Plato, in dialogues such as Crito and Republic I, maintained a radical anti-harm principle (AHP): one ought never to harm oneself or another, for harming is always unjust. In this dissertation, I explain the meaning of AHP, describe and evaluate Plato's arguments for it, and situate it within the broader framework of Platonic ethics. In Chapter 1, I provide historical background and discuss anti-harm thinking in Plato's predecessors and successors. Most significantly, I argue that Xenophon's Soc…
Read morePlato, in dialogues such as Crito and Republic I, maintained a radical anti-harm principle (AHP): one ought never to harm oneself or another, for harming is always unjust. In this dissertation, I explain the meaning of AHP, describe and evaluate Plato's arguments for it, and situate it within the broader framework of Platonic ethics. In Chapter 1, I provide historical background and discuss anti-harm thinking in Plato's predecessors and successors. Most significantly, I argue that Xenophon's Socrates joins Plato's Socrates in opposing all harm, though Xenophon himself does not. In Chapter 2, I counter a common suggestion about AHP, namely that Plato must have carved out "justified harms" to account for cases of self-defense, war, and legal punishment. I argue that the Crito does not support this reading by showing how Socrates's anti-harm ideals differ from the more traditional mores defended by the Laws of Athens. In Chapter 3, I describe more precisely the scope and nature of Socratic harm, and I analyze the argument for AHP given in Republic I. I conclude that, contra much recent scholarship, Republic I does not show us that Socratic harm is limited to corruption of the soul's virtue; rather, the infliction of any evil is harmful. Thus, AHP retains its full radical character. Chapter 4 contains my solution to a central problem: why would anyone endorse a principle that looks as naive as AHP does? I argue that, according to a Platonic metaphysics of causation, only the good can benefit, and only the bad can harm; thus, a good character guarantees that we are not responsible for harming. We can adhere to AHP if we are able to purify our characters, and the principle gains considerable plausibility. In Chapter 5, I describe how Plato thought such purification might be possible by outlining his ideal of godlikeness. I argue that, just as the gods never harm anyone and cause all goods, the person who imitates them to the utmost extent humanly possible will also be both beneficent and non-maleficent. Finally, I conclude by discussing how Plato thought AHP might fit into political life: what concessions must rulers and legislators make under non-ideal political conditions so that citizens who cannot be entirely prevented from harming one another nonetheless harm one another as little as possible?
