Thomas Minguy

In Imagining Salvation: The Narratives and Imaginaries of Spinoza’s Philosophy, I propose a philosophical theory of imagination founded on Spinoza’s philosophy. Moving away from a philosophical tradition that considers imagination as a power of illusion, fantasy, and falsity, I suggest that imagination, in a Spinozan perspective, is a power to signify reality. This means that imagination is different from reason, without having to be overcome by the latter. Rather, my work shows that to imagine is to interpret the world through narratives representing human power. The importance and ambivalence of such narratives in human experience are the guiding thread of my research. In the first half of the dissertation, I root my theory of imagination in Spinoza’s ontology and philosophy of mind. My claim is that through imagination, we make sense of reality by organizing it as a coherent whole. Furthermore, we are affectively invested in this narrative of reality: we naturally strive to see the world as offering possibilities for empowering ourselves. The second half of the dissertation builds on this theory of imagination to see its political effects. Starting with a presentation of the role of imagination in Spinoza’s political philosophy, I ultimately show how different kinds of narratives play an important role in our representation of political identity. Considering the dangers of utopianism and the resources of historical narratives, I ultimately show how imagination should be seen as a powerful human power – one through which we can empower ourselves and others. ans 'Imagining Salvation: The narratives and Imaginaries of Spinoza's Philosophy', je propose une théorie philosophique de l'imagination, fondée dans la pensée de Spinoza. Dans cette proposition, je m'éloigne d'une tradition philosophique qui caractérise l'imagination comme une puissante source d'illusions, de fantaisies, et de faussetés, suggérant plutôt que dans une perspective spinozienne, imaginer, c'est signifier la réalité. Ceci veut dire que l'imagination diffère de la raison, sans toutefois devoir être dépasser par cette-dernière. Au contraire, mes recherches démontrent qu'imaginer, c'est interpréter le monde à l'aide de récits afin de représenter la puissance humaine. L'importance et l'ambivalence de ces récits dans l'expérience humaine constituent les fils conducteurs de mon interprétation. Dans la première moitié de cette dissertation, je fonde ma théorie de l'imagination dans l'ontologie et la philosophie de l'esprit de Spinoza. Ma thèse principale est qu'à l'aide de l'imagination, nous donnons un sens à la réalité en l'organisant comme un tout cohérent. De plus, nous sommes affectivement investis dans cette narrativité de la réalité: nous cherchons naturellement à représenter le monde comme nous offrant des possibilités pour augmenter notre puissance. La seconde moitié de mon travail se base sur cette théorie de l'imagination afin de détailler ses effets dans la vie politique. Commençant par une présentation du rôle de l'imagination dans la philosophie politique de Spinoza, je démontre ultimement comment différents types de récits jouent un rôle important dans notre représentation des identités politiques. Considérant les dangers de l'utopisme et les ressources offertes par les récits historiques, je suggère que l'imagination devrait être pensée comme une grande puissance humaine -- une puissance qui permet de libérer soi-même et les autres.

This paper argues that we find a double deduction of the origin of society in Spinoza’s philosophy. The site of this doubleness is in E4p37, where Spinoza offers two distinct demonstrations for the same phenomenon. Paying close attention to this double articulation highlights important features of Spinozian social and political philosophy. As Étienne Balibar noted, the two demonstrations operate according to two dimensions of human existence, namely rationality and affectivity. Through rationality, human beings are necessarily in harmony; through affectivity, human beings are in an ambivalent relationship towards one another. The root of this ambivalence, Balibar argued, is the structure of imitation that rules human interactions. Accordingly, the task of politics is to avoid the inimical tendencies of the said ambivalence through artful strategies. In this paper, I aim to sharpen Balibar’s reading by proposing a reading of E4p37 that focuses on a little-discussed distinction between commonality and similarity. This distinction bleeds into social life and becomes the difference between the apolitical community of friends and the political society of citizens. In other words, through a close re-reading of E4p37 that puts it in relation with Spinoza’s political works, I argue that rationality cultivates harmony under the guise of friendship, while politics is an art that shapes the category of the similar, thus drawing the contour of the fellow-citizen. Hence, politics seeks to imitate friendship, and it can only do so by shaping our judgement concerning the similarity of the other.

The figure of Eros is permeated with a logic of lack and fulfillment. As a figure of desire that seeks to be filled, that craves the ineffable, Eros is appropriately described by Plato as the child of poverty and abundance. It is a form of desire that seeks to take what lies outside, to possess the unpossessed and to devour what is desirable. Is it possible, however, to conceive of Eros—and eroticism—as something that is not working according to the traditional logic of desire? Such seems to be the task of Georges Bataille’s philosophy. Refusing the vision of Eros as a quest for pleasure, he developed a thought of eroticism as sovereignty through evil. This article aims at exploring what this evil entails; what a transgression of moral norms, seriousness, and selfhood means. Bataille is famously considered to be a thinker fascinated by evil, and it seems that such a consideration is too easily a reason to avoid him. I would like to show that his thoughts concern freedom, sovereignty and community. Through erotic transgressions, Bataille saw the possibility for true human freedom and communication. Evil as liberation and not Eros as pleasure. I take on a new approach regarding Eros through an exploration of Bataille’s notions of continuity, morality, transgression, death and holiness. The first part of the article will set down the basis of Bataille’s thought. The second will deal in detail with transgression and death, and finally I will deal with holiness, thus making the final step on the path to sovereignty.