Thomas Sinclair

There is a distinction between two different ways in which people’s interests might figure as inputs into the reasoning that determines verdicts of moral permissibility and impermissibility. Their interests may receive a certain priority in that reasoning, as for example the interests of the people whose lives are at stake in the famous Bystander example should. Or they may not, as for example the interests in spectacle that people watching on the sidelines might have should not. A theory of rights needs to make sense of this distinction. One of the chief attractions of Alec Walen’s theory of rights in The Mechanics of Claims and Permissible Killing in War is that it promises to do so, thanks to the concept of a claim that it introduces and the structural role this concept plays in the theory. However, I argue here that the substantive content of the mechanics of claims – in particular, a principle Walen calls the ‘welfare principle’ – privileges welfare interests to a degree that threatens to undermine the theory’s advantages. I consider and reject some ways of modifying the welfare principle so as to avoid this implication, suggesting that their failure raises much deeper questions of moral theory that must be confronted if the mechanics of claims is to make good on its promise.

The creation of artificial moral systems requires us to make difficult choices about which of varying human value sets should be instantiated. The industry-standard approach is to seek and encode moral consensus. Here we argue, based on evidence from empirical psychology, that encoding current moral consensus risks reinforcing current norms, and thus inhibiting moral progress. However, so do efforts to encode progressive norms. Machine ethics is thus caught between a rock and a hard place. The problem is particularly acute when progress beyond prevailing moral norms is particularly urgent, as is currently the case due to the inadequacy of prevailing moral norms in the face of the climate and ecological crisis.

The Kantian account of political authority holds that the state is a necessary and sufficient condition of our freedom. We cannot be free outside the state, Kantians argue, because any attempt to have the ‘acquired rights’ necessary for our freedom implicates us in objectionable relations of dependence on private judgment. Only in the state can this problem be overcome. But it is not clear how mere institutions could make the necessary difference, and contemporary Kantians have not offered compelling explanations. I present a detailed analysis of the problems Kantians identify with the state of nature and the objections they face in claiming that the state overcomes them. I then sketch a response on behalf of Kantians. The key idea is that only under state institutions can a person can make claims of acquired right without presupposing that she is by nature exceptional in her capacity to bind others.

It seems that you can be in a position to rescue people in mortal danger and yet have no obligation to do so, because of the sacrifice to you that this would involve. At the same time, if you do save anyone, then you must not leave anyone to die whom it would cost you no additional sacrifice to save. On the basis of these claims, Theron Pummer and Joe Horton have recently defended a ‘conditional obligation of effective altruism’, which requires one to give to the most cost-effective charity if one is going to make a charitable donation at all, all other things equal. Appealing to a distinction between 'thoroughgoing' and 'half-hearted' non-consequentialism, I argue that their inferences don’t go through, and moreover that this sort of argument in general is unlikely to work as a way to defend effective altruism.

Most people believe that the rights of others sometimes require us to act in ways that have even substantially sub-optimal outcomes, as viewed from an axiological perspective that ranks outcomes objectively. Bringing about the optimal outcome, contrary to such a requirement, is an ‘optimific wronging’. It is less clear, however, that we are required to prevent optimific wrongings. Perhaps the value of the outcome, combined with the relative weakness of prohibitions on allowing harm as compared to those against doing harm, justifies non-intervention. In this article, I consider arguments to that effect, focusing on a recent paper in this journal by Andreas Mogensen. I argue that while we do not, in general, do wrong by failing to prevent optimific wrongings, we are nevertheless not permitted, in key cases, to refrain from intervening on the grounds that not intervening will secure the optimal outcome.

John Rawls is regarded as the most important political philosopher of the twentieth century. His seminal work, _A Theory of Justice_, transformed the study of political philosophy and shaped the political thought of a generation. _Rawls on Justice_ demystifies this difficult text by introducing and assessing: Rawls’ life and the background to his philosophy The key concepts of _A Theory of Justice_, including the ‘orginal position’, the ‘veil of ignorance’, and the two principles of justice Rawls’ continuing importance to contemporary philosophy and influence on political thought Ideal for those coming to Rawls for the first time, _Rawls on Justice_ is an invaluable guide for students of philosophy, political thought, economics and law.

The argument from background justice is that conformity to Lockean principles of justice in agreements and transactions does not preclude the development of inequalities that undermine the freedom and fairness of those very transactions, and that, therefore, special principles are needed to regulate society's “basic structure.” Rawls offers this argument as his “first kind of reason” for taking the basic structure to be the primary subject of justice. Here I explore the background justice argument and its implications for questions about the scope of distributive justice. As it turns out, the background justice argument can offer no independent support for conclusions about the scope of distributive justice. For the special principles that it justifies inherit their scope from conclusions that must be established or assumed in advance. These prior conclusions are precisely what is at issue in debates about global justice.