Thomas Rowe

Questions of fair allocation arise regularly throughout our lives, ranging from the trivial to the significant, for governments, private companies, associations, families, and friends. This article discusses the nature of allocative fairness, which is focused on the fair distribution of divisible and indivisible goods. The recent literature on allocative fairness takes John Broome's discussion of fairness as the proportional treatment of claims as its starting point. On this view, a claim is a reason why an individual ought to receive a good. This article discusses the nature of allocative fairness, claims, and goods. The most prominent allocative procedures in the literature are discussed, including equal allocation, equitable allocation, markets, lotteries, and queues.

In the spring of 2009, a novel strain of the H1N1 influenza virus, containing a never before witnessed combination of gene segments from human influenza, two forms of swine influenza, and avian influenza, 1 was declared a global pandemic. The UK Government had to decide whether to undertake, at a cost of £1.2 billion (USD 1.9 billion at the time, equivalent to 1 percent of that year’s health budget), an extensive set of preparatory measures, including the purchase of both antiviral medication and a novel vaccine in quantities sufficient to cover the entire UK population, or whether instead to take substantially less costly measures, which would involve having only a limited supply of these medicines and vaccines at hand.2 The possible.

Questions of fair allocation arise regularly throughout our lives, ranging from the trivial to the significant, for governments, private companies, associations, families, and friends. This article discusses the nature of allocative fairness, which is focused on the fair distribution of divisible and indivisible goods. The recent literature on allocative fairness takes John Broome's discussion of fairness as the proportional treatment of claims as its starting point. On this view, a claim is a reason why an individual ought to receive a good. This article discusses the nature of allocative fairness, claims, and goods. The most prominent allocative procedures in the literature are discussed, including equal allocation, equitable allocation, markets, lotteries, and queues.

This paper examines and evaluates a range of methodologies that have been proposed for making useful claims about the probability of phenomena that would contribute to existential risk. Section One provides a brief discussion of the nature of such claims, the contexts in which they tend to be made and the kinds of probability that they can contain. Section Two provides an overview of the methodologies that have been developed to arrive at these probabilities and assesses their advantages and disadvantages. Section Three contains four suggestions to improve best practice in existential risk assessment. These suggestions centre on the types of probabilities used in risk assessment, the role of methodology rankings including the ranking of probabilistic information, the extended use of expert elicitation, and the use of confidence measures to better communicate uncertainty in probability assessments. Finally, Section Four provides an annotated literature review of catastrophic and existential risk probability claims as well as the methodologies that were used to produce each of them.

When and why is it wrong to impose a pure risk of harm on others? A pure risk of harm is a risk that fails to materialise into the harm that is threatened. It initially seems puzzling on what grounds a pure risk of harm can be wrong. There have been multiple attempts to explain the wrongness of imposing risk either by reference to the badness of the risked outcome itself or to impacts on the victim, such as harm. In this article, I argue that these approaches are unsatisfactory. Instead, I motivate another approach, what I call a wronging-first approach to the wrongness of imposing pure risk of harm. This approach explains the wrongness of imposing risk of harm in virtue of it being a wronging. As an example of this approach, I put forward the Adequate Concern Account, which holds that an imposition of a risk of harm is wrong in virtue of the act failing to consider the victim's equal moral standing as a stringent source of constraints on conduct. I close by demonstrating the superiority of this approach and account to existing outcome-based approaches.

How should we make distributive decisions when there is not enough of the good to go around, or at least not enough of it right now? What does fairness require in such cases? In what follows, we distinguish between cases of scarcity and bottleneck cases, and we argue that both arguments for lotteries and arguments for queues have merit, albeit for different distributive scenarios. When dealing with scarcity not everyone can get the good. A secondary good that can be distributed fairly is the chances of obtaining the good. In cases of scarcity, lotteries are the best way of allocating chances of obtaining the good fairly. When dealing with bottlenecks, the secondary good that can and ought to be distributed fairly is waiting time. Queues are best suited to distribute the good of waiting time fairly.

Defenders of the Everettian version of quantum mechanics generally hold that it makes no difference to what we ought to do. This paper will argue against this stance, by considering the use of lotteries to select the recipients of indivisible goods. On orthodox non-Everettian metaphysics this practice faces the objection that only actual and not probable goods matter to distributive justice. However, this objection loses all force within Everettianism. This result should be of interest to both philosophers of physics and to ethicists.

Many activities impose risks of harm on other people. One such class of risks are those that individuals culpably impose on others, such as the risk arising from reckless driving. Do such risks in themselves constitute a harm, over and above any harm that actually eventuates? This paper considers three recent views that each answer in the affirmative. I argue that each fails to overcome what I call the ‘interference objection’. The risk of harm itself, whether taken as a subjective or an objective risk, is unable to interfere with the interests of victims in order to constitute a harm. This does not mean that a risk of harm cannot itself be wrongful, but the conclusion does weaken the moral objectionableness of impositions of risks of harm.

This paper offers a novel account of how complaints of unfairness arise in risky distributive cases. According to a recently proposed view in distributive ethics, the Competing Claims View, an individual has a claim to a benefit when her well-being is at stake, and the strength of this claim is determined by the expected gain to the individual’s well-being, along with how worse off the individual is compared to others. If an individual is at a lower level of well-being than another, their claim to a given benefit is stronger. On this view, the strength of individuals’ claims are a function of their comparative well-being levels. In this paper, I instead argue that competing claims obtain only when a particular relationship obtains between the fates of individuals: that one individual’s gain is at the expense of another. This is a particular complaint that obtains when the fates of individuals are tied together in such a way that inequality that is to the detriment of the person who is worse off is guaranteed to obtain. I demonstrate that this complaint arises only when individuals are exposed to a particular type of risk that allows some to gain only if others lose. As such, I propose that complaints of unfairness occur less frequently than we might think if we take the Competing Claims View to be true. A purely comparative view is unable to account for this unique complaint of unfairness. I argue that this complaint is not only independently plausible, but can serve as a foundation for a more general account of competing claims complaints.

Decision-makers face severe uncertainty when they are not in a position to assign precise probabilities to all of the relevant possible outcomes of their actions. Such situations are common—novel medical treatments and policies addressing climate change are two examples. Many decision-makers respond to such uncertainty in a cautious manner and are willing to incur a cost to avoid it. There are good reasons for taking such an uncertainty-averse attitude to be permissible. However, little work has been done to incorporate it into an egalitarian theory of distributive justice. We aim to remedy this lack. We put forward a novel, uncertainty-averse egalitarian view. We analyse when the aims of reducing inequality and limiting the burdens of severe uncertainty are congruent and when they conflict, and highlight practical implications of the proposed view. We also demonstrate that if uncertainty aversion is permissible, then utilitarians must relinquish a favourite argument against egalitarianism.

This thesis engages with the following three questions. First, how should the presence of risk and ambiguity affect how we distribute a benefit to which individuals have competing claims? Second, what is it about the imposition of a risk of harm itself, such as the playing of Russian roulette on strangers, which calls for justification? Third, in the pursuit of the greater good, when is it permissible to foreseeably generate harms for others through enabling the agency of evildoers? Chapters 1 through 3 of the thesis provide an answer the first question. Chapter 1 defends the importance of a unique complaint of unfairness that arises in risky distributive cases: that sometimes individuals are better off at the expense of others. Chapter 2 defends a view called Fairness as Proper Recognition of Claims which guides how a decision-maker ought to act in cases where individuals have unequal claims to a good. Chapter 3 considers how the presence of ambiguity affects distributive fairness, and defends an egalitarian account of the evaluation of ambiguous prospects. Chapter 4 provides an answer to the second question through a defence of the Insecurity Account, which is a unique way in which impositions of risks of harm can be said to harm individuals, namely by rendering the victim’s interests less secure. Chapter 5 provides an answer to the third question by defending what I call the Moral Purity Account, to explain when it is permissible to provide aid in cases where individuals are harmed as a foreseeable consequence of the provision of such aid.