Thomas Carnes

In a recent paper, Bender (European Journal of Political Theory 1–20, 2024) argues that we should reject the notion of climate refugeehood because the existing defenses of climate refugeehood cannot be squared with political realism, according to which refugees fulfill a specific function and possess a specific value for admitting states. On this view, refugees serve admitting states’ self-interest by allowing admitting states to undermine rival regimes whose illegitimate practices render their citizens refugees, thus enhancing admitting states’ domestic and international perceptions of legitimacy. This article argues that the political autonomy account of refugeehood, an account Bender never examines, can accommodate climate refugees in a way that satisfies Bender’s political realist concerns. The broader implications of this argument are threefold: (1) such an account of refugeehood would limit the number of people who would count as climate refugees substantially more than most accounts that admit of the possibility of climate refugees; and (2) the fact that such an account of refugeehood can simultaneously accommodate the possibility of climate refugees while not being subject to Bender’s criticisms renders the political autonomy account especially plausible as a theory of refugeehood, whether one is a political realist or not.

Tacitly authorized unauthorized immigrants are officially unauthorized, but their presence is tacitly sanctioned by the state because of the economic or political benefits their presence provides. Most arguments about them claim they have a moral right to remain because the state is complicit in their presence. This complicity argument, however, is fundamentally flawed because it suggests there is nothing inherently unjust about the practice of tacitly authorizing unauthorized immigrants. This article argues that states commit an injustice when they tacitly authorize unauthorized immigrants because it socially constructs them in a way that uniquely and unjustly undermines their planning agency. To make this claim I introduce a novel form of injustice, what I call ontological ambiguity, which occurs when an individual is socially constructed as a member of two social kinds simultaneously and the individual experiences the constraints and enablements constitutive of both social kinds as incompatible. I show that tacitly authorized unauthorized immigrants are necessarily socially constructed as ontologically ambiguous and then argue that recognizing the injustice of ontological ambiguity reveals a more compelling argument regarding their rights: while it may not establish a right to remain, it does entail that states are morally prohibited from tacitly authorizing unauthorized immigrants.

This paper proposes the notion of evaluative injustice as a distinct kind of injustice. Evaluative injustice occurs when someone is evaluated with regard to whether one satisfies the ideal associated with a social role one occupies, and the evaluation is characterized by an unjust failure of appraisal respect. This kind of injustice is importantly distinct from other kinds of injustice recently theorized, in particular epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007) and ontological injustice (Jenkins 2023). It is distinct insofar as it is how one is evaluated with respect to a given ideal that accounts for the injustice in question. After analyzing the nature of the phenomenon of evaluative injustice (section 2), this paper discusses the multiple different forms it can take (section 3) and argues that the wrong of all instances of evaluative injustice can be understood in terms of appraisal respect (Darwall 1977) (section 4). Throughout, the paper highlights various theoretical benefits the notion of evaluative injustice affords us.

Avia Pasternak’s account of permissible political rioting includes a constraint that insists only oppressed citizens, and not privileged citizens, are permitted to riot when rioting is justified. This discussion note argues that Pasternak’s account, with which I largely agree, should be expanded to admit the permissibility of privileged citizens rioting alongside and in solidarity with oppressed citizens. The permissibility of privileged citizens participating in riots when rioting is justified is grounded in the notions that it is sometimes necessary, in accordance with Pasternak’s necessity condition, and that it will oftentimes substantially improve the chances of successfully achieving the just aims the rioting seeks to achieve, in accordance with Pasternak’s success condition. Allowing for this improves Pasternak’s already strong account of permissible political rioting on its own terms.

This paper argues that liberal states are wrong to forcibly separate through deportation the unauthorized immigrant parents of member children and that states must therefore regularize such unauthorized immigrants. While most arguments for regularization focus on how deportation wrongs the unauthorized immigrants themselves, I ground my argument in how deportation wrongs the state’s members, namely the unauthorized immigrants’ member children. Specifically, forced separation through deportation wrongs affected children by violating a basic right to sustain the intimate relationships with their parents on which they rely for their development into fully autonomous agents.

This article brings an account of reasonable expectations to bear on the question of when unauthorized immigrants have a right to be regularized—that is, to be formally guaranteed freedom from the threat of deportation. Contrary to the current literature, which implicitly relies on a flawed understanding of reasonable expectations, this article argues that only those unauthorized immigrants who have both been tacitly permitted by the state despite lacking formal authorization and have remained long enough to develop deep social roots in the state have a right to regularization.

A challenging question regarding compensation for historic injustices like slavery or colonialism is whether there is anyone to whom it would be just to ascribe duties of compensation given that allegedly all the perpetrators--the guilty parties--are dead. Some answer this question negatively, arguing it is wrong to ascribe to anyone compensatory duties for injustices committed by others who died multiple generations ago. This objection to compensation for historic injustice, which I call the Historical Responsibility Objection (HRO), takes as its core premises (1) that one must be guilty of wrongdoing with respect to a given historic injustice in order to bear a duty to compensate for the injustice, and (2) that no one alive today can be considered so guilty because no one alive today was alive when the historic injustice occurred. The result is that we cannot ascribe compensatory duties to anyone for any historic injustic. While all arguments I am aware of that refute HRO reject premise (1), this paper sketches a novel refutation of HRO by exploring the implications of rejecting premise (2). Doing so would invoke the state as a collective agent, distinct from its constitutive individual agents, liable to acquire compensatory duties for wrongs it commits that none of its constitutive individuals bear. To the extent that states that are collective agents committed historic injustices, such states have duties to compensate for historic injustice.

A recent challenge to statist arguments defending the right of states to exclude prospective immigrants maintains that such statist arguments prove too much. Specifically, the challenge argues that statist arguments, insofar as they are correct, entail that states may permissibily exclude current members' newcomers by birth, which seems to violate a widely held intuition that members' newcomers by birth ought automatically to be granted membership rights. The basic claim is that statist arguments cannot account for the differntial treatment between prospective immigrants and newcomers by birth. Call this the newcomer-by-birth objection. This article rejects the newcomer-by-birth rejection. It begins by sketching the precise extent to which the objection applies to statist arguments. It then examines the case of newcomers by birth and argues for a principled basis for treating them differentially from prospective immigrants such that a right to exclude prospective immigrants need not entail a right to exclude newcomers by birth. But this distinction holds only in most cases, not all, and therefore the newcomer-by-birth objection is not entirely defeated. With respect to the cases in which the objection does hold, it is argued that such cases are morally akin to international adoption, and thus morally benign. All considered, statist arguments easily survive the newcomer-by-birth objection.