Prominent figures in the philosophical literature on
attention hold that the connection between attention and selection is
essential (Mole, 2011), necessary (Wu, 2011; 2014), or conceptual
(Smithies, 2011). I argue that selection is neither essentially,
necessarily, nor conceptually tied to attention. I first isolate the target
conception of selection that I deny is so tightly coupled with attention:
graded intramodal selection within consciousness. I analyse two
visual cases: analysis of the fi…
Read moreProminent figures in the philosophical literature on
attention hold that the connection between attention and selection is
essential (Mole, 2011), necessary (Wu, 2011; 2014), or conceptual
(Smithies, 2011). I argue that selection is neither essentially,
necessarily, nor conceptually tied to attention. I first isolate the target
conception of selection that I deny is so tightly coupled with attention:
graded intramodal selection within consciousness. I analyse two
visual cases: analysis of the first case shows that there can be
attention without a connection to tasks or action; analysis of the
second case shows that there can be attention without a phenomenal
foreground/background structure. Finally, I extend the argument into
the domain of the body by considering a form of meditative absorption
in body sensations to recapitulate the conclusions drawn from the two
visual cases.