Thomas Hill

Contrasts common‐sense ideas of what is reasonable with current philosophical ideas of rational choice: maximizing self‐interest, efficiency and coherence in pursuit of one's ends, maximizing intrinsic value, and efficiency and coherence constrained by a Kantian ideal of co‐legislation. Contrary to the usual assumptions, the last corresponds more closely to common‐sense ideas than any of the other models do. This is not a proof of the Kantian ideal, or of common sense, but it calls for rethinking assumptions about self‐regarding and other‐regarding reasons for action.

Contrasts utilitarian, Kantian, and deep retributive views about the relations between wrongdoing and suffering because of one's wrongdoing. Kant maintains that, although wrongdoers are intrinsically liable to suffer self‐reproach and moral disapproval of others, wrongdoing does not entail “deserving to suffer” in a sense providing intrinsic practical reasons to inflict suffering. Arguably, even Kant's most infamous remarks on punishment fail to prove otherwise. Contrary to common impressions, Kant is best understood as holding a mixed theory in which the retributive policies that Kant endorses lack deep retributive justification. Some implications for the justice of current practices of punishment are explored.

The focus here is on what individuals value and pursue when considered apart from moral considerations. Personal values are contrasted with various kinds of moral values, but the central question is whether having the former commits one to the latter. Textual evidence casts doubt on the recently popular thesis that, in Kant's view, in setting ends agents thereby express a rational commitment to the objective goodness of their ends and acts. Unfortunately, influential Kantian arguments seem to use that dubious thesis to argue that even minimally rational agents are rationally committed to moral standards. A further troublesome issue considered here is whether, independently of debates about free will, Kant's idea that we “set ends” as an “act of freedom” implies an untenable voluntarism about how we come to have our basic goals.

Reviews briefly Kant's conceptions of punishment and conscience and then considers the role of punishment and conscience as motives in a moral life. From a Kantian perspective, both motives seem to lack moral worth. We note, however, that some motives, such as anticipation of grief and a desire to do worthy deeds, can be interpreted in two ways, one commendable and the other less so. By analogy, the essay argues that anticipation of punishment and pangs of conscience can motivate us in two different ways, one morally worthy and the other not.

Distinguishes basic and more extreme ideas underlying three related Kantian themes: that fundamental questions of moral philosophy require an a priori method, that moral duties are conceived as categorical imperatives, and that moral agents have autonomy of the will. Arguably, an a priori method is needed for analysis and assessment of rationality claims, and we can act on moral reasons implicit in the humanity formula without a sense of constraint or an objectionably impartial attitude. The idea of a noumenal world is not a premise of Kantian ethics, but a conclusion to which Kant thought his ethics inevitably led.

Offers an explanation of Kant's denial that there can be any genuine moral dilemmas and criticizes Alan Donagan's claim that we can put ourselves into a moral dilemma by our own wrongdoing. Although genuine moral dilemmas, in which one would be wrong no matter what one did, are impossible, “gaps” in moral theory may leave us with no resolution in tragic cases of moral conflict. Kantian moral theory has such gaps, but attempts to develop theories without such gaps are not necessarily desirable. Finally, the essay addresses “residues” of moral feeling and attitude after one has acted in a case of tragic conflict in which one could find no morally better option. Perhaps surprisingly, Kantians should affirm that, even though feeling guilty for the choice is inappropriate, there is an important sense in which one should feel especially bad about those one has harmed, and regret one's own role, in such cases.

This essay, responding to recent work of David Cummiskey and Barcia Baron, defends the thesis that imperfect duty of beneficence in Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals is a rather minimal, indeterminate requirement but must be supplemented by judgement guided by the values expressed in Kant's formulas of the Categorical Imperative. So understood, Kant's ethics is neither as permissive nor as inflexibly demanding as various commentators have thought. Although Kant does not acknowledge supererogation as a moral category, arguably his position implies that some acts are meritorious and more than required.

Reviews the role of happiness in Kant's moral and political philosophy and contrasts his ideas of happiness with ideas of human flourishing prominent in ancient philosophy. It considers possible reasons why Kant avoided the latter and worked instead with more subjective conceptions of happiness. This was apparently due not merely to historical influences or misunderstanding of ancient ethics but also to Kant's respect for the moral freedom of individuals to choose, within limits, the way of life they prefer. Kant's understanding of happiness affects his ideas of intrinsic value, prudence, beneficence, and the aim of government. Michael Slote's charge that Kantian ethics requires us to devalue our own happiness relative to others’ arguably rests on a flawed analogy between beneficence to others and promoting one's own happiness.

This essay regarding Kantian moral epistemology focuses specifically on one normative version of Kantian constructivism. The aim is to examine the justificatory role of actual, hypothetical, and possible consent in Kantian ethics. The importance of actual consent is more limited and derivative than commonly thought, and the difference between possible and hypothetical consent standards has been exaggerated. Review of formulas of the Categorical Imperative and the idea of an original contract confirms these claims, and familiar objections to appeals to hypothetical consent are not decisive against the Kantian position. For example, arguably, hypothetical agreement does not serve merely as a dubious proxy for actual consent, reduce value to empirical fact, alienate us from common moral standards, or depend on circular reasoning.

Kantian responses to three related questions are considered: Given the limits of our altruistic sentiments, is it possible for us to act beneficently as duty seems to require? What are we morally required to do for others besides respecting their rights? Why is this a reasonable requirement? Although the importance of empirical facts in deliberation is undeniable, the distinction between a practical deliberative point of view and the perspective of empirical inquiry proves to be crucial. Kant's grounds for an imperfect duty of beneficence are examined. From a deliberative perspective, we must assume that we can act beneficently, even when lacking altruistic sentiments, provided we understand the good reasons for doing so.

This contrasts Kant's view of conscience, and its merits, with alternative views. These alternatives are a popular religious view, a social relativist conception, and Joseph Butler's philosophical account. Kant's view avoids the epistemological problems of the first view, but accepts its idea that conscience is often experienced as an unsolicited voice. Kant denies the metaethical scepticism of social relativists, but agrees with them that conscience expresses a dissonance between our acts and our moral beliefs rather than an independent perception of what is truly right or wrong. Kant agrees with Butler that reason, in due reflection, is the source of justified moral beliefs, but he distinguishes moral reasoning and judgement about what acts are permissible from conscience, which is an inner forum in which a verdict of innocence or guilt is pronounced on the basis of the moral beliefs that we already have.

In Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant aims to articulate and defend “the supreme principle of morality.” He presents the elements of this basic principle in his famous formulations of the Categorical Imperative, which demand that we universalize our maxims, respect humanity as an end in itself, and conform to the moral principles that we will as rational persons with autonomy. Kantians disagree about the interpretation and relative importance of these various formulations, but most now agree that although they provide no algorithms, the formulations can be helpful in guiding moral deliberation and judgment. Hill explains the basic features of the formulations, reviews different interpretations, illustrates how they might guide judgment regarding the duty of beneficence, and notes various problems that each formulation raises.

This chapter describes and illustrates ideals of appreciation and positive expressions of respect in personal relationships and then argues that these are distinct from beneficence, that they are aspects of a full recognition of human dignity, and that they have important general and special implications for relationships involving persons with disabilities. The chapter emphasizes that especially among family, friends, and caregivers, proper respect for persons calls for positive affirmations and being open to appreciate the good in others and their lives and that appreciating them is more than respecting them and caring for their comfort and happiness. Respect and appreciation for and by us, as persons with disabilities, requires confronting and changing cultural stigmas that undermine these morally important attitudes.

Immanuel Kant is known for his ideas about duty and morally worthy acts, but his conception of virtue is less familiar. Nevertheless Kant’s understanding of virtue is quite distinctive and has considerable merit compared to the most familiar conceptions. Kant also took moral education seriously, writing extensively on both the duty of adults to cultivate virtue and the empirical conditions to prepare children for this life-long responsibility. Our aim is, first, to explain Kant’s conception of virtue, second, to highlight some distinctive and potentially appealing features of the Kantian account of virtue, third, to summarize and explain Kant’s prescriptions for educating young children and youth as well as the duty of moral self-improvement that he attributes to all adults, and, fourth, to respond to some common objections that we regard as misguided or insubstantial.

Thomas Hill, a leading figure in the recent development of Kantian moral philosophy, presents a set of essays exploring the implications of basic Kantian ideas for practical issues. The first part of the book provides background in central themes in Kant's ethics; the second part discusses questions regarding human welfare; the third focuses on moral worth -- the nature and grounds of moral assessment of persons as deserving esteem or blame. Hill shows moral, political, and social philosophers just how valuable moral theory can be in addressing practical matters.

Through a collection of new, previously unpublished essays, _The_ _Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics_ addresses diverse topics crucial to our understanding of Kant's moral philosophy and its implications for the modern age. Provides a fresh perspective on themes in Kant’s moral philosophy Addresses systematically Kant’s foundational work, _Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals_ and his more specific treatment of justice and virtue in _The Metaphysics of Morals_ Includes essays by both established scholars and rising stars Identifies common misperceptions of Kant's thought and challenges some prevailing interpretations Shows how Kant developed and supplemented his earlier ethical thought with specific discussions of practical issues in law, international relations, personal relations, and self-regarding virtues and vices

This chapter summarizes briefly what John Rawls meant by stability, the role it plays in Theory of Justice (TJ), and the outline of his main strategies for showing that a well‐ordered society based on his principles of justice would be relatively stable. It presents comments on Rawls's use of developmental moral psychology in support of his claim that societies based on justice as fairness would be relatively stable. The chapter discusses Rawls's conception of self‐respect, its role in his arguments for justice as fairness, and whether it is subject to a certain Kantian objection that echoes in our contemporary political culture. It argues that if Rawls's turn to an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines as the basis of stability in Political Liberalism (PL) was well motivated, then why not quietly bypass the earlier work on a sense of justice and self‐respect simply as an acknowledged failure.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Special Value of a Good Will and Acts from Duty Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives The Universal Law Formulas The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends Deriving the Supreme Moral Principle from Common Moral Ideas Why Kant Needs the Second‐Person Perspective Kant on Law and Justice Kant on Punishment Kant's Vision of a Just World Order Beneficence and Other Duties of Love Duties to Oneself and Duties of Respect to Others The Enduring Value of Kant's Ethics.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Special Value of a Good Will and Acts from Duty Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives The Universal Law Formulas The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends Deriving the Supreme Moral Principle from Common Moral Ideas Why Kant Needs the Second‐Person Perspective Kant on Law and Justice Kant on Punishment Kant's Vision of a Just World Order Beneficence and Other Duties of Love Duties to Oneself and Duties of Respect to Others The Enduring Value of Kant's Ethics.