Thomas Meier

‘Civilisation as a thin membrane stretched over chaos’ is Mark O’Donnell’s first impression of the neatly manicured lawn on an Auckland volcano, during his visit to discover why so many billionaires are prepping for the Apocalypse in New Zealand (O’Donnell, 2018). Nobody should approach the apocalyptic end of civilisation without a sense of humour because it is so full of contradictions and paradox. The apocalyptic imaginary that suffuses Silicon valley and its tech start ups is concerning. There is an irreverent juxtaposition of gigantic Promethean optimism and pessimistic acknowledgement of the Anthropocene, from which emerges a supercharged libertarian viscera where the super rich manage to keep extracting coin from the collapse of civilisation as we know it.

The ascent of tech billionaires—and, depending on the market, soon trillionaires—signals more than a shift in global economic structures; it marks a transformation in the moral and cultural conditions under which democratic life is sustained. This contribution offers a communitarian critique of Big Tech’s influence, grounded in the philosophical frameworks of Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and virtue ethicist Shannon Vallor, and further supported by public goods theory and economic insights from Paul Samuelson and Joseph Stiglitz, with Elinor Ostrom’s work emphasizing the civic importance of collective stewardship. It contends that the challenge to democracy posed by concentrated digital power is not merely institutional, economic, or ethical, but a disruption of the very conditions for democratic citizenship.

Newman’s objection can be used to argue that structuralism fails to specify a unique structure for the unobservable world, and hence, one can argue, it is ultimately a trivial task to determine the structure that the world ultimately has. Provided there are enough objects, any structure can be made compatible with that structure. We formulate a pragmatically enriched version of structuralism that avoids the Newman objection. For this purpose, we return to Carnap’s conception of founded relations, and provide a different interpretation of them. According to Carnap, these are real, experienceable, physical relations. We argue that, when we specify a structural description of a given physical system, if we rely on such founded relations—provided they are properly understood—the threat of the Newman objection is avoided. However, pure structuralism has to be given up, and a form of empiricism can then be advanced. Finally, by using founded relations, we offer a framework in terms of which different conceptions can be articulated to avoid the Newman problem as well.

A form of structural realism affirms that, when our theories change, what is always retained is their structural content and that there is structural continuity between our theories, even through radical theory change. I first introduce and discuss structural realism, with a focus on structural realism and change theory. Then, I will consider some critiques on structural realism. In order to address them, I introduce the framework of the so-called structuralist metatheory and allude to the notion of reduction, arguing that this notion provides the formal elucidation of the notion structural continuity. This aims to get a precise notion of continuity of structure, which is central to structural realism and to the understanding of theory change. In this sense, I propose a new way of formulating structural realism in an appropriate formal framework, namely, the framework of structuralist metatheory.

The aim of this work is to provide a historical reconstruction of the interconnections between Carnap’s Aufbau, Kuhn’s model of theory change, and the structuralist view of scientific theories. I will discuss how the structuralist view takes its motivations from Carnap’s early work, especially from the Aufbau. Carnap’s idea of purely structural definite descriptions exposed in the Aufbau can be seen analogous with the goal of the structuralist view of representing our knowledge about scientific theories structurally. Such Carnapian purely structural definite descriptions of our knowledge guarantee the objectivity and intersubjectivity of our claims. In the same way, structuralist philosophy of science aims to provide objective and ontologically neutral descriptions of the logical structure of our scientific theories. As a further step, I will also discuss how the development of the structuralist view is strongly motivated by Kuhn’s conception of theory change.

The purpose of this work is to outline a new approach to the debate on structural realism. This position has been criticized in the recent literature. First, the two arguments which led to the introduction of structural realism into the debate on scientific realism are introduced, namely, the “no-miracles Second, argument” the and framework the of “pessimistic structuralist meta induction”. meta-theory is introduced in order to argue as follows. Once this framework is adapted, it is possible to respond to the critiques that have been made to structural realism and to clarify this position, especially the notion of structural continuity.

In this work we present a logical reconstruction of Leonard Bloom- field’s theory of structural linguistics. First, the central notions of this theory are analyzed and discussed. In the following section, a recon- struction with the so-called structuralist approach in the philosophy of science is presented. After defining the general framework of Bloom- field’s theory, questions of lawlikeness and theoretical terms will be discussed. In a further step, this work aims to contribute to the dis- cussion of theory change and scientific realism, applied to linguistic theory. After the reconstruction of further theories of linguistics, it can be studied whether certain inter theoretical relations hold. It aims to be a contribution to the discussion on the foundations of linguistics.