Thomas Bretz

This paper investigates the plausibility of one aspect of animism, namely the experience of other-than-human beings as exhibiting a kind of inaccessible interiority. I do so by developing a parallel between Husserl’s account of our experience of other conscious beings and our experience of non-conscious as well as so-called inanimate beings. I establish this parallel based on Derrida’s insistence on the irreducibility of context. This allows me to show how the structure of presence qua absence characteristic of our experience of conscious others emerges in our experience of non-conscious beings as well.

While the disability community has long argued convincingly that disability is not a negative condition, academic and popular discourses on environmental justice routinely refer to disability as a prima facie harm to be avoided. This perpetuates the harms of ableism, and it is, furthermore, unnecessary in order to advance environmental justice. It is possible to demand an investigation into the state of an environment, to object to toxic environmental conditions and to hold polluting parties accountable without assuming any overall difference in value or desirability between disabled and non-disabled lives.

At first glance, it might seem strange to consider Derrida as an environmental philosopher. There is still a sense with many that Derrida is primarily a thinker of poetry and texts rather than of “leaves or soil”. While this is still a common view, even a cursory glance at Derrida’s work and at this volume shows that it is based on a misunderstanding. What it ignores is the fact that ‘text’ for Derrida is “coextensive [at least, T.B.] with mortal life” and indeed can be said to include every aspect of the world. Moreover, Derrida challenges the idea that we can understand culture independently from its material manifestations in the world and from its relations...