Thomas Hurka

If acts can be supererogatory, presumably some can be more supererogatory than others, or further beyond the call of duty. This paper explains how this is possible within a general account of supererogation that sees it arising when a prima facie duty, for example to promote other people’s good, is outweighed by a prima facie permission to promote one’s own good. An act is then more supererogatory when the permission outweighs the duty by more, or when the gap between its strength and that of the duty’s is larger. The paper contrasts its permission-based account of supererogation with a more common one typified by Parfit in _On What Matters_, which rests it on a conflict between two ‘reasons’ that, despite their differing contents, are of the same deontic type and have the same favouring force. Alongside several other weaknesses, Parfit’s account doesn’t allow differing degrees of supererogation but must treat all supererogatory acts as on a par.

This comment discusses the book's positive account of the trolley problem, given in the Principle of Permissible Harm. This principle says an act that causes both a greater good and a lesser evil is impermissible if the evil results from a means to the good but can be permissible if the evil results from the good itself or from its noncausal flip side. This comment argues that this principle has counterintuitive implications—for example, that bombing an arms factory that kills nearby civilians is impermissible if the civilians are killed by flying pieces of bomb but permissible if they are killed by flying pieces of factory. It then argues that the principle lacks a persuasive philosophical rationale because it draws an arbitrary line in a sequence of means to an end and trades on an ambiguity in its understanding of “the greater good.”

This chapter discusses two topics: the basis of agent-relative permissions to produce less than the best outcome, and the relation between them and the partialist view that you have stronger duties to promote the good of those who are closer to you. The paper's first part argues against the common view that agent-relative permissions result from a conflict between two types of reason, prudential and impartial; instead, their basis is two underivative prima facie permissions, one to pursue your own good and another not to pursue it. When these permissions are weighed against a prima facie duty to promote the good of all people impartially, the result is a band of permissions within which you may permissibly promote your own lesser rather than another's greater good (up to a limit) or his lesser rather than your greater good (again up to a limit). The paper's second part argues that the location of this band is not constant but moves down as the person you can benefit becomes closer to you. With a stranger the band's location is quite high, so you are permitted a considerable degree of agent-favoring but not much agent-sacrifice; with a friend or even more so a spouse the band is lower, so you are permitted less agent-favoring and more agent-sacrifice. And the reason the band moves is that prima facie permissions of constant strength are weighed against a duty to promote another's good that, given a partialist view, is stronger when the other is closer to you. The paper's last claims are illustrated with especially attractive graphs.

This chapter examines Ross’s account of moral virtue as one of his four intrinsic goods and argues that in key respects it’s superior to the better-known accounts of Aristotle and Kant. Among the topics covered are: (1) Ross’s treatment of virtue as a secondary or derivative good, one that consists in fitting attitudes to other, independently given values or duties—this in contrast with many virtue-ethical views; (2) his sharp separation between the right and the morally good, so a wrong act can be virtuous and good; (3) his recognizing both de dicto and de re forms of virtue; (4) his making the primary locus of moral value occurrent attitudes rather than, as in Aristotle, dispositions; (5) his (unpersuasive) arguments that virtue is the greatest intrinsic good and the motive of duty the best motive; and (6) his interesting accounts of the moral worth of actions done from multiple motives or not done from a good motive that should be present and effective but isn’t.

This comment discusses the book's positive account of the trolley problem, given in the Principle of Permissible Harm. This principle says an act that causes both a greater good and a lesser evil is impermissible if the evil results from a means to the good but can be permissible if the evil results from the good itself or from its noncausal flip side. This comment argues that this principle has counterintuitive implications—for example, that bombing an arms factory that kills nearby civilians is impermissible if the civilians are killed by flying pieces of bomb but permissible if they are killed by flying pieces of factory. It then argues that the principle lacks a persuasive philosophical rationale because it draws an arbitrary line in a sequence of means to an end and trades on an ambiguity in its understanding of “the greater good.”

[Thomas Hurka] Using Bernard Suits's brilliant analysis of playing a game, this paper examines the intrinsic value of game-playing. It argues that two elements in Suits's analysis make success in games difficult, which is one ground of value, while a third involves choosing a good activity for the property that makes it good, which is a further ground. The paper concludes by arguing that game-playing is the paradigm modern as against classical value: since its goal is intrinsically trivial, its value is entirely one of process rather than product, journey rather than destination. /// [John Tasioulas] This paper contends that play, not achievement, is the primary intrinsic good internal to game-playing, and supports a relational, as opposed to formal, conception of achievement.

Continues the discussion of theoretical and practical perfection by examining the considerations that give some beliefs and intentions more quality and therefore value than others. It argues that Aristotelian considerations about rationality as essential to humans require measures of quality to be formal, considering only formal properties of beliefs and ends rather than their substantive content. There are two such measures: the extent of a belief's or end's content in space, time, and objects involved, and the degree to which different beliefs and ends are organized in a hierarchical structure. Together, these measures value explanatorily organized knowledge, a unified life, and complex, difficult activities such as games.

Argues for two claims about human essential properties that together constitute an “Aristotelian” theory of human nature. The first is that humans essentially have a physical nature involving circulatory, digestive, and other physiological systems; their functioning to a high degree constitutes good health and, beyond that, athletic excellence. The second is that humans are essentially rational, both theoretically and practically. This last claim yields the two main “Aristotelian” values of theoretical and practical perfection, which develop theoretical and practical rationality. The claim is defended both intuitively, in thought‐experiments, and by the analysis of psychological explanation, in which rationality plays a central role.

Discusses how different perfections are compared within a single life. After arguing that physical perfection has less value than theoretical or practical rationality while those are roughly equal in value, it defends a “balancing” view that prefers a well‐rounded achievement of different perfections and, beyond that, of different instances of the same perfection. Its key is the idea, represented on indifference graphs, that the relative value of an extra unit of perfection A as against B depends on the relative extent to which A and B have already been achieved. To the objection that this idea promotes dilettantish mediocrity, the chapter replies that two plausible empirical factors imply that the best practically available lives will usually specialize moderately on one perfection or perfectionist activity. Nonetheless, well‐roundedness remains in principle a perfectionist ideal.

Chapters 8–10 discuss the measurement of individual perfections, especially the theoretical and practical perfection that realize theoretical and practical rationality. This chapter introduces the basic structure of this measurement, which looks both to the number of certain states a person has – beliefs for theoretical perfection, intentions for practical perfection – and their score on a dimension of quality. It then elaborates on the dimension of number by discussing the further conditions a state must meet to count for perfection. Are all beliefs of a person relevant, or only those that are true, justified, or both? Do all the ends he intends count, or only those he achieves, is justified in believing he will achieve, or both? Discussion of these alternatives raises issues about romanticism, prudence, relations between the mind and world, and more.

Given some perfectionist values, whether derived from human nature or not, what is the structure of a moral view centered on them? This chapter argues that the most plausible perfectionism is consequentialist, identifying right actions by the quantity of good they result in; tells us to maximize the good rather than satisfice; and is time‐ and agent‐neutral, so we should care equally about perfections at all times and in all lives. That we should pursue others’ perfections as much as our own goes against a common view of narrow perfectionism as egoistic, but is necessary if the view does not make each person's perfection involve acting virtuously toward others. It can also be obscured if people can promote others’ perfection less well than their own and if their perfections often cooperate, so one's achieving them encourages rather than retards others’ doing so.

Discusses different possible understandings of human nature, e.g., that it consists in the properties distinctive of humans, essential to them, or distinctive –and essential. In the end, it defends a version of perfectionism mandating the development of those properties essential to humans and conditioned on their being living things. It then uses this version to answer standard objections to perfectionism, e.g., that human nature includes trivial or morally repellent properties; it also rejects the traditional view that each person's perfection necessarily involves acting morally or virtuously toward others.

This chapter further develops the perfectionist case for distributive equality by arguing that different people's perfections do not compete but often cooperate, so one person's achieving perfection encourages or requires others to do so. This cooperativeness is the core of Marx's argument for distributive equality and strengthens the case from natural abilities and diminishing marginal utility given in Ch. 12. The chapter then considers perfectionist arguments of Green and Bosanquet for private property and the free market, arguing that while these have some merit they do not overturn the general perfectionist case for equality; its arguments here echo those of Hobhouse.