Thomas Regan

(1938 - 2017)

This paper presents a design for a social and political philosophy course for fourth- and fifth-year undergraduates. The theoretical foundation of the courses is based upon Rawls' theory of original position as a starting point to engage with the history of political thought. Students are able to approach problems in the history philosophy through a practical investigation of contemporary structural issues in public policy. The success of the course lies in students’ engagement with an in-class theoretical and hands-on research project that develops over the course of a semester.

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THREE QUESTIONS: (1) HOW CAN A TRIUNE NOTION OF GOD BE ACCOMMODATED IN WHITEHEAD’S DI-POLAR THEISM? (2) HOW CAN GOD BE THREE PERSONS AND YET ONE ACTUAL ENTITY? AND (3) HOW CAN GOD BE BOTH IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT? AFTER LOOKING AT THE WORK OF JOSEPH BRACKEN, S J AND LEWIS FORD ON THESE QUESTIONS, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT WHITEHEAD’S PHILOSOPHY CANNOT SERVE AS THE GROUND FOR A TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY WITHOUT INVOLVING MAJOR DISTORTIONS OF HIS ORIGINAL POSITION

An argument for denying moral rights to nonhuman species is that beliefs, desires, and interests are inherent in the normal human capacity for speech and, since only humans are linguistically capable, only humans can have rights. We argue that linguistics and many conceptual abilities are ontogenetically independent in humans and that various morally relevant mental capacities can exist independently. We also then argue that phylogenetic independence is also possible and hence, that the concept of an inherent dependence of moral standing on having linguistic capabilities is insufficient for denying rights to nonhumans

A conception of an environmental ethic is set forth which involves postulating that nonconscious natural objects can have value in their own right, independently of human interests. Two kinds of objection are considered: (1) those that deny the possibility (the intelligibility) of developing an ethic ofthe environment that accepts this postulate, and (2) those.that deny the necessity of constructing such an ethic. Both types of objection are found wanting. The essay condudes with some tentative remarks regarding the notion of inherent value.

Donald VanDeVeer has again forwarded the debate over the morality of our treatment of animals, this time by focusing attention on certain arguments used in defense of vegetarianism. Since I am identified as the principal, though not alway the sole perpetrator of these arguments I would like to respond to VanDeVeer's most important remarks. For while I readily concede that there is at least much that is incomplete in my arguments for vegetarianism and for the more humane treatment of animals generally, it is not clear to me that VanDeVeer quite puts his finger on where my arguments are open to this objection or, if and when he does, that he draws the correct conclusion from this.