Thomas Lepeltier

In Making a Stand for Animals, the philosopher Oscar Horta offers a rigorous critique of speciesism and its effects on animals. He then expands the traditional scope of animal ethics by addressing the situation of free-living animals and the moral status of future animals. Taking this framework as a starting point, the present article examines three issues that the book leaves open: the practical applicability of the principle of equal consideration of suffering, the moral problem of predation, and the long-term future of animals. In doing so, it seeks to extend Horta's analysis by exploring some of the most significant implications of his approach.

Summary During the 1930 and 1940s, the small world of cosmologists was buzzing with philosophical and methodological questions. The debate was stirred by Edward Milne's cosmological model, which was deduced from general principles that had no link with observation. Milne's approach was to have an important impact on the development of modern cosmology. But this article shows that it is an exaggeration to intimate, as some authors have done recently, that Milne's rationalism went on to infiltrate the discipline

To reinforce their positions, animal advocates often rely on scientific arguments. They have the impression that evolutionary theory and ethological studies, in showing that animals are related to us and that they are more intelligent than one used to think, strengthen their arguments. This article shows that, on the contrary, in most cases scientific discoveries of this kind are not useful for animal ethics. Indeed, the fact that animals are close to us is not the reason one should not exploit them. The simple knowledge that they are sentient, which predates modern science, should be sufficient. So making reference to science is often an inappropriate strategy for animal advocates.