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Terrance A. Tomkow

Cambridge University
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  •  Publications
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Cambridge University
Faculty of Philosophy
PhD, 1977
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  • All publications (18)
  •  1047
    Causation
    with Kadri Vihvelin
    Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologically independent facts and C is a necessary part of a nomologically sufficient condition for E. The analysis is applied to problems of overdetermination, preemption, trumping, intransitivity, switching, and double prevention. Preventing and allowing are defined and distinguished from causing. The analysis explains the direction of causation in terms of the logical form of dynamic laws. Even in a univ…Read more
    Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologically independent facts and C is a necessary part of a nomologically sufficient condition for E. The analysis is applied to problems of overdetermination, preemption, trumping, intransitivity, switching, and double prevention. Preventing and allowing are defined and distinguished from causing. The analysis explains the direction of causation in terms of the logical form of dynamic laws. Even in a universe that is deterministic in both temporal directions, not every fact must have a cause and present facts may have no future causes.
    The Direction of CausationCausal RelataNomological Theories of Causation
  •  139
    The Dif
    Journal of Philosophy 102 (4): 183-205. 2005.
  •  1530
    The Temporal Asymmetry of Counterfactuals
    with Kadri Vihvelin
    Possible-World Theories of CounterfactualsCounterfactual Theories of CausationPhilosophy of Time, Mi…Read more
    Possible-World Theories of CounterfactualsCounterfactual Theories of CausationPhilosophy of Time, MiscDavid Lewis
  •  56
    The Computational Theory of the Laws of Nature
    A new account of the of the laws of nature based upon Algorithmic Information Theory.
  •  67
    Computational Metaphysics
    Introduces 'Turing Worlds' as a device for thinking about Metaphysical Problems and uses them to examine several different theories of counter-factuals.
    Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology
  •  211
    The dif
    with Kadri Vihvelin
    Journal of Philosophy 103 (4): 183-205. 2006.
  •  122
    The Retributive Theory of Property
    A new theory of property.
    Self-OwnershipOriginal AppropriationThe Concept of RightsProperty Rights, Misc
  •  55
    A Few Short Steps to the Gallows
    Our justification for punishing the wrong doer is not that we are enacting God-like retribution. Neither do we have to argue that inflicting the punishment will make any person, living or dead, happier or better off. We punish to keep a promise to the victims: a promise made before they were victims, a promise they were entitled to ask for; that we were entitled to give and that we are now obliged to honor.
  •  66
    The Good, The Bad and Peter Singer
    There are no positive moral duties.
    SupererogationConsequentialism and Deontology
  •  643
    Counterfactuals: The Short Course
    with Kadri Vihvelin
    Possible-World Theories of CounterfactualsSymmetry in PhysicsMetaphysics, MiscellaneousThe Direction…Read more
    Possible-World Theories of CounterfactualsSymmetry in PhysicsMetaphysics, MiscellaneousThe Direction of Time
  •  118
    The Simple Theory of Counterfactuals
    The standard account of counterfactuals that most philosophers endorse—Lewis's 'Analysis 1' — is wrong. The correct theory is one invented by Jonathan Bennett in 1984 which he called 'The Simple Theory'. Bennett later argued himself out of that theory and went on to champion the standard account. But those arguments fail. The Simple Theory has been right all along.
    David LewisCounterfactual Theories of CausationMetaphysics, General WorksPossible World Semantics
  •  99
    Blackburn, Truth and other Hot Topics
    Quine taught us that the collapse of positivism entails that empirical theories are, in principle, undetermined-- not just by the available evidence-- but by all possible evidence. Without disputing that conclusion, contemporary philosophers-- exampled here by Simon Blackburn and Jerry Fodor-- have wanted to treat this as a merely abstract possibility that need not undermine our confidence in actual scientific theory and practice. I argue that there is no basis for this complacency.
    Scientific Realism, MiscFalsification
  • What is Grammar?
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 6 (n/a): 61. 1980.
  •  111
    Determinism
    with Kadri Vihvelin
    Determinism
  •  692
    Now, Me.
    Philosophy of Mind, MiscThe Nature of Belief
  •  153
    Computation, Laws and Supervenience
    The Computational Theory of the Laws of Nature entails that the accessibility relation for nomological necessity is not symmetric or transitive. This means that nomologically possible worlds need not share our world's laws. This subverts a standard style of argument against Humean Supervenience.
    Humeanism and Nonhumeanism about LawsNomological Necessity
  •  48
    What is Grammar?
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (sup1): 61-82. 1980.
    While there is agreement that it is the central task of semantics to give the semantic interpretation of every sentence in the language, nowhere in the linguistic literature will one find, so far as I know, a straightforward account of how a theory performs this task, or how to tell when it has been accomplished. The contrast with syntax is striking. The main Job of a modest syntax is to characterizemeaningfulness. We may have as much confidence in the correctness of such a characterization as w…Read more
    While there is agreement that it is the central task of semantics to give the semantic interpretation of every sentence in the language, nowhere in the linguistic literature will one find, so far as I know, a straightforward account of how a theory performs this task, or how to tell when it has been accomplished. The contrast with syntax is striking. The main Job of a modest syntax is to characterizemeaningfulness. We may have as much confidence in the correctness of such a characterization as we have in the representativeness of our sample and our ability to say when particular expressions are meaningful. What clear and analogous task and test exist for semantics?
  •  113
    Self Defense
    If there are rights there is surely a right to self-defense. But self-defense has proved very puzzling to rights theorists. The central puzzle has been called the "paradox of self-defense": If our right not to be harmed gives rise to our right to fight back, what happens to the attacker's right not to be harmed when the defender fights back? If the attacker somehow forfeits his right to self-defense because he is a bad actor, what do we say about innocent threats? I argue that these problems…Read more
    If there are rights there is surely a right to self-defense. But self-defense has proved very puzzling to rights theorists. The central puzzle has been called the "paradox of self-defense": If our right not to be harmed gives rise to our right to fight back, what happens to the attacker's right not to be harmed when the defender fights back? If the attacker somehow forfeits his right to self-defense because he is a bad actor, what do we say about innocent threats? I argue that these problems stem from a confusion about the nature of rights.
    Normative Ethics, General WorksThe Concept of RightsEthics, General WorksThe Basis of Rights, Misc
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