•  145
    Can we define mental disorder by using the criterion of mental dysfunction?
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1): 35-47. 2010.
    The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the heart serves the …Read more
  •  131
    The significance of the concept of disease for justice in health care
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (2): 121-135. 2007.
    In this paper, I want to scrutinise the value of utilising the concept of disease for a theory of distributive justice in health care. Although many people believe that the presence of a disease-related condition is a prerequisite of a justified claim on health care resources, the impact of the philosophical debate on the concept of disease is still relatively minor. This is surprising, because how we conceive of disease determines the amount of justified claims on health care resources. Therefo…Read more
  •  82
    ‘I hope that I get old before I die’: ageing and the concept of disease
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (3): 171-187. 2013.
    Ageing is often deemed bad for people and something that ought to be eliminated. An important aspect of this normative aspect of ageing is whether ageing, i.e., senescence, is a disease. In this essay, I defend a theory of disease that concludes that ageing is not a disease, based on an account of natural function. I also criticize other arguments that lead to the same conclusion. It is important to be clear about valid reasons in this debate, since the failure of bad analyses is exploited by pr…Read more
  •  77
    Being Amoral. Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity (edited book)
    MIT Press. 2014.
    Psychopathy has been the subject of investigations in both philosophy and psychiatry and yet the conceptual issues remain largely unresolved. This volume approaches psychopathy by considering the question of what psychopaths lack. The contributors investigate specific moral dysfunctions or deficits, shedding light on the capacities people need to be moral by examining cases of real people who seem to lack those capacities. -/- The volume proceeds from the basic assumption that psychopathy is no…Read more
  •  77
    Moral Theory and Theorizing in Healthcare Ethics
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4): 365-368. 2011.
    Moral Theory and Theorizing in Healthcare Ethics Content Type Journal Article Category Editorial Pages 365-368 DOI 10.1007/s10677-011-9291-x Authors Mike McNamee, College of Human and Health Sciences, Swansea, SA28PP UK Thomas Schramme, Universität Hamburg, Philosophisches Seminar, Von-Melle-Park 6, 20146 Hamburg, Germany Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820 Journal Volume Volume 14 Journal Issue Volume 14, Number 4
  •  72
    New trends in philosophy of psychiatry
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1): 1-4. 2010.
  •  66
    On Being Wholeheartedly Ambivalent: Indecisive Will, Unity of the Self, and Integration by Narration (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1): 27-40. 2014.
    In this paper, I want to discuss the relation between ambivalence and the unity of the self. I will raise the question whether a person can be both ambivalent about his own will and nevertheless be wholehearted. Since Harry Frankfurt’s theory is my main point of reference, I briefly introduce his account of the will and the reasons for his opposition towards ambivalence in the first section. In the second section, I analyse different interpretations of ambivalence. In the third section, I provid…Read more
  •  47
    Die politische Quacksalberei des libertären Paternalismus
    Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (1): 531-558. 2016.
    Der libertäre Paternalismus befürwortet Eingriffe in die Entscheidungsfindung von Bürgern, ohne ihnen Optionen völlig nehmen zu wollen. Vielmehr soll die Lenkung des Willens durch Schubser geschehen. Im folgenden Beitrag möchte ich zeigen, dass der libertäre Paternalismus auf tönernen Füßen steht. Ich bediene mich dabei des polemischen Bilds von Quacksalbern. Dieses Bild passt zu meinem argumentativen Vorgehen, da ich erstens zeigen will, dass der libertäre Paternalismus falsche Diagnosen über v…Read more
  •  47
    In this paper, I will focus on the role that findings of the empirical sciences might play in justifying normative claims in political philosophy. In the first section, I will describe how political theory has become a discipline divorced from empirical sciences, against a strong current in post-war political philosophy. I then argue that Rawls’s idea of reflective equilibrium, rightly interpreted, leads to a perspective on the matter of justification that takes seriously empirical findings rega…Read more
  •  44
    A qualified defence of a naturalist theory of health
    Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10 (1): 11-17. 2006.
    The paper contrasts Lennart Nordenfelt’s normative theory of health with the naturalists’ point of view, especially in the version developed by Christopher Boorse. In the first part it defends Boorse’s analysis of disease against the charge that it falls short of its own standards by not being descriptive. The second part of the paper sets out to analyse the positive concept of health and introduces a distinction between a positive definition of health (‘health’ is not defined as absence of dise…Read more
  •  42
    Lennart Nordenfelt’s theory of health: Introduction to the theme (review)
    Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10 (1): 3-4. 2006.
    The paper contrasts Lennart Nordenfelt’s normative theory of health with the naturalists’ point of view, especially in the version developed by Christopher Boorse. In the first part it defends Boorse’s analysis of disease against the charge that it falls short of its own standards by not being descriptive. The second part of the paper sets out to analyse the positive concept of health and introduces a distinction between a positive definition of health and a positive conception of health. An obj…Read more
  •  40
    Christopher Boorse and the Philosophy of Medicine
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6): 565-571. 2014.
    In 2012, the symposium "Christopher Boorse and the Philosophy of Medicine" was held at the University of Hamburg. The initial ideas presented at this event, which celebrated Chris's contribution to the development of what is now a vibrant area of research, especially to the theory of disease, form the core of the papers published in this issue. Similarly to what Robert Nozick once said about John Rawls's work, it can be demanded that philosophers of medicine must now either work within Boorse's …Read more
  •  38
    New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care (edited book)
    Springer Verlag. 2015.
    Decision-making capacity or mental competence is one of the most intensively discussed concepts in contemporary bioethics and medical ethics. In this paper I argue that anorexia nervosa, an eating disorder primarily afflicting adolescent girls and young women, seriously challenges what I label the traditional account of decision-making capacity. In light of these results, it may in addition be necessary to rethink a certain popular type of paternalistic argumentation that grounds the justificati…Read more
  •  34
    The chapter starts from a specific interpretation of what it means to know the difference between right and wrong, which stems from Gilbert Ryle. To know the difference between right and wrong implies caring about morality. The author links Ryle’s ideas to the notion of being a moral person. Two different ideas found in moral philosophy are delineated, namely, the amoral person, that is, someone who rejects the demands of morality, and the morally incapacitated person, that is, someone who canno…Read more
  •  33
    Barbara Bleisch/ Peter Schaber (eds.), Weltarmut und Ethik, Paderborn: Mentis 2007, 342 pp (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2): 253-255. 2011.
  •  32
    The Future of Academic Journals?
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2): 259-261. 2019.
  •  30
    Verteilungsgerechtigkeit ohne Verteilungsgleichheit
    Analyse & Kritik 21 (2): 171-191. 1999.
    Alternative approaches in the discussion of distributive justice differ in their answers to the question 'equality of what'? In this essay I intend to ask instead 'why equality'? The article rejects several arguments in favour of distributive equality, mainly on the grounds that they confuse two different kinds of justice, namely 'formal' justice and distributive justice. The ideal of distributive equality is based on comparisons but equal respect does not necessarily involve relational consider…Read more
  •  29
    Natürlichkeit als Wert
    Analyse & Kritik 24 (2002): 249-271. 2002.
    The predicate 'natural' is often used in a normative fashion, especially in Bioethics. But that something is natural does not alone suffice to explain its value. In this essay, I want to fulfil mainly two tasks: Firstly, to differentiate between several usages of the concept of naturalness and scrutinize whether they may serve a function in ethics; secondly, to argue for the value of naturalness in certain respects. The value of the natural lies firstly in its significance for human well-being: …Read more
  •  24
    Behinderung. Absolute oder relative Einschränkung des Wohlergehens?
    Ethik in der Medizin 15 (3): 180-190. 2003.
    ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob eine Behinderung immer als Form von Leid betrachtet werden muss. Mit Hilfe einer Unterscheidung zwischen absoluten und komparativen Einschränkungen des Wohls wird aufgezeigt, dass die bloße Tatsache einer vorliegenden medizinischen Schädigung nicht hinreicht, ein Urteil über das absolute Wohl einer Person zu treffen. Es werden verschiedene Argumente geprüft, warum Behinderung dennoch generell negativ bewertet werden sollte. Diese werd…Read more
  •  24
    Paternalism and self‐interest: A rejoinder
    Bioethics 24 (4): 208-210. 2010.
    No Abstract
  •  23
    Geert Keil, Lara Keuck, and Rico Hauswald : Vagueness in Psychiatry
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (1): 155-158. 2018.
  •  23
    Review: Philosophie und Medizin. Ein Blick in aktuelle Veröffentlichungen (review)
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 51 (1). 1997.
  •  22
    Wenn Philosophen aus der Hüfte schießen
    Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 2 (2): 377-384. 2015.
    In diesem Artikel wird argumentiert, dass die Philosophie nicht über passende Methoden verfügt, reale politische Probleme angemessen zu analysieren. So sind die tatsächlich vorzufindenden Empfehlungen zur Lösung solcher Fragen meist trivial oder unterkomplex. Es wird geraten, zuerst geeignete Instrumentarien der angewandten bzw. konkreten Ethik zu entwickeln, bevor sich PhilosophInnen zu solch komplexen Fragen wie die der Flüchtlingspolitik äußern.
  •  22
    Michael Schefczyk: Umverteilung AlS legitimationsproblem (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5): 599-601. 2006.
  •  21
    Political Perfectionism and State Paternalism
    Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft Und Ethik 14 (1): 147-166. 2009.
  •  19
    Selbstbestimmung zwischen Perfektionismus und Voluntarismus
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (6): 881-896. 2011.