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541Verstehen, einfhlen and mental simulation: Reply to Anne Rugh MackorIn Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Rodopi Ny. pp. 263-267. 2005.
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254Structures in scientific cognition: A synopsis of structures in science. Heuristic patterns based on cognitive structures. An advanced textbook in neo-classical philosophy of sciencePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 23-92. 2005.The philosophy of science has lost its self-confidence. Structures in Science (2001) is an advanced textbook that explicates, updates and integrates the best insights of logical empiricism and its main critics. This "neo-classical approach" aims at providing heuristic patterns for research.The book introduces four ideal types of research programs (descriptive, explanatory, design and explicative) and reanimates the distinction between observational laws and proper theories without assuming a the…Read more
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241Beauty, a road to the truthSynthese 131 (3): 291-328. 2002.In this article I give a naturalistic-cum-formal analysis of therelation between beauty, empirical success, and truth. The analysis is based on the onehand on a hypothetical variant of the so-called `mere-exposure effect'' which has been more orless established in experimental psychology regarding exposure-affect relationshipsin general and aesthetic appreciation in particular (Zajonc 1968; Temme 1983; Bornstein 1989;Ye 2000). On the other hand it is based on the formal theory of truthlikeness a…Read more
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227Abduction aiming at empirical progress or even truth approximation leading to a challenge for computational modellingFoundations of Science 4 (3): 307-323. 1999.This paper primarily deals with theconceptual prospects for generalizing the aim ofabduction from the standard one of explainingsurprising or anomalous observations to that ofempirical progress or even truth approximation. Itturns out that the main abduction task then becomesthe instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming atan empirically more successful theory, relative to theavailable data, but not necessarily compatible withthem. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress aswell as obse…Read more
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200The threefold evaluation of theories: A synopsis of from instrumentalism to constructive realism. On some relations between confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation (2000)Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 23-85. 2005.Surprisingly enough, modified versions of the confirmation theory of Carnap and Hempel and the truth approximation theory of Popper turn out to be smoothly synthesizable. The glue between confirmation and truth approximation appears to be the instrumentalist methodology, rather than the falsificationist one.By evaluating theories separately and comparatively in terms of their successes and problems (hence even if they are already falsified), the instrumentalist methodology provides – both in the…Read more
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185Logic in service of philosophy of science: Reply to Isabella Burger and Johannes HeidemaPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 489-492. 2005.
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165A realist partner for Linda: confirming a theoretical hypothesis more than its observational sub-hypothesisSynthese 184 (1): 63-71. 2012.It is argued that the conjunction effect has a disjunctive analog of strong interest for the realism–antirealism debate. It is possible that a proper theory is more confirmed than its (more probable) observational sub-theory and hence than the latter’s disjunctive equivalent, i.e., the disjunction of all proper theories that are empirically equivalent to the given one. This is illustrated by a toy model
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164Qualitative and quantitative inference to the best theory: Reply to Ilkka NiiniluotoPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 276-280. 2005.
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159Naive and refined truth approximationSynthese 93 (3). 1992.The naive structuralist definition of truthlikeness is an idealization in the sense that it assumes that all mistaken models of a theory are equally bad. The natural concretization is a refined definition based on an underlying notion of structurelikeness.In Section 1 the naive definition of truthlikeness of theories is presented, using a new conceptual justification, in terms of instantial and explanatory mistakes.
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152Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theoriesSynthese 190 (16): 3307-3324. 2013.In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on “nomic conjunctive theories”, i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion…Read more
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144An erotetic approach to explanation by specificationErkenntnis 40 (3). 1994.In earlier publications of the first author it was shown that intentional explanation of actions, functional explanation of biological traits and causal explanation of abnormal events share a common structure. They are called explanation by specification (of a goal, a biological function, an abnormal causal factor, respectively) as opposed to explanation by subsumption under a law. Explanation by specification is guided by a schematic train of thought, of which the argumentative steps not concer…Read more
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143A generalization of Carnap's inductive logicSynthese 25 (3-4). 1973.In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
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132Non-inductive explication of two inductive intuitionsBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (3): 209-223. 1983.In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
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131The dual foundation of qualitative truth approximationErkenntnis 47 (2): 145-179. 1997.The main formal notion involved in qualitative truth approximation by the HD-method, viz. ‘more truthlike’, is shown to not only have, by its definition, an intuitively appealing ‘model foundation’, but also, at least partially, a conceptually plausible ‘consequence foundation’. Moreover, combining the relevant parts of both leads to a very appealing ‘dual foundation’, the more so since the relevant methodological notions, viz. ‘more successful’ and its ingredients provided by the HD-method, can…Read more
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130Approaching descriptive and theoretical truthErkenntnis 18 (3). 1982.In this article I give a naturalistic-cum-formal analysis of the relation between beauty, empirical success, and truth. The analysis is based on the one hand on a hypothetical variant of the so-called 'mere-exposure effect' which has been more or less established in experimental psychology regarding exposure-affect relationships in general and aesthetic appreciation in particular (Zajonc 1968; Temme 1983; Bornstein 1989; (Ye 2000). On the other hand it is based on the formal theory of truthliken…Read more
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98The periodic table — its formalization, status, and relation to atomic theoryErkenntnis 28 (3): 387-408. 1988.
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97The instrumentalist abduction task and the nature of empirical counterexamples: Reply to Atocha AlisedaPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 190-192. 2005.This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for generalizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation. It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress as we…Read more
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96Some estimates of the optimum inductive methodErkenntnis 24 (1). 1986.In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
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95How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed HypothesesPhilosophy of Science 76 (1): 1-21. 2009.Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence
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93Another start for abduction aiming at empirical progress: Reply to joke MeheusPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 218-220. 2005.This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for generalizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation. It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress as we…Read more
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89Empirical progress and truth approximation by the 'hypothetico-probabilistic method'Erkenntnis 70 (3). 2009.Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic (HP-) method’, in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional…Read more
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86How to confirm the disconfirmed. On conjunction fallacies and robust confirmationPhilosophy of Science 76 (1): 1-21. 2009.Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for nine different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
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85Two types of inductive analogy by similarityErkenntnis 21 (1). 1984.In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
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84Comparative versus quantitative truthlikeness definitions: Reply to Thomas Mormann (review)Erkenntnis 47 (2): 187-192. 1997.
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84Basic and Refined Nomic Truth Approximation by Evidence-Guided Belief Revision in AGM-TermsErkenntnis 75 (2): 223-236. 2011.Straightforward theory revision, taking into account as effectively as possible the established nomic possibilities and, on their basis induced empirical laws, is conducive for (unstratified) nomic truth approximation. The question this paper asks is: is it possible to reconstruct the relevant theory revision steps, on the basis of incoming evidence, in AGM-terms? A positive answer will be given in two rounds, first for the case in which the initial theory is compatible with the established empi…Read more
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64A coherent trio of, distance and size based, measures for nomic and actual truthlikenessSynthese 201 (2): 1-31. 2023.So far, the most prominent measure for actual truthlikeness, i.e. the likeness of a theory to the actual truth, is Ilkka Niiniluoto’s minsum definition, which is purely based on distances. A competing definition is the average distance measure proposed by Pavel Tichy and Graham Oddie. We will define three related, distance and size based, measures for actual truthlikeness and compare them with the two well-known options. However, we will start, Sect. 2, from a trio of such measures for nomic tru…Read more
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64Introduction and OverviewErkenntnis 75 (2): 151-163. 2011.Introduction and Overview Content Type Journal Article Category Introduction Pages 151-163 DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9288-9 Authors Theo Kuipers, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands Gerhard Schurz, Department of Philosophy, University of Duesseldorf, Universitaetsstrasse 1, Geb. 23.21, 40225 Duesseldorf, Germany Journal Erkenntnis Online ISSN 1572-8420 Print ISSN 0165-0106 Journal Volume Volume 75 Journal Issue Volume 75, Number 2
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59What is Closer-to-the-truth?: A Parade of Approaches to Truthlikeness (edited book)Rodopi. 1987.INTRODUCTION When Karl Popper published in' his definition of closer-to-the- truth this was an important intellectual event, but not a shocking one. ...
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56What is the best empirically equivalent theory?: Reply to Igor DouvenPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 310-313. 2005.