Thiago Vasconcelos

The severity of the climate emergency contrasts sharply with the ongoing omission and inaction of most individuals and governments, despite overwhelming evidence. This paradox raises an urgent question: why does humanity continue to choose paralysis and procrastination in the face of existential threats? While acknowledging the complexity of the issue, this article examines four of the most common — and, we argue, spurious — ‘justifications’ used by climate deniers to evade responsibility: [1] ‘The science is still up for debate,’ [2] ‘We don’t owe justice to distant strangers,’ [3] ‘We don’t owe justice to future generations,’ and [4] ‘Not my fault, not my job.’ In response, we present counterarguments based on key principles of the ethics of responsibility developed by German philosopher Hans Jonas (1903–1993). By confronting these evasive claims, the article not only exposes their inconsistency but also revisits Jonas’s work as a valuable ethical resource to understand the gravity of our current situation. Ultimately, we argue that the climate crisis constitutes an urgent ethical and political challenge that demands immediate and comprehensive action grounded in responsibility toward life — present and future, near and distant.

This article aims to analyze the perspective of the philosopher Hans Jonas with regard to the rights of animals to life. We will show how, according to Jonas, the ethical significance of animals emerges as they reveal nature’s vulnerability and underscore the moral duty of humans, whose responsibility intensifies as their capacity to cause harm increases. Within this framework, it is essential to recognize that (1) Jonas supports the criterion of maximum benefit when it comes to animal experimentation for scientific purposes; (2) his theory reflects a concern for the conditions of animals within the meat industry, advocating for moderation in consumption; and (3) his ethical approach is particularly focused on the protection of endangered animal species, a concern that has become increasingly urgent with the rise of new powers of technology. For Jonas, an ethical theory that seeks to address the challenge of species preservation must begin with a theoretical redefinition that acknowledges animals as ‘ends in themselves’, a shift that would necessitate a re-evaluation not only of ethics but also of underlying ontological and metaphysical assumptions. Finally, as we will discuss, Jonas’s ongoing debate on the rights of animals to life brings to the forefront the central concern of his ethics of responsibility: maintaining the balance of the cosmic whole against the destructive impact of human activity, which has led to the extinction of animal species with which humans share a ‘solidarity of interests’. It is within this context that Jonas’s stance on animal rights should be understood, and it is precisely here that his position stands out as both innovative and urgent in the defense of animal life.