Thomas Brian Mooney

There are surely few writers who have had a more profound impact on European culture, and in the broadest range of fields, than St. Augustine, and this despite the fact that he was North African. Nonetheless, while Augustine is still called upon in debates on interfaith dialogue and in theological and philosophical disputes, one area of his large corpus has received scant attention—his philosophy of education. Although there are references throughout Augustine’s writings to his philosophy of education, he devotes only a single text to its elaboration—De Magistro—On the Teacher. The fact that this work has been largely overlooked by scholars is disappointing, because the De Magistro, despite its use of theological language, retains a very modern and contemporary thematic with interesting insights for any contemporary theory of education. In this article we provide a primer in reading Augustine’s De Magistro.

In his seminal work Moral Notions , Julius Kovesi presents a novel account of concept formation. At the heart of this account is a distinction between what he terms the material element and the formal element of concepts. This paper elucidates his distinction in detail and contrasts it with other distinctions such as form-matter, universal-particular, genus-difference, necessary-sufficient, and open texture-closed texture. We situate Kovesi’s distinction within his general philosophical method, outlining his views on concept formation in general and explain how his theory of concept formation is applied in moral philosophy

The book aims at equipping you with 21st Century Skills key life skills that will drive your future employability, promotion and career success. These are required for effective reasoning, writing and decision-making in changing, evolving environments. You give reasons for what you do and think every day. You argue. You often argue about things that matter to you. For example you might argue that you are the best candidate for promotion, about whether your company should invest in China, about the best way to help a friend or about what the right thing to do is in an ethical dilemma. The list is up to you. If you work your way carefully through this book you will become better at reasoning both in terms of understanding and clarifying other peoples’ arguments and also at producing increasingly sophisticated and compelling arguments of your own. You will learn how to recognize common but often seductive mistakes in reasoning and so be empowered to avoid making these mistakes yourself. Your writing and oral presentations will improve and you will hone your ability to define crucial terms in argument, debate and discussion. As this book is specifically written with everyday language considerations in mind, it is a valuable tool for anyone to understand, evaluate and construct arguments in ordinary language.

A central feature of Confucianism is the doctrine that an adult child has, for want of a better word, the ‘duty’ to care for his elderly parents1. Whether this doctrine should be framed in terms of an ethic of duties as opposed to an ethic of virtues is a vexed question. It might be argued that the doctrine is best framed in terms of the behaviour and dispositions appropriate to an agent who is, within the Confucian moral vision, good. Nonetheless, in both popular discourse and in much the secondary literature, the doctrine is characterized in terms of a moral ‘ought’. We will adopt this perspective, and talk of the ‘filial duty of care’. We investigate the empirical question of whether Chinese communities still have a strong sense of this duty. We conclude that although there is a widespread perception among Chinese communities that their sense of filial duty of care has been eroded, in fact the adherence to it remains robust.

Julius Kovesi's Moral Notions (1967) was a startlingly original contribution to moral philosophy and theory of meaning. After initial positive reviews Kovesi's book was largely forgotten. Nevertheless, it continued to have an enduring influence on a number of philosophers and theologians some of whom have contributed to this volume. The original essays collected here critique, analyze, deepen and extend the work of Kovesi. The book will be of particular interest to moral philosophers and those working on concept formation, while also having a broader appeal to social scientists grappling with the description/evaluation problem.

“Politeness” appears to be connected to a quite disparate set of related concepts, including but not limited to, “manners,” “etiquette,” “agreeableness,” “respect” and even “piety.” While in the East politeness considered as an important social virtue is present (and even central) in the theoretical and practical expressions of the Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist traditions, (indeed politeness has been viewed in these traditions as central to proper education) it has not featured prominently in philosophical discussion in the West. American presidents Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington all devoted discussion to politeness within the broader ambit of manners and etiquette, as too did Erasmus, Edmund Burke and Ralph Waldo Emerson but on the whole sustained philosophical engagement with the topic has been lacking in the West. The richest source for philosophical investigation is perhaps afforded by the centrality of the concept of respect in Immanuel Kant.However in this paper we will instead draw on the writings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to defend the centrality of “politeness” as an important and valuable moral virtue. Starting with an analysis of the broader Aristotelian arguments on the virtues associated with “agreeableness,” namely, friendliness, truthfulness and wit I will argue that “politeness” should be thought of as an important moral virtue attached to social intercourse (and by extension the vice of impoliteness). I then move to identify an even broader and more important account of politeness, drawing on the work of Aquinas, as intimately connected to the notion of pietas (piety) as a fundamental part of the virtue of justice.

Aristotle distinguishes friendships of pleasure or utility from more valuable ‘character friendships’ in which the friend cares for the other qua person for the other’s own sake. Aristotle and some neo-Aristotelians require such friends to be fairly strictly symmetrical in their separateness of identity from each other, in the degree to which they identify with each other, and in the degree to which they are virtuous. We argue that there is a neglected form of valuable friendship–neither of friendship nor utility–that allows significant asymmetries. We know of no sustained discussion of such ‘asymmetrical’ friendships in the literature.

Generous selections from these four seminal texts on the theory and practice of education have never before appeared together in a single volume. The Introductions that precede the texts provide brief biographical sketches of each author, situating him within his broader historical, cultural and intellectual context. The editors also provide a brief outline of key themes that emerge within the selection as a helpful guide to the reader. The final chapter engages the reflections of the classic authors with contemporary issues and challenges in the philosophy and practice of education.

A perennial problem in the philosophy of love has centred around what it is to love persons qua persons. Plato has usually been interpreted as believing that when we love we are attaching ourselves to qualities that inhere in the objects of our love and that these qualities transcend the objects. Vlastos has argued, along with Nussbaum, Price and many others that such an account tells against a true love of persons as unique and irreplaceable individuals. I argue that Plato’s account of love as presented in the Lysis and Symposium is not so easily rejected. My concern is both to show that Plato can meet the objections and that his theory can still offer helpful insights into the understanding of love in our own lives. In particular I will identify two manners of loving persons; one which is context and individual specific, and another which might be termed metaphysical, thereby preserving aspects of the Platonic ascent of love. I will further argue that the two aspects are often non–controversially linked, and that such linking helps explain something of the mysterious nature of love.

Generous selections from these four seminal texts on the theory and practice of education have never before appeared together in a single volume. The Introductions that precede the texts provide brief biographical sketches of each author, situating him within his broader historical, cultural and intellectual context. The editors also provide a brief outline of key themes that emerge within the selection as a helpful guide to the reader. The final chapter engages the reflections of the classic authors with contemporary issues and challenges in the philosophy and practice of education.

Connatural knowledge is knowledge readily acquired by beings possessing a certain nature. For instance, dogs have knowledge of a scent-world exceeding that of human beings, not because humans lack noses, but because dogs are by nature better suited to process olfaction. As various ethicists have argued, possession of the virtues involves a sort of connatural knowing. Here, connatural knowledge emerges as a knowledge by inclination which systematically tracks the specific moral interests we humans possess precisely because we are human. In this essay we explore the importance of connaturality for moral education.

Generous selections from these four seminal texts on the theory and practice of education have never before appeared together in a single volume. The Introductions that precede the texts provide brief biographical sketches of each author, situating him within his broader historical, cultural and intellectual context. The editors also provide a brief outline of key themes that emerge within the selection as a helpful guide to the reader. The final chapter engages the reflections of the classic authors with contemporary issues and challenges in the philosophy and practice of education.

Recently we have come to witness an assault on the traditional conception of the university as a centre of detached concern for pure research. The economic rationalist vision which has occasioned this assault has deeply permeated almost every facet of contemporary life and even the specific kind of discourse emanating from this interpretation has managed to ensconce itself within the academies. Philosophers are at particular risk in the uncertain climate that has been created. However philosophers have not addressed the issues which the new ideology has foisted upon the universities with sufficient rigour and clarity. The facility with which economic rationalist considerations have filtered into academic discourse points, I believe, to a deep malaise in academia. The fatalism with which many philosophers have faced the threat has in its own way hypostatised the new ideology and granted it the titanism of some inevitable, irresistible and irrevocable force. The tradition of the public philosopher has not enjoyed the same degree of public approbation in the English-speaking world as has been the case on the European continent, and in particular, in France. One can think of notable exceptions but on the whole the public philosopher in the English-speaking world is a rare breed. Given the radical changes that contemporary universities are undergoing it is clearly worth while to reflect upon the professional philosopher's relationship to other individuals in society, to communities and to the state. Here the meditation will focus on a debate on these issues within France, a country which perhaps more than anywhere else has elevated public philosophy to an art form. Philosophers, perhaps more than any other academics, are prone to a certain hesitancy in attempting to describe what it is they do. Philosophy no doubt employs techniques but it is not itself a technique, nor is there a single problem or series of problems or mysteries which can claim sway over philosophy's subject matter. Such hesitancy, one might say ambiguity, is the very stuff of philosophy and indeed of the philosopher. In Merleau-Ponty's inaugural address to the College de France, later published as Eloge de la philosophie he returns to these perennial philosophical musings, in particular, through attempting to characterise something of the nature of philosophy and the philosopher.

Locke considers miracles to be crucial in establishing the credibility and reasonableness of Christian faith and revelation. The performance of miracles, he argues, is vital in establishing the "credit of the proposer" who makes any claim to providing a divine revelation. He accords reason a pivotal role in distinguishing spurious from genuine claims to divine revelation, including miracles. According to Locke, genuine miracles contain the hallmark of the divine such that pretend revelations become intuitively obvious. This paper argues that serious tensions exist in Locke's position regarding miracles, which impact on the reasonableness of the assent to Christianity which he presumes they provide.

Generous selections from these four seminal texts on the theory and practice of education have never before appeared together in a single volume. The Introductions that precede the texts provide brief biographical sketches of each author, situating him within his broader historical, cultural and intellectual context. The editors also provide a brief outline of key themes that emerge within the selection as a helpful guide to the reader. The final chapter engages the reflections of the classic authors with contemporary issues and challenges in the philosophy and practice of education.