Thomas Boyer-Kassem

In this paper, I address a question in social epistemology about the unity of a scientic community to- wards its inner groups (teams, labs...). I investigate the reasons why these groups might want to \go it alone", working among themselves and hiding their discoveries from other groups. I concentrate on the intermediate results of a longer project, where the first steps can help to achieve a more advanced result. I study to what extent the isolation of research groups might be damaging to the epistemic progress of the whole community. In order to get an idea of the reason why scientists might not share their intermediate results with others, consider for example Schawlow and Townes in the summer of 1958 (the historical material is drawn from Broberg, 1991, chap. 3): together they had just designed the principle of functioning of what would be known as the laser, with the intention of constructing the rst laser, relying on their theoretical ideas. Should they have published their theoretical discovery, or rather taken advantage of their advance on possible oppo- nents and start the experimental work? They chose to publish their theoretical ideas in a scientic journal, and they also led a patent application. On the one hand, it was a valuable choice: the patent was granted and their paper was published, making them soon famous. Further- more, another scientist called Gould was to le a simi- lar patent application a few months later, in March 1959; it was refused, because of the priority of Schawlow and Townes. If the latter had not submitted their idea in 1958, the patent would certainly have been acknowl- edged to Gould. In this sense, publishing their intermediate result was a worthy strategy. On the other hand, history showed that their publication had also some drawbacks for them. Schawlow and Townes' publication triggered a race among many American laboratories for the rst experimental construction of the laser. In addition to bringing them competitors, their publication helped these competitors in crucial ways; so much so that it was another scientist, Maiman, and not Schawlow and Townes, who was able to build the rst working laser, in May 1960, and to publish the result. If Schawlow and Townes had not published their theoretical idea, there are chances that they would have been the first ones to build a laser. Their publication of the first theoretical result certainly prevented them from getting the second experimental one. In short, the best publishing strategy about an intermediate result is no easy question for a scientist. Consider now the whole community, concerned with the results available to all and with the pace of the epistemic progress. Schawlow and Townes' publication enabled the rst laser to be built quicker, as other teams could rely on their theoretical work. More generally, being able to reuse other's works seems to be a rm basis of scientic progress. Thus, for the whole community, it seems that there are only benets if intermediate results are published. As this is not necessarily the best strategy for those who reach these intermediate results, there might be a conflict between the interests of individuals and those of the whole community. The question Schawlow and Townes faced was whether they should make their discovery publicly known, or keep it for themselves to progress alone. This alternative can also arise for an entire lab, when competing with other labs on some long-run project: should it make its discoveries known to its opponents, or only share them internally among its members? At a higher level still, this question arises for what can be called scientic schools, which are groups of labs sharing some particular approach|methodological, experimental or interpre- tational, for example. At each level within the scientic community, there are competitive groups of scientists which may decide to go it alone and to prevent their results from being accessible to others. If they had good reasons for doing so, there would be dramatic consequences for the whole community: other groups would not be able to reuse their results, labour force would be wasted in achieving them again, and the progress of the eld would be slowered. 9 The aim of this paper is to investigate this risk of division: to assess the conditions under which it may oc- cur, its damage for the community, and to draw the limit of an acceptable pluralism. The reasoning with benets and drawbacks which has been sketched for Schawlow and Townes seems to be implicitly an informal economic argument. In order to clarify and to rene such an argument, I will investigate it in a rational decision framework, supposing some utility or preferences for the groups of scientists, and I will propose a formal model, in game theory. In social epistemology of science, formal models have been proposed for various questions (for example, Kitcher 1990, 1993, Goldman 2009, Strevens 2003, 2006, Weisberg and Muldoon, forthcoming, Zollman 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), but not for the question of the division of the scientic community. I will concentrate on the normative aspect of the question, ignoring the descriptive and historical question of whether groups do go it alone or not. The model I propose is sequential: two groups are competing on a research program, which consists of several results which have to be obtained in order. The groups always carry out some research for the next result, which they reach with some probability per unit of time. When a group, say A, reaches a result, it can either make it public for the other group, or continue its research. After a result is made public, the competitor B can start from it so as to continue its own research. Thus, when A publishes it loses its lead, and its competitor will be able to compete with it in the near future. But it is also recognized as the rst to reach this step. I consider two dierent cases, one in which the number of steps is limited, another where the limit concerns the number of temporal intervals. In both cases, assuming that all steps are equally dicult and equally rewarding, it turns out that the best strategy for a group concerned with its own reward is to make public every step it takes. Thus, there is no risk that groups might separate: a scientist, whatever its group, will publish for all. Finally, I turn to more complex situations, where results have varying size or diculty: there, groups can indeed be better o going it alone.

A part of the scientific literature consists of intermediate results within a longer project. Scientists often publish a first result in the course of their work, while aware that they should soon achieve a more advanced result from this preliminary result. Should they follow the proverb “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush”, and publish any intermediate result they get? This is the normative question addressed in this paper. My aim is to clarify, to refine, and to assess informal arguments about the choice whether to publish intermediate results. To this end, I adopt a rational decision framework, supposing some utility or preferences, and I propose a formal model. The best publishing strategy turns out to depend on the research situation. In some simple circumstances, even selfish and short-minded scientists should publish their intermediate results, and should thus behave like their altruistic peers, i. e. like society would like them to behave. In other research situations, with inhomogeneous reward or difficulty profiles, the best strategy is opposite. These results suggest qualified philosophical morals.

In some applications to human beings, the precautionary principle seems to raise specific ethical concerns. For instance, it has been used by a business owner in a court of justice to justify his refusal to hire applicants with a certain geographical origin for safety reasons. Or in public management, the precautionary principle has been used to exclude men who have sexual relations with men from donating blood on the basis of a higher HIV prevalence in this group. Does not the precautionary principle here amount to justifying a form of discrimination? To help analyze what is at stake from a decision-theoretic viewpoint and to consider the possibility of ethical catastrophes, we offer a lexical utility model of the precautionary principle, which generalizes a previous model by Bartha and DesRoches (Synthese 199:8701–8740, 2021), Steel and Bartha (Risk Anal https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13892, 2022). Traditional expected utility theory also comes out as a special case of the model. Our proposal opens new perspectives for considering ethical dilemmas within a precautionary approach. It is intended to serve as a guiding tool for management teams in socially responsible companies, public institutions, and government agencies.

ABSTRACTDeliberative and decisional groups play crucial roles in most aspects of social life. But it is not obvious how to organize these groups and various socio-cognitive mechanisms can spoil debates and decisions. In this paper we focus on one such important mechanism: the misrepresentation of views, i.e. when agents express views that are aligned with those already expressed, and which differ from their private opinions. We introduce a model to analyze the extent to which this behavioral pattern can warp deliberations and distort the decisions that are finally taken. We identify types of situations in which misrepresentation can have major effects and investigate how to reduce these effects by adopting appropriate deliberative procedures. We discuss the beneficial effects of holding a sufficient number of rounds of expression of views; choosing an appropriate order of speech, typically a random one; rendering the deliberation dissenter-friendly; having agents express fined-grained views. These applicable procedures help improve deliberations because they dampen conformist behavior, give epistemic minorities more opportunities to be heard, and reduce the number of cases in which an inadequate consensus or majority develops.

When scientists are asked to give expert advice on risk-related questions, such as the authorization of medical drugs, deliberation often does not eliminate all disagreements. I propose to model these remaining discrepancies as differences in risk assessments and/or in risk acceptability thresholds. The normative question I consider, then, is how the individual expert views should best be aggregated. I discuss what “best” could mean, with an eye to some robustness considerations. I argue that the majority rule, which is currently often used in expert panels, has significant drawbacks.

Scientists are often asked to advise political institutions on pressing risk-related questions, like climate change or the authorization of medical drugs. Given that deliberation will often not eliminate all disagreements between scientists, how should their risk assessments be aggregated? I argue that this problem is distinct from two familiar and well-studied problems in the literature: judgment aggregation and probability aggregation. I introduce a novel decision-theoretic model where risk assessments are compared with acceptability thresholds. Majority voting is then defended by means of robustness considerations.

Scientific collaboration has increased over the past two centuries, a fact for which various explanations have been proposed. We offer a novel functional explanation of this increase in collaboration, grounded in a sequential model of scientific research where the priority rule applies. Robust patterns concerning the differential success of collaborative groups with respect to their competitors are derived, and it is argued that these patterns feed the development of collaboration. This general mechanism may trigger an ‘arms race’ and is compatible with a certain amount of decreased productivity in collaborative groups as well as some over-collaboration. The proposed explanation succeeds in integrating various factors usually associated with the rise of collaboration.

Human agents happen to judge that a conjunction of two terms is more probable than one of the terms, in contradiction with the rules of classical probabilities—this is the conjunction fallacy. One of the most discussed accounts of this fallacy is currently the quantum-like explanation, which relies on models exploiting the mathematics of quantum mechanics. The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical adequacy of major quantum-like models which represent beliefs with quantum states. We first argue that they can be tested in three different ways, in a question order effect configuration which is different from the traditional conjunction fallacy experiment. We then carry out our proposed experiment, with varied methodologies from experimental economics. The experimental results we get are at odds with the predictions of the quantum-like models. This strongly suggests that this quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy fails. Future possible research paths are discussed.