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Thomas Lindley

University of Connecticut
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    13
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    11

 More details
  • University of Connecticut
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
Boston University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1952
Storrs, Connecticut, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Probability
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (13)
  •  73
    Oswald Spengler; a Critical Estimate (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 49 (19): 619-621. 1952.
    British Philosophy
  •  135
    Moore Omar Khayyam. Nominal definitions of ‘culture.’. Philosophy of science, vol. 19, pp. 245–256.Foster Lindley T.. Moore's nominal definitions of ‘culture.’ Philosophy of science, vol. 20, pp. 335–338.Moore Omar Khayyam. Dr. Lindley and “Nominal definitions of ‘culture’.” Philosophy of science, vol. 20, pp. 339–340
    with Omar Khayyam Moore
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (1): 85-86. 1959.
    Paradoxes, Misc
  •  81
    Professor Shwayder on "="
    Mind 66 (264): 532-537. 1957.
  •  73
    Is It the Coin That Is Biased?
    Philosophy 56 (217). 1981.
  •  88
    Moore's nominal definitions of 'culture'
    Philosophy of Science 20 (4): 335-338. 1953.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsSense-Datum Theories
  •  93
    `True' and `false'
    Journal of Philosophy 61 (13): 387-395. 1964.
  • C. West Churchman, "Theory of Experimental Inference" (review)
    Philosophical Forum 7 (n/a): 46. 1949.
    Continental Philosophy
  •  79
    Mr. Walhout's "objectivity and value"
    Journal of Philosophy 51 (6): 190-192. 1954.
    Moral Objectivity
  •  114
    The control factor in social experimentation
    Philosophy of Science 21 (3): 260-268. 1954.
    When the terms ‘control’ and ‘experiment’ are used in reference to the methodological procedures of the social sciences, frequently the question is raised as to whether or not the investigator uses the terms in the same sense as the natural scientist. The purpose of this paper is to show that the social scientist has good reason to use them in the same sense and that in fact this usage is consistent with a long tradition of social research. This will be shown by an investigation of some common a…Read more
    When the terms ‘control’ and ‘experiment’ are used in reference to the methodological procedures of the social sciences, frequently the question is raised as to whether or not the investigator uses the terms in the same sense as the natural scientist. The purpose of this paper is to show that the social scientist has good reason to use them in the same sense and that in fact this usage is consistent with a long tradition of social research. This will be shown by an investigation of some common assumptions in the social sciences, such as, the claim that the social sciences are younger than the natural sciences and that the former have depended upon the latter for methodological cues, that human behavior is ultimately inexplicable and unpredictable, and that the social scientist is unable to observe human behavior under controlled, experimental conditions except in trivial instances. Of course, not all social scientists make these assumptions but they occur in the literature and their significance is considerable when the scientific status of the social sciences is being discussed.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessPhilosophy of PsychologyPhilosophy of Sociology, Misc
  •  81
    Indeterminate and conditional truth-values
    Journal of Philosophy 59 (17): 449-458. 1962.
    Semantics
  •  26
    Ordinary Language and Ordinary Terms
    Atti Del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia 4 179-186. 1960.
  • The History of Historiography
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 37 (4): 379. 1956.
    Philosophy of History
  •  102
    Lying and falsity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2). 1971.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Lying
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