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Why Epistemic Partiality is OverratedPhilosophical Topics 46 (1): 37-51. 2018.Epistemic partialism is the view that friends have a doxastic duty to overestimate each other. If one holds that there are no practical reasons for belief, we will argue, one has to deny the existence of any epistemic duties, and thus reject epistemic partialism. But if it is false that one has a doxastic duty to overestimate one’s friends, why does it so often seem true? We argue that there is a robust causal relationship between friendship and overestimation that can be mistaken for a constitu…Read more
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Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theoristPhilosophical Issues 33 (1): 22-32. 2023.
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Deference and UniquenessPhilosophical Studies 176 (3): 709-732. 2019.Deference principles are principles that describe when, and to what extent, it’s rational to defer to others. Recently, some authors have used such principles to argue for Evidential Uniqueness, the claim that for every batch of evidence, there’s a unique doxastic state that it’s permissible for subjects with that total evidence to have. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to assess these deference-based arguments for Evidential Uniqueness. I’ll show that these arguments only work given a …Read more
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Moral KnowledgeOxford University Press. 2019.
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Meta-Ethics |