Therese Cory

There are cases in which one could easily make sense of a certain human behavior if the agent had a certain motive—yet the agent claims that she does not have that motive. Even when she reflects, she simply cannot discover within herself, from a first-person perspective, any sort of corresponding desire or belief. Freud drew our attention to these cases, which he attributed to the Unconscious. But can these cases be accounted for without recourse to an Unconscious? In this paper, I consider a thinker who holds that all occurrent mental states are conscious, Thomas Aquinas. I suggest that some of his intriguing and neglected remarks about the inner senses (specifically, a group of them that I call the “imaginarium”) can provide resources for analyzing the phenomenon that appears to call for unconscious motivation. In fact, for Aquinas, even though acts of the imaginarium are conscious, the imaginarium is structured in such a way as to be able to step into the shoes of a Freudian Unconscious, providing an alternative way to account for a number of pathological phenomena in psychology.

In Aquinas, the senses are widely construed as “gatekeepers” restricting the possible content of our embodied intellectual thought. But if this is true, how can Aquinas justify his extensive theorizing about incorporeal substances, and how can he account for human experiential self-awareness? This paper argues that, for Aquinas, (1) the scope of our embodied experience is not limited to objects of sense, but extends to our intellects and everything ontologically “below” them; (2) we can and do conceptualize something incorporeal—the intellectual soul—as it is in itself and not merely by comparison to bodies; (3) this concept of ‘incorporeality’ is precisely a concept of ‘intellectuality.’ The restrictions embodied human intellects encounter in attempting to know entities “above” us arise less from their incorporeality than from a fundamental mismatch between our attempts to conceptualize them in terms of what they have in common with us, and their simplicity.

A reified self (“the self,” “the I”) is absent from medieval European thought. Nonetheless, medieval Scholastic authors do have something to say about the subjective dimension of human experience that the later concept of the reified self was intended to address. Focusing on Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), this chapter examines the two key themes of self-consciousness and personal identity, in order to explore how Aquinas developed his notion of the human individual as a subject of experience who can speak about herself as “I,” in the first person. This episode illustrates a key moment in the development of medieval European thought on selfhood, in the confluence of philosophical and theological traditions from the Greek, Islamic, and Latin worlds.

The standard gloss of ‘intentionality’ as ‘aboutness’ may be insufficiently fine-grained to capture the complexity of medieval theories of intentionality. Using Thomas Aquinas as a case study, I show that he provides distinct accounts of two aspects of the phenomenon, which could be called ‘intentional presence’ and ‘intentional directing’. These distinct accounts are joined together through his theory of imitation into what I call a ‘theory of intentionality as active imitating’, but without giving relations of likeness any work to do in the account. In each part of the account, Aquinas draws on a general metaphysical schema that applies to both mental and non-mental being, contra interpretations that view intentionality as a sui generis feature of mental states.

This essay examines how Aquinas’s philosophical psychology can suggest a way of analyzing the phenomenon of implicit bias. On the account sketched here, implicit bias should be understood, not as a submerged or unconscious belief, but as a pre-rational imaginative frame that may or may not accord with our intellectual beliefs. Such imaginative frames are common features of our experience, and they arise from a habituation of the cogitative power in tandem with imagination and memory. The essay explains how this notion works in Aquinas’s philosophical psychology, how it can be applied to provide an account of implicit bias, and why (given Aquinas’s account of justice) we are morally obligated to remediate our implicit biases wherever possible. The final sections offer a Thomistic response to the objection that “sometimes the stereotype is true,” and return to Aquinas’s philosophical psychology to identify some strategies for remediating implicit biases.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas III by John F. WippelTherese Scarpelli CoryWIPPEL, John F. Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas III. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021. ix + 321 pp. Cloth, $65.00; eBook, $65.00This volume is the third in what can now be considered informally a series of volumes collecting some of John F. Wippel's most important writings. (Two previous volumes, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas and Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II, were published in 1984 and 2007, respectively, by the same press.) In this volume, Wippel has collected nine of his articles or book chapters, originally published from 2002–2019, on a wide range of topics: (1) "Aquinas on Separatio and Our Discovery of Being as Being," (2) "Thomas Aquinas on Philosophy and the Preambles of Faith," (3) "Cornelio Fabro on the Distinction and Composition of Essence and Esse in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas," (4) "Cornelio Fabro on Participation and Aquinas's Quarta Via," (5) "Aquinas on Creation and Preambles of Faith," (6) "Thomas Aquinas and the Unity of Substantial Form," (7) "Thomas Aquinas on the Separated Soul's Natural Knowledge," (8) "Metaphysical Themes in De Malo I," and (9) "Metaphysical Composition of Angels in Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Godfrey of Fontaines."Such collections provide a valuable opportunity for the author's retrospective on the work thus collected. In this respect, it is especially worth noting the usefulness of the introduction to this volume, in which Wippel has provided a detailed précis for each included chapter. The introduction thus serves as a helpful roadmap to orient new and returning readers of Wippel's work to some of his most important writings.In a book review of this length, it is impossible to summarize adequately the content of each essay. Indeed, it would be redundant to try, given the much more authoritative content of Wippel's own introduction to the volume. Consequently, I will limit myself to highlighting one of the notable inclusions in this collection, namely, chapter 6, "Thomas Aquinas and the Unity of Substantial Form." Despite the modest title, the piece is an extensive and wide-ranging study of the development and fate of Aquinas's controversial doctrine, the anxieties it raised among his contemporaries, and the debate that raged at Paris in the late thirteenth century, and during which the doctrine appears to have narrowly escaped inclusion on the list of condemnations of 1270. Wippel correlates some interesting historical anecdotes and documentary evidence with Aquinas's series of changing formulations in discussions of the unity of substantial form. He is thereby able to document a particularly nuanced case in which Aquinas attempts to make his own thought clearer in the face of a developing controversy, but without giving up on the essentials of his own position.Nonetheless, Wippel points out that Aquinas never fully resolved the theological criticisms lodged against his position. Within the debate over the number of substantial forms in a substance, the identity of Christ's dead body in the tomb between the crucifixion and resurrection ended up becoming a test case: What makes Christ's living body and his dead body in the tomb both be identically the same body? The problem is as follows: [End Page 371] Since substantial form is what secures the identity of a substance across time, if there is just one substantial form in a human substance, and that form (the human soul) departs Christ's body in his death on the cross, then after his death whatever is left can no longer be identified as Christ's body. It must be some new substance with its own substantial form.For opponents, this difficulty was fatal. How did Aquinas respond? Disappointingly, he only asserts that Christ's dead body is numerically identical with his living body, just not "in every way"—but without explaining why he thinks this identity is preserved. It is left to Giles of Rome to fill out a tentative solution: Although the matter of Christ's body does take on a new substantial form, it remains Christ's, because it remains united to the person of the Word.The problem is...

Este artículo pretende dilucidar la expresión utilizada por Tomás de Aquino “vuelta al fantasma”, con la intención de esclarecer lo que entiende por “vuelta”. Se argumenta que el marco conceptual subyacente al “giro intelectual” se encuentra en dos fuentes islámicas que fueron ampliamente influyentes en la psicología filosófica latina del siglo XIII, y que presentan conceptos técnicos específicos de la “vuelta” como un tipo de dependencia. Las obras son: Liber de Causis, de autor anónimo; y Liber de anima, del filósofo persa Avicena. Así, este artículo busca recuperar este marco histórico subyacente, examinando cómo estas dos fuentes clave conciben la “vuelta” y cómo Tomás de Aquino incorpora estas fuentes en su concepción de la “vuelta al fantasma”.

What does it mean to be an embodied thinker of abstract concepts? Does embodiment shape the character and quality of our understanding of universals such as 'dog' and 'beauty', and would a non-embodied mind understand such concepts differently? I examine these questions through the lens of Thomas Aquinas’s remarks on the differences between embodied (human) intellects and non-embodied (angelic) intellects. In Aquinas, I argue, the difference between embodied and non-embodied intellection of extramental realities is rooted in the fact that embodied and non-embodied intellects grasp different kinds of universals by means of different kinds of intelligible species (intellectual likenesses), which elicit in them different “modes” of understanding. By spelling out what exactly it means to be an embodied knower, on Aquinas’s account, I argue, we can also shed new light on his mysterious claim that the embodied intellect “turns to phantasms”—the imagination’s likenesses of individuals—in its acts of understanding.

I argue that Thomas Aquinas’s Identity Formula—the statement that the “intellect in act is the intelligible in act”—does not, as is usually supposed, express his position on how the intellect accesses extramental realities (responding to the so-called “mind-world gap”). Instead, it should be understood as a claim about the metaphysics of intellection, according to which the perfection requisite for performing the act of understanding is what could be called “intellectual-intelligible being.” In reinterpreting Aquinas’s Identity Formula, I explore the notion of being “in act” as an intellect or intelligible (intelligibile actu, intellectus actu), his curious comments about an “order” or “genus” of intelligibles, and the relationship of understanding and being-understood.

This study brings together two thinkers whose work illustrates the idea of mental life as a kind of vital striving, Thomas Aquinas and Edith Stein. On the side of Aquinas, whereas his theory of intentionality has often been understood in quasi-semantic terms, as cognitive act's reference to or signification of something, in reality it is better understood as a kind of vital striving toward the cognitive object. Stein, for her part, famously develops the notion of a living "I," which I argue reflects many of these same insights. The study does not make any claims about historical influence (even though Stein is well-known to be familiar with Aquinas's cognitive theory). Rather, its goal is to open up the possibility for recasting intentionality in teleological terms, as a striving for some good—while also having implications for the history of intentionality, by opening up new interpretive possibilities.

Medieval accounts of diachronically unified consciousness have been overlooked by contemporary readers, because medieval thinkers have a unique and unexpected way of setting up the problem. This paper examines the approach to diachronically unified consciousness that is found in Augustine’s and Aquinas’s treatments of memory. For Augustine, although the mind is “distended” by time, it remains resilient, stretching across disparate moments to unify past, present, and future in a single personal present. Despite deceptively different phrasing, Aquinas develops a remarkably similar view when, in order to accommodate Aristotle’s view of memory to Augustine’s, he insists that an implicit self-awareness “time-stamps” all intellectual acts. According to their shared approach, diachronic unified consciousness is the result of the curious way in which the mind is both drawn into and transcends the temporal succession of its own acts.

This article examines two medieval thinkers—Averroes and Aquinas—on the kind of causation exercised by the agent intellect in “abstracting” or producing intelligibles from images in the imagination. It argues that abstraction in these thinkers should be interpreted in causal terms, as an act whereby images in the imagination, through the power of the agent intellect, educe their intelligible likeness in a receptive intellect. This Averroan-Thomistic causal approach to abstraction offers an intriguing alternative to the usual approach to abstraction as an epistemological content-sorting. The article also demonstrates the extensive common ground uniting these thinkers’ cognition theories, despite Aquinas’s well-known rejection of Averroes’s theory of separate Intellects.

Self-knowledge is commonly thought to have become a topic of serious philosophical inquiry during the early modern period. Already in the thirteenth century, however, the medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas developed a sophisticated theory of self-knowledge, which Therese Scarpelli Cory presents as a project of reconciling the conflicting phenomena of self-opacity and privileged self-access. Situating Aquinas's theory within the mid-thirteenth-century debate and his own maturing thought on human nature, Cory investigates the kinds of self-knowledge that Aquinas describes and the questions they raise. She shows that to a degree remarkable in a medieval thinker, self-knowledge turns out to be central to Aquinas's account of cognition and personhood, and that his theory provides tools for considering intentionality, reflexivity and selfhood. Her engaging account of this neglected aspect of medieval philosophy will interest readers studying Aquinas and the history of medieval philosophy more generally.

The thesis of this paper is that Thomas Aquinas offers an alternative model of abstraction (the Active Principle Model) that overcomes the standard objections to abstractionism and expands our view of what an abstractionist theory might look like. I contend that this alternative model of abstraction has been invisible in plain sight, in Aquinas’s references to the mind’s abstractive mechanism as an “intellectual light.” Such language is not metaphorical but rather technical, signaling that intellectual abstraction is to be modeled on the activity of physical light as he understood it from theories proposed by Avicenna and Averroes. The Active Principle Model requires us to rethink Aquinas’s account of how we come to know essences—a process that turns out to be much more tentative and incremental than previously thought.