consequently the classical negation remains inexpressible in $L_{2}$