Thomas Colclough

There has been significant interest in addressing the underrepresentation of various demographic groups in philosophy. Indeed, many have proposed remedies at the disciplinary level. However, underrepresentation is an issue that varies by subfield in philosophy. Women, for example, are especially underrepresented in subfields considered formal (e.g., logic). As has already been argued in the existing literature, addressing underrepresentation, even within subfields, is not as simple as recruiting more students from underserved populations. Instead, we advocate for a student-centered approach, promoting inclusive pedagogy. In this paper, we share a case study in which we implemented feminist and trauma-informed interventions in two undergraduate formal logic courses and investigated their impact with respect to elements of structural injustice. We found that our interventions successfully eliminated existing gender-based differences in perceptions of self-efficacy and largely diminished students’ perceptions of the objectivity of logic, but were unsuccessful at changing students’ impressions of the broader applicability of logic. By sharing our interventions, we hope to provide educators with practical tools and ideas for implementing similar approaches in their classrooms. By sharing our results, we invite educators to reflect on the potential impact of similar approaches in formal philosophy courses and on tools for measuring that impact.

This paper ties together three threads of discussion about the following question: in accepting a system of axioms S, what else are we thereby warranted in accepting, on the basis of accepting S? First, certain foundational positions in the philosophy of mathematics are said to be epistemically stable, in that there exists a coherent rationale for accepting a corresponding system of axioms of arithmetic, which does not entail or otherwise rationally oblige the foundationalist to accept statements beyond the logical consequences of those axioms. Second, epistemic stability is said to be incompatible with the implicit commitment thesis, according to which accepting a system of axioms implicitly commits the foundationalist to accept additional statements not immediately available in that theory. Third, epistemic stability stands in tension with the idea that in accepting a system of axioms S, one thereby also accepts soundness principles for S. We offer a framework for analysis of sets of implicit commitment which reconciles epistemic stability with the latter two notions, and argue that all three ideas are in fact compatible.