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236Reasons, concerns, and necessityEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1): 75-87. 2005.This articles concerns the compatibility of orthonomy (making the right choices) and autonomy (making one’s own choices). On the one hand we have the experience that we do not just want to govern ourselves, but that we want to do so rightly. the other hand, it seems that the very fact that our choices are responsive to reasons is insufficient to explain why making these choices adds up to leading a life of one’s own. Iit is argued that we can develop a viable view on the co-realisation of autono…Read more
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130Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative ReasonsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2): 45-62. 2005.Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like ‘having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children’. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns.…Read more
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123Norman Daniels: Justice and justification. Reflective equilibrium in theory and practice & Folke Tersman, reflective equilibrium. An essay in moral epistemology (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1): 129-132. 1998.
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97Moral compromises, moral integrity and the indeterminacy of value rankingsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4): 385-404. 2000.Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points…Read more
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84Shaping the Arrow of the Will: Skorupski on Moral Feeling and RationalityUtilitas 15 (3): 353-368. 2003.I oppose the way John Skorupski characterizes morality in terms of the blameworthy and the role he consequently assigns to punitive feelings in directing one's will and shaping one's character. Skorupski does not hold that the punishment involved in blame- and guilt-feelings grounds the normativity of moral obligation. He defends a specific view of moral psychology and moral practice in which the blame-feeling disposes to the withdrawal of recognition, which involves some sort of casting the tra…Read more
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73Protecting autonomy as authenticity using Ulysses contractsJournal of Medicine and Philosophy 30 (4). 2005.Pre-commitment directives or Ulysses contracts are often defended as instruments that may strengthen the autonomous self-control of episodically disordered psychiatric patients. Autonomy is understood in this context in terms of sovereignty ("governing" or "managing" oneself). After critically analyzing this idea of autonomy in the context of various forms of self-commitment and pre-commitment, we argue that what is at stake in using Ulysses contracts in psychiatry is not autonomy as sovereignty…Read more
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40Understanding value as knowing how to value, and for what reasonsJournal of Value Inquiry 38 (1): 91-104. 2004.
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39New casuistry: what’s new?Philosophical Explorations 1 (2). 1998.The aim of this article is to review the recent popularity of casuistry as a model of moral inquiry. I argue that proponents of casuistry do not endorse the particularist epistemology that seems to be implied by their position, and that this is why casuistry does not seem to present something really new in comparison to 'top-down' generalist approaches. I contend that casuistry should develop itself as a (moderately) particularist position and that the challenge for the defender of casuistry is …Read more
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38Shareability and Actual Sharing: Korsgaard’s Position on the Publicity of ReasonsPhilosophical Investigations 25 (2). 2002.
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32Rethinking Organizational Ethics: A Plea for PluralismJournal of Business Ethics 55 (4). 2004.This paper challenges a pervasive, if not always explicit assumption of the present state of theorising in business ethics. This is the idea that a workable theory of organizational ethics must provide a unified perspective on its subject matter. In this paper we will sketch the broad outlines of an alternative understanding of business ethics, which focuses on constraints on corporate conduct that cannot reasonably be rejected. These constraints stem from at least three different levels or sphe…Read more
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23An internalist view on the value of life and some tricky cases relevant to itJournal of Applied Philosophy 18 (1). 2001.If we understand death as the irreversible loss of the good of life, we can give meaning to the idea that for suffering patients in the end stage of their illness, life may become an evil and death no longer a threat. Life may lose its good already in the living person. But what does the good of life consist in, then? I defend an internalist view according to which the goodness of life is intrinsically related to the attitudes, concerns, interests and experiences of the person who is leading the…Read more
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22Rethinking Organizational Ethics: A Plea for PluralismJournal of Business Ethics 55 (4): 385-393. 2004.This paper challenges a pervasive, if not always explicit assumption of the present state of theorising in business ethics. This is the idea that a workable theory of organizational ethics must provide a unified perspective on its subject matter. In this paper we will sketch the broad outlines of an alternative understanding of business ethics, which focuses on constraints on corporate conduct that cannot reasonably be rejected. These constraints stem from at least three different levels or sphe…Read more
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17Moral Compromises, Moral Integrity and the Indeterminacy of Value RankingsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4). 2000.Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points…Read more
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16Norman Daniels: Justice and Justification. Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice & Folke Tersman, Reflective Equilibrium. An Essay in Moral Epistemology (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1): 129-132. 1998.
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13An Internalist View on the Value of Life and Some Tricky Cases Relevant to itJournal of Applied Philosophy 18 (1): 25-35. 2001.If we understand death as the irreversible loss of the good of life, we can give meaning to the idea that for suffering patients in the end stage of their illness, life may become an evil and death no longer a threat. Life may lose its good already in the living person. But what does the good of life consist in, then? I defend an internalist view according to which the goodness of life is intrinsically related to the attitudes, concerns, interests and experiences of the person who is leading the…Read more
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12Rechtfertigung moralischer Urteile: Ein NetzmodelZeitschrift Für Evangelische Ethik 35 (1): 88-95. 1991.
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5Norman Daniels: Justice and Justification. Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice & Folke Tersman, Reflective Equilibrium. An Essay in Moral Epistemology (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1): 129-132. 1998.
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Sterke gevoelens en morele oordeelsvormingAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 2. 2003.
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Wat blaamtaal doet of beoogt te doenAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 102 (4): 265-267. 2010.
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The turn to applied ethics, Practical consequences for research, educationand the role of ethicists in public debateFilosofie En Praktijk 15 209-219. 1996.
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P, But I Lack Sufficient Evidence For P: A Reply to DouvenArs Disputandi 3. 2003.In his ‘Review of Belief’s Own Ethics,’ Ars Disputandi 3 , Igor Douven argued that ‘P, but I lack sufficient evidence for p’ is heard as odd not for conceptual reasons, but for pragmatic reasons. We hear this sentence as odd, because we are not regularly exposed to it. In this reply, the author argues that the assertion ‘P, but I lack sufficient evidence for p’ sounds contradictory, because the two parts of the assertion refuse combination on conceptual grounds. We are not regularly exposed to s…Read more
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Improving nature? The science and ethics of genetic engineeringJournal of Applied Philosophy 15 116-118. 1998.
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De status en rol van sterke gevoelens in morele oordeelsvormingAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 95 (2): 81-99. 2003.
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Nation, State and the Coexistence of Different CommunitiesTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 58 (4): 790-790. 1996.