This paper offers an affirmative answer to the question posed in its title: it is indeed possible to change the soliciting powers of a contradiction. The paper develops a functional and naturalistic account of logic grounded in neo-pragmatist inferentialism, logical expressivism, and the ecological theory of affordances. On this view, logical systems are not metaphysical structures that represent an abstract logical order, but normative techniques that make explicit, articulate, refine, and revi…
Read moreThis paper offers an affirmative answer to the question posed in its title: it is indeed possible to change the soliciting powers of a contradiction. The paper develops a functional and naturalistic account of logic grounded in neo-pragmatist inferentialism, logical expressivism, and the ecological theory of affordances. On this view, logical systems are not metaphysical structures that represent an abstract logical order, but normative techniques that make explicit, articulate, refine, and revise the norms of inferential practices. What matters for logic is not the categorical or metaphysical basis of these inferential practices, but the functional roles they play within reasoning. Central to the proposal is the notion of inferential affordances, understood as relational opportunities for reasoning that arise from the interaction between agents’ normative abilities and their conceptual, social, and material environments. Inferential affordances are multiply realizable and may be grounded in different categorical bases, such as propositions, beliefs, information states, institutional rules, or data structures, without this diversity undermining their normative role. What unifies them is their function in enabling, constraining, or reshaping conceptual activities. Drawing on Gibsonian and post-Gibsonian theories of affordances (Gibson 1986; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014; Vetter 2023), the paper extends the notion of affordance beyond perception to the domain of inference and normativity. Focusing on paraconsistent and paracomplete logics, the paper argues that conflict and vagueness are pervasive features of our everyday inferential niches. Contradictions need not be treated as inherently explosive or epistemically catastrophic. Their soliciting powers can be modulated and revised, depending on agents’ normative abilities, training and the purposes of reasoning at stake. Logical plurality, on this account, reflects not arbitrariness or relativism, but the adaptive management of inferential affordances within dynamically evolving conceptual landscapes.