Thanassis Gkatzaras

In this paper I examine Socrates’ argument that presupposes an audience familiar with Forms and explains why the sight-lovers are not philosophers. It is divided into three parts: the first part (476a1–6) shows why each Form is one in number; the second part (476a6–9) distinguishes Forms from their sensible appearances; and the third part (476a10–d6) draws an analogy between philosophers – people being awake and sight-lovers – people being asleep. Remarkably, the argument works only for opposites, which are mistakenly identified by the sight-lovers with sensible things. Also in this paper I suggest an alternative interpretation of the so-called ‘Two Worlds Theory’ which is based on the distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion.

Plato’s argument in Rep. 5, 477c1-478a6, proves that knowledge (epistēmē) is a power different from opinion (doxa), and their objects are different in kind, too. This claim by itself would probably have been rejected by the so-called ‘sight-lovers’, i.e. people who deny the existence of Forms, so the argument uses premises that the sight-lovers would admit as true and self-evident, in order to convince them. My paper engages in the debate concerning the appropriate reading of these premises, and explains why the sight-lovers should accept something they previously would not.

In this paper I examine Socrates’ argument that presupposes an audience familiar with Forms and explains why the sight-lovers are not philosophers. It is divided into three parts: the first part (476a1–6) shows why each Form is one in number; the second part (476a6–9) distinguishes Forms from their sensible appearances; and the third part (476a10–d6) draws an analogy between philosophers – people being awake and sight-lovers – people being asleep. Remarkably, the argument works only for opposites, which are mistakenly identified by the sight-lovers with sensible things. Also in this paper I suggest an alternative interpretation of the so-called ‘Two Worlds Theory’ which is based on the distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion.

This paper questions the traditional interpretation of Plato’s Republic 515a5. When Socrates claims that the prisoners in the simile of the Cave are ‘like us’, he does not imply any sort of similarity or analogy between their cognitive state and ours. Rather, I argue he says that we should imagine a cave inhabited by ordinary human beings, instead of some fictitious creatures. Among other things, Plato’s intent is to highlight the weakness of our human nature in both parts of the simile. Consequently, concerning someone’s chance to become true philosopher, Plato’s view is quite pessimistic.

The subject of my paper is the explanation of Plato’s attitude in Republic on three lines taken from Odyssey (11.489-91). In one case (386c5-7) Plato rejects these lines, because they should not be heard by children or free men, while in another case (516d4-7) he repeats them as a perfect example of illustrating philosopher’s feelings. My purpose is to show that this attitude is not ambiguous; it is compatible with Plato’s doctrines and a good example of the importance that the context plays whenever Plato interprets a poem.

The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that the Form of the Good (as we know it from the Republic) is still present in the Timaeus and is ontologically independent from the Demiurge and his Paradigm. This claim is supported by selected passages from Timaeus’ text, but it is also based on Phaedo’s theory of causation and on the simile of the sun in Republic. It is also highlighted after a detailed comparison between the philosopher-kings and the Demiurge, and after the emergence of their striking similarities.