Thomas Carson

This chapter examines arguments about the morality of lying and the limits of our knowledge about the rightness and wrongness of lying. It defends a version of the golden rule and several other rationality requirements as negative tests for moral judgments. It argues that certain moral views can be discredited or shown to be false, but that, for many moral issues, including lying, there is a range of reasonable but incompatible views. These reasonable views include both act-utilitarianism and Ross’s theory, but not egoism or absolutism. The author conjectures that the range of reasonable views excludes all views that permit lying in cases in which _both_ act-utilitarianism and Ross’s theory prohibit it—lying is wrong in all cases in which both theories forbid it. The chapter concludes by addressing the moral relevance of the distinction between lying and deception.

Honesty is generally regarded as a cardinal virtue. In order to assess this conventional wisdom the chapter examines the arguments of several dissenters who reject it. Some argue that as lying and deception are frequently justified in certain spheres of life/activity, honesty is not a virtue (in those spheres). We need to distinguish between what, for lack of better terms, this chapter calls “honesty in a negative sense” (having a strong principled disinclination to tell lies or deceive others) and “honesty in a positive sense,” which (in addition to involving being disinclined to tell lies or deceive others) involves being candid, open, and willing to reveal information. The chapter argues that honesty in the negative sense (or something that closely resembles it) is a cardinal virtue in ordinary circumstances, but often honesty in the positive sense is not a virtue. The chapter also identifies spheres of activity in which candor and openness are virtues.

This chapter examines cases in which political leaders and public figures told lies or engaged in deception as a pretext for fighting wars. The examples given here include William Randolph Hearst, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, George W. Bush, and Dick Cheney. The chapter devotes particular attention to the case of Bush and Cheney and argues that they lied and attempted to deceive the public. Although this claim will strike many readers as obvious, it has not been adequately defended by those who make it. The journalists, public officials, and commentators who have accused Bush and Cheney of lying and deception do not offer careful definitions of lying and deception, much less a careful application of those definitions to the cases at issue. Certain features of my definition of lying are salient in these cases and help to show that Bush and Cheney lied and attempted to deceive the public – they strongly warranted the truth of claims that they knew were open to serious doubts. In most of these cases, lying and deception led to disastrous consequences and were morally wrong. However, the chapter argues that Franklin Roosevelt was morally justified in his lying and deception in order to aid Britain during the early stages of WWII. The chapter also discusses cases in which Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Dwight Eisenhower may have engaged in lying and deception in order to _avoid_ wars. These also seem be to cases of justifiable lying/deception.

The main thesis of this chapter is that deception and dishonesty can create or aggravate conflicts and sometimes lead to disastrous consequences and, that, therefore, this sort of deception and dishonesty is morally wrong. The chapter provides a detailed account the myth of the “stab in the back” (_Dolchstosslegende_) and Germany's defeat in WWI. The widespread acceptance of this myth by the German people was one of the central causes of the rise of Nazism and the Holocaust. The chapter discusses other cases of deception and lying that distorted the historical record and led to very bad consequences; the examples given here are the dishonest version of history defended by neo‐Confederates in the aftermath of the US Civil War and lies denying the crimes of Joseph Stalin by the New York correspondent Walter Duranty. Then the chapter explicates the important concept of “half‐truths.” Half‐truths mislead people and distort the truth but fall short of lying (often, they fall short of deception). Even when it falls short of lying and deception, endorsing half‐truths is often a form of intellectual dishonesty. The chapter discusses several cases in which half‐truths have distorted the historical record and thereby aggravated social/political conflicts. The concept of half‐truths has widespread application in personal relationships. The chapter concludes by offering a brief account of the virtue of intellectual honesty (with particular attention to intellectual honesty about political questions).

Often, professionals are in a position to advance their own financial interests by means of lying and deception, e.g., lying to a client to manipulate her into purchasing unneeded services. This creates very serious ethical problems because clients often have no way to assess the truth of what professionals tell them. We are at the mercy of professionals and need to rely on their honesty. This chapter presents examples that illustrate this important and wide‐spread phenomenon and argue that the financial benefits professionals often derive from deception create systemic conflicts of interest. Professionals should adhere to a strong presumption against lying and deception in their dealings with their clients. In addition, all, or almost all, professionals have a duty to warn others of potential health and safety hazards and refrain from steering clients/customers toward decisions they have reason to think will be harmful to them. Professionals who work on the understanding that they are acting as fiduciaries (or quasi‐fiduciaries) for the benefit of their clients/employers are obligated to do much more than this. They must be candid and provide salient information that clients/employers need. Those who have fiduciary duties to others have extensive positive duties to provide information to others – they must do more than refrain from lying and deception. Perhaps the most fully developed account of the obligation of individuals to provide information is found in the principle of informed consent in medicine. The chapter explains this principle and ask how far it can or should be extended to other professions. The chapter argues that informed consent is a good model for professionals who are hired and paid by their clients and have fiduciary duties to act for the benefit of their clients, but not for professionals who do not have fiduciary duties to their clients/customers.

This chapter discusses deception and bluffing in negotiations and focuses on the following kind of case: I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $350 000 is absolutely the lowest price that I will accept, when I know that I would be willing to accept as little as $320 000 for the house. In this case, I make a deliberate false statement about my intentions and bargaining position. Despite the strong presumption against harmful lying and deception in commercial transactions, lying and deception in negotiations can sometimes be justified on the ground of “self‐defense” if others are engaging in lying/deception and thereby gaining an advantage over one.

Deceptive advertising harms people in much the same ways as deception in sales and tends to be wrong for the same reasons. Deceptive ads harm consumers by causing them to have false beliefs about the nature of the products being advertised and thereby causing them to make different purchasing decisions than they would have made otherwise (and purchase things unsuitable for their needs). This chapter presents examples of deceptive ads that harm consumers and argue that running such ads is morally wrong. The chapter's arguments appeal to the presumption against harmful deception established in Chapters 6–8. The chapter then examines US laws regarding deceptive advertising. The law prohibits deceptive advertising, but it defines “deceptive advertising” too narrowly. US law frequently permits what is, in fact, deceptive advertising; therefore, following US laws is not an adequate ethical standard for advertisers. The chapter also addresses the objection that deceptive advertising is permissible if one's competitors are putting one at a disadvantage by means of their own deceptive practices.

The chapter argues that salespeople have _prima facie_ duties to: (1) warn customers of potential hazards; (2) refrain from lying and deception; (3) fully and honestly answer questions about what they are selling (insofar as their knowledge and time constraints permit); and (4) refrain from steering customers toward purchases they have reason to think will be harmful to customers. The chapter defend this theory by appeal to the version of golden rule and the strong presumption against harmful lying and deception established in Chapters 6 and 7. The chapter also analyzes cases of deception and withholding information in sales. This chapter gives the book's most detailed application of the golden rule to particular cases.

The rationality and consistency tests defended in Chapter 6 can be used to discredit and rule out certain moral principles and moral judgments and, thus, indirectly establish the truth of certain other moral judgments and moral principles. This chapter argues that there is a _large_ overlap or convergence in the moral judgments about lying and deception of people whose judgments satisfy rationality/consistency requirements. The moral principles and moral judgments about lying and deception that survive rationality and consistency tests support a moral presumption against harmful lying and deception that is _at least as strong as_ that endorsed by (welfare maximizing versions of) act-utilitarianism. Moral principles and moral judgments that claim or imply that lying or deception is permissible in cases in which it harms others and the harm it causes outweighs the benefits it produces fail rationality/consistency tests. In addition, the view that lying and/or deception are always wrong no matter what does not survive consistency and rationality tests.

This chapter develops a theory of moral reasoning in the form of rationality conditions for moral judgments. The chapter argues that moral judges must be: 1) consistent, 2) adequately informed by knowledge of relevant facts (this requires vividly understanding relevant considerations, including the feelings of others), and 3) able to reason properly and have properly functioning cognitive abilities. The chapter argues that requirements of consistency commit us to the following version of the golden rule: “If I think it would be morally permissible for someone to do a certain act to another person, then I must not object to someone doing the same act to me (or someone I love) in relevantly similar circumstances.” The chapter answers several well-known objections to the golden rule and illustrate how it can be applied to cases.

If lying and not lying will have exactly the same consequences, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it doesn't matter whether or not one lies. Ross claims that lying is _prima facie_ wrong, or wrong other things being equal. He holds that this is “self-evident.” Ross also thinks that it is obvious that it is wrong to lie when lying produces only slightly better consequences than not lying. In contrast with Ross, Moore claims that it is self-evident that we should always do whatever has the best consequences. Ross's criticisms of act-utilitarianism are inconclusive because they appeal to disputed moral intuitions and because he doesn't do enough to justify his own moral intuitions. Brad Hooker's argument in favor of his well-known version of rule-consequentialism is inconclusive for similar reasons — it rests on an appeal to disputed considered moral judgments that he doesn't adequately justify.

In several works, Kant claims that lying is always wrong, no matter what. He is probably the most well‐known defender of an absolute prohibition against lying in the history of Western philosophy. The chapter surveys what Kant says about lying in his writings. It is noteworthy that he never directly appeals to the categorical imperative in any of his arguments to show that lying is always wrong. The chapter argues that the universal law version of the categorical imperative does not imply that lying is always wrong – one can consistently will that everyone follows maxims or principles that sometimes permit lying. Korsgaard to the contrary, the second version of the categorical imperative, which says that we should never treat another person as a mere means, does not imply that lying is never permissible. The chapter contends that Korsgaard's arguments rest on contentious interpretations of several ambiguous passages in Kant. None of the versions of the categorical imperative commits Kant to an absolute prohibition against lying. Not only does Kant fail to give a compelling argument for an absolute prohibition against lying, there are positive reasons to reject his absolutism. The duty not to lie can conflict with other moral duties. If lying is always wrong no matter what, then the duty not to lie must _always_ be more important than any conflicting duty. However, it is most implausible to hold that the duty not to lie is _always_ more important than any conflicting duty. Kant's own example of lying to thwart the plans of a would‐be murderer is one of the best illustrations of this.

Act‐utilitarianism implies that lying is morally permissible when, and only when, there is no alternative course of action open to one that has better consequences than lying. Many critics contend that utilitarianism is too permissive about the morality of lying. Mill attempts to answer this objection in _Utilitarianism_ where he claims that lying always has indirect bad consequences (lying makes one less honest and undermines trust between people). Mill claims that, therefore, utilitarianism implies that there is a strong moral presumption against lying. The chapter defends Mill's argument and note two ways in which it can be extended and strengthened. First, there is another indirect bad consequence of lying that Mill does not mention – the difficulties that liars incur in trying to “keep their stories straight.” Second, in addition to the indirect bad consequences of lying (and deception), there are also direct bad consequences. We are (generally) harmed when we are deceived because we cannot effectively pursue our ends and interests if we act on the basis of false beliefs.

This chapter defines lying roughly as follows: a lie is a deliberate false statement that the speaker warrants to be true. Two features of this definition are noteworthy. First, contrary to most standard definitions, it argues that lying does not require that the liar intends to deceive others. (The chapter appeals to cases in which one is compelled or enticed to make false statements, cases of lying in which one can benefit by making false statements even if they do not deceive others, and cases of bald‐faced lies in which the liar knows that others know she is lying and therefore has no hope or intention of deceiving them.) Second, the chapter holds that in order to tell a lie, one must make a statement that one warrants to be true. According to the definition, any lie violates an implicit promise or guarantee that what one says is true. The definition makes sense of the common view that lying involves a breach of trust. To lie, on this view, is to invite others to trust and rely on what one says by warranting its truth, and at the same time to betray that trust by making a false statement that one does not believe to be true. The chapter discusses several published criticisms of the definition. The chapter isolates several criticisms that, while it is not certain, may require a refinement of the basic definition, and the chapter formulates a revised version of the definition that clearly answers them. According to the revised definition, lying requires that one _intends to warrant_ the truth of what one says but does not require that one actually warrants its truth, as in the original definition. Nothing that is said in the book depends on the subtle difference between these two definitions.

Deception can be defined roughly as intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs, but this definition needs to be qualified to deal with certain cases, including the following. I intentionally cause you to believe statement X and X is false, but I neither believe that X is true nor believe that X is false. The chapter also discuss several other cases that may require modifications of this definition and formulate several revised versions of the definition; the chapter counts cases in which people intentionally cause others to persist in false beliefs as cases of deception. There are two main differences between lying and deception. First, unlike “lying,” “deception” implies success. An act must actually cause someone to have false beliefs in order to count as a case of deception. Intentional false statements need not succeed in deceiving others in order to count as lies. Second, although a lie must be a false statement, deception need not involve making a false statement; true statements can be deceptive, and many forms of deception do not involve making statements of any sort. Thus, many instances of deception do not constitute lying. The chapter also explains the relationship between deception and the notions of withholding information, concealing information, “keeping someone in the dark,” “spin,” and “half‐truths,” and the chapter analyzes the relationship between lying, deception, and bullshit. Harry Frankfurt, to the contrary, suggests bullshit does not require the intent to deceive and bullshit can constitute lying. The chapter also argues that Frankfurt's famous claim that bullshitters, _qua_ bullshitters, are unlike liars in that they are unconcerned with the truth (unconcerned with knowing “how things are”) is mistaken. As Frankfurt claims that unconcern with the truth is the essence of bullshit, this shows that his analysis of bullshit is mistaken.

Normative nonrealism denies (a) that some things are good or bad or right or wrong independently of facts about the attitudes of moral agents, and (b) that attitude‐independent normative facts determine what is rational. An influential nonrealist approach to rationality comes from Richard Brandt's account of rationality in terms of “full information.” Using Brandt's account as illustrative, this paper identifies a serious problem for nonrealist normative theories based on theories of rationality. The paper argues that nonrealist accounts of rationality that oppose relativism cannot successfully handle the most serious threat from relativists: namely, a threat from a ‘Why care?’ open‐question argument that stems from the question why one should care about being rational in a certain respect or sense. The paper identifies the bearing of ‘Why care?’ questions on the conflict between internalism and externalism regarding practical reasons. The main lesson is that ‘Why care?’ questions wreak havoc for nonrelativist nonrealist approaches to rationality and reason‐based morality.

Becker attempts to formulate a defensible stoic ethical theory and claims that “a philosophically respectable version of stoic ethics is both possible and interesting”. This book is not an exposition or reconstruction of the views of ancient stoic philosophers. Becker claims that we should reject those elements of traditional stoicism that have been discredited by modern science; therefore, a defensible stoicism needs to dispense with the traditional stoic conception of “cosmic telos—the notion that the natural world is a purposive system with an end or goal that practical reason directs us to follow”. The chapters of the book are followed by commentaries that discuss the ancient stoic positions corresponding to the positions he defends in each chapter; Becker provides summaries of, quotations from, and references to classic stoic texts and contemporary commentators.

I begin by discussing views about the permissibility of lying by political leaders. Sections II and III address historically important lies and lies about history and the historical record. These two categories overlap - some lies about the historical record were historically important events. In section IV, I discuss the related notion of half-truths and give examples of misleading/deceptive half-truths about history. In the final section of this chapter, I briefly discuss the obligations of historians to give truthful accounts of historical events.

Thomas Carson offers the most comprehensive and up-to-date investigation of moral and conceptual questions about lying and deception. Part I addresses conceptual questions and offers definitions of lying, deception, and related concepts such as withholding information, "keeping someone in the dark," and "half truths." Part II deals with questions in ethical theory. Carson argues that standard debates about lying and deception between act-utilitarians and their critics are inconclusive because they rest on appeals to disputed moral intuitions. He defends a version of the golden rule and a theory of moral reasoning. His theory implies that there is a moral presumption against lying and deception that causes harm — a presumption at least as strong as that endorsed by act-utilitarianism. He uses this theory to justify his claims about the issues he addresses in Part III: deception and withholding information in sales, deception in advertising, bluffing in negotiations, the duties of professionals to inform clients, lying and deception by leaders as a pretext for fighting wars (with special attention to the case of Bush and Cheney), and lying and deception about history (with special attention to the Holocaust), and cases of distorting the historical record by telling half-truths. The book concludes with a qualified defence of the view that honesty is a virtue.Readership: Scholars and advanced students of philosophy, as well as historians and students of history (especially American history and the history of the Holocaust).