Thomas Telios

This article reconstructs Cicero’s original contribution to the concept of sensus communis by situating it within Roman rhetorical practice and Cicero’s broader social philosophy. Departing from Aristotle’s object-oriented and truth-seeking model of rhetoric, Cicero redefines rhetorical activity as a socially embedded, audience-oriented practice aimed at securing the welfare of the state. This shift transforms the rhetor into an orator-statesman whose task is not simply to discover truth, but to mobilise the shared norms, emotions, and expectations of the community. The article argues that Cicero’s understanding of sensus communis – a socially produced horizon of shared norms, feelings, and ways of acting – functions as a communal precondition for persuasive public reasoning. By analysing Cicero’s four personae in De Officiis, the study shows how Cicero anticipates a theory of collective subjectivity in which individuality emerges from the interplay of reason, singularity, circumstance, and judgement. Through close readings of Pro Plancio and De Oratore, the article ultimately presents sensus communis as both a mode of social belonging and a medium of self-determination within communal life.

In this paper, I follow Avshalom Schwartz's (2024) recent suggestion to treat Aristotle's imagination as “the psychological microfoundations of collective action and thus helps explain how we can move from individual psychology to collective agency and action.” As I argue, though, imagination can unravel such a political function thanks to the fact that it is an affection (πάθος) of what Aristotle introduces and calls “common sense” (κοινὴ αἴσθησις). In support of this argument, I start by presenting Schwartz's reasoning as to why imagination can qualify as the psychological foundation of collective actions. Building upon that, I return to Aristotle's concept of common sense to sketch its functions. In addition, I qualify common sense as a σύνολον, a condition of individuation, and, leaning on Catherine Malabou and Jacques Derrida, an analysis of common sense as a collective event. In doing so, common sense is disclosed as a collective, both logical-analytical and normative, process that acknowledges, fosters, and accommodates difference. It is thanks to such an understanding of common sense that imagination can act as a regulative and inclusive fundament that can furnish the community with a common, yet inclusive and non-hierarchical or excluding common goal. In conclusion, I hint at further intertwinements of Aristotle's conceptualization of common sense with concepts like memory and utopia.

Im Zeitalter der Hochspezialisierung sind sie selten geworden, die Philosoph*innen, die an der Universität wie im Feuilleton gleichermaßen zuhause sind. Dieter Thomä ist einer dieser Wenigen. Ob in leichtfüßigen Kolumnen oder in tiefschürfenden Studien zur Geistesgeschichte - stets gilt sein Interesse den Unruheherden innerhalb von Ordnungen, den Umschlagspunkten, an denen ein System kippt. In vier Jahrzehnten publizistischer Tätigkeit hat er der Philosophie neue Gegenstände erschlossen und die Öffentlichkeit mit provokativen Zeitdiagnosen bereichert. Anlässlich seines 60. Geburtstags werden die Denkanstöße gewürdigt, die von seiner beherzten theoretischen Quertreiberei ausgingen.

In this article, I revisit Karl Marx’s claim in his Economic and Phil-osophic Manuscripts of 1844, that the subject in its “individual existence is at the same time a social being.” I redefine what has been translated as “social being” as “common being” in order to extrapolate an understanding of subjectivity that is a socio-ontological and collectively structured collectivity. In doing so, I demonstrate (1) that this common being is a collection of different socio-ontological traits; (2) that in order for this common being to be approximated we must take into account all modes of subjectivity production that intersect in what will appear as the subject; and (3) that the Other is the constitutive parameter of the common being on which the subject depends. Finally, I revisit three exemplary modes of practice - namely critique, solidarity, and utopia - and show that conceiving of the subject as a common being renders critique constellational, solidarity overdetermined, and utopia a koinotopia.

Jacques Derrida’s lectures on Theory and Practice leave a lot to be desired from the perspective of historical materialism. Yet, one can nonetheless find in them the germ of a genuine understanding of materialism. More specifically, following the systematic use of the word “enigma” in the text, I show that this term serves as the heu-ristic device for articulating an originally Derridean materialism, one which I name “enigmatic materialism,” and which, I argue, is genuinely collective, insofar as it opposes any form of monism. Moreover, this materialism has profound repercussions for the concept of hope developed in these lectures. Hope, from the perspective of an “enigmatic materialist,” becomes a collective endeavour that avoids the pitfalls of solipsistic individualism through the joint effort of the subject and its/the Other.

After its proliferation as a primarily psychological term in the literature of the late 1960s, creativity has since advanced to a core notion also for sociology. The first part of the paper tackles “the creativity narrative” according to three paradigmatic readings brought forward by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, Maurizio Lazzarato, and most recently Andreas Reckwitz. Despite the insightful accounts that those readings provide concerning the entanglement of creativity to capitalist ways of production, the practical consequences they offer regarding how to contest this entanglement are debatable. Therefore, in the second part of the article a fourth understanding of creativity is invoked that was proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis. As argued, the radicality of this concept lies in defining creativity as a mode of production of the subject’s psyche as a collective co-existence from which broader, necessarily collective practices can be derived.Après sa prolifération en tant que notion psychologique dans la littérature des années 1960, la créativité est aussi devenue une notion fondamentale pour la sociologie. La première partie de l’article aborde le « récit de la créativité » à partir des trois lectures paradigmatiques proposées par Luc Boltanski et Ève Chiapello, Maurizio Lazzarato et, plus récemment, par Andreas Reckwitz. Malgré le fait qu’elles éclairent de manière signi?icative l’enchevêtrement de la créativité aux modes capitalistes de production, les conséquences pratiques que ces lectures tirent sur les contestations possibles de cet enchevêtrement sont sujettes au débat. C’est pourquoi, dans la deuxième partie de ce texte, une quatrième compréhension de la créativité est proposée à partir de Cornelius Castoriadis. La radicalité de ce concept repose sur sa dé?inition en tant que mode de production du psychisme du sujet compris en tant que co-existence collective, à partir de laquelle des pratiques plus larges et nécessairement collectives peuvent découler.

In spite of recent interpretation according to which “selfing,” that is, taking “selfies” of oneself, realizes the transparency dream because it renders someone completely visible, the chapter argues that the “selfie” should be seen as an exemplary device for a subjectivation process which at the same time thwarts the aim of full subjectification. The storage, serialization and dissemination of the “selfies” point to a “selfing” project that takes place under conditions of sociality and sharedness. In this respect, the “selfie” is neither a diminished version of the “I,” nor an idealized type; neither merely self-referential, nor merely self-quantificational. Rather, it is a device of an ongoing “selfing” process, which opacifies a given identity all the while it pretends making it transparent.

This article draws on relational psychoanalysis to reinterpret Ovid’s version of Narcissus and Echo as a means to reflect on the dynamics of how subjects connect to others and themselves through listening. Attuning to a long tradition of scholarship, we understand Ovid’s tale as a rich template for contemplating the difficulties of becoming social. We underline how both protagonists take on essential roles in each other’s transformations. While acknowledging how each actor’s unique biography creates an intrapsychic vector, we highlight the effect of their encounters in their mutual becoming. We illustrate how the relational space between them plays an essential role in their development as they overcome their unique difficulties in connecting to each other. Our relational-psychoanalytic analysis offers a surprising interpretation, namely, that Narcissus and Echo can ultimately overcome their isolation and connect through their transformation. This illustrates the potential of relational psychoanalysis as an interpretative tool that allows us to understand social dynamics as a product of a relational space in which intra-psychic representations encounter and transform each other, thus contributing to ongoing discussions on the concept of relational subjectivity.

In this article, I revisit Karl Marx’s claim in his Economic and Phil-osophic Manuscripts of 1844, that the subject in its “individual existence is at the same time a social being.” I redefine what has been translated as “social being” as “common being” in order to extrapolate an understanding of subjectivity that is a socio-ontological and collectively structured collectivity. In doing so, I demonstrate (1) that this common being is a collection of different socio-ontological traits; (2) that in order for this common being to be approximated we must take into account all modes of subjectivity production that intersect in what will appear as the subject; and (3) that the Other is the constitutive parameter of the common being on which the subject depends. Finally, I revisit three exemplary modes of practice - namely critique, solidarity, and utopia - and show that conceiving of the subject as a common being renders critique constellational, solidarity overdetermined, and utopia a koinotopia.

In this paper, I start by pointing out that despite their differences, Slavoj Žižek and Karen Barad share an understanding of the notions of relationality, processuality, and immanence as central tenets of materialist philosophy. As I argue, however, it is collectivity that acts in both Žižek’s and Barad’s works as a safety valve that lends immanence, processuality, and relationality their materialist quality. To support this argument, I demonstrate that certain forms of collectivity underlie the passage from Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty to Niels Bohr’s indeterminacy in Barad’s interpretation of Bohr’s ‘philosophy-physics’. I call those forms of collectivity "collectivity as ontological necessity" and "collectivity as methodological necessity" respectively. However, I claim that there is a further form of collectivity, which I call ‘collectivity as inclusive and holistic overdetermination’, that Barad overlooks and that conditions the indeterminability of indeterminacy. As I argue, the latter also has implications for political agency. I conclude by briefly sketching out how these forms of collectivity can determine the production of subjectivity and, as a consequence, shape the subject’s collective action.

Jacques Derrida’s lectures on Theory and Practice leave a lot to be desired from the perspective of historical materialism. Yet, one can nonetheless find in them the germ of a genuine understanding of materialism. More specifically, following the systematic use of the word “enigma” in the text, I show that this term serves as the heu-ristic device for articulating an originally Derridean materialism, one which I name “enigmatic materialism,” and which, I argue, is genuinely collective, insofar as it opposes any form of monism. Moreover, this materialism has profound repercussions for the concept of hope developed in these lectures. Hope, from the perspective of an “enigmatic materialist,” becomes a collective endeavour that avoids the pitfalls of solipsistic individualism through the joint effort of the subject and its/the Other.

Die Frage nach einem neuen Materialismus hat gegenwärtig quer durch die Disziplinen Konjunktur. Dabei wird Materie oder 'Matter' nicht länger als passiver Träger von Bedeutung, Diskursen oder menschlicher Manipulation verstanden, sondern die Eigensinnigkeit und Kontingenz der materiellen Welt betont. Dieser Band versammelt Beiträge, die die bislang massgeblich im englischsprachigen Raum und auf theoretischer Ebene stattfindende Debatte aufgreift und sie mit Blick auf ihr gesellschaftskritisches Potenzial diskutiert. Bei aller Diversität der disziplinären und thematischen Zugänge hebt der Band eine grundlegende Tendenz hervor. Zum einen die Unzufriedenheit über die gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Zustände, zum anderen die Unfähigkeit gegenwärtiger Analysen, die aktuellen Bewegungen und Umbrüche in der Gesellschaft anschaulich zu machen. Die unterschiedlichen im Band vorgestellten Ansätze, Materie neu zu denken, nehmen diese Herausforderung an: Sie versuchen, soziale und politische Zusammenhänge in ihrer Komplexität zu erfassen ohne den kritischen Impetus des 'alten' marxistischen Materialismus aufzugeben. Dabei wird versucht, neomaterialistische Ansätze für unterschiedliche Bereiche der Gesellschaftskritik fruchtbar zu machen, darunter Ökonomiekritik, Biopolitik, Feminismus, Raumtheorie, Ästhetik, Technologie und kritische Theorie"--Back cover.

The Russian Revolution is a historical milestone both politically and theoretically. Its supporters found in it the consummation of all history that preceded it and the springboard towards a new history absolved from all grievances. Its opponents saw in it a violent coup d’ etat leading to the destruction of a state, the beginning of the division of the world in two hostile camps and last but not least one of the paradigmatic examples of an almost unprecedented authoritarianism. This book examines the discursive and practical battleground of the Russian Revolution, describes how it keeps living through the events, struggles, theories, and effects it prompted, and analyzes revolutionary ideas and processes in a more general vein. By taking the Russian Revolution as the prime example of revolutionary processes, the articles of this volume attempt to acknowledge the legacy of the Russian Revolution, come to terms with its failures and sketch the future of revolutionary thinking and practice in its aftermath.

This article begins by acknowledging the legacy of both the French and the Russian Revolution in establishing collectivity as the core element of revolutionary process par excellence. Nevertheless and as the paper argues, both “the people” and “the party” as paradigmatic collectivities failed to implement the totality of their goals due to the fact that in the course of the revolutions they instantiated, those collectives were universalized and as such they forfeited their collective, diverse character and fell back to become mere supra-individual entities. Though this can be easily attributed to adhering to a notion of subjectivity that bestows the subject with a metaphysically grounded revolutionary agency, the decentering of the subject that was pursued in the aftermath of May ’68 as a remedy to this problematic is equally insufficient since as soon as there is no subject there is no revolutionary subject—and if there is no revolutionary subject, there is no revolution. With this as backbone, the paper argues that an alternative understanding of the subject as a socially constructed collective subjectivity can serve as an alternative to this conundrum and can be traced back to Marx’ understanding of the subject as being in its “individual existence […] at the same time a social being.” By taking into account similar notions to be found in Judith Butler, intersectionality studies and Jean-Luc Nancy the paper substantiates the notion of a communist, collective subjectivity that becomes capable to engage in collective actions due to its social-ontological production as a collective. The last part is dedicated to the practices that are to be derived from such an understanding of subjectivity and how the collective agency of this subjectivity can obviate the impasses of both the universal-idealist and the hollowed-decentered subject.

After its proliferation as a primarily psychological term in the literature of the late 1960s, creativity has since advanced to a core notion also for sociology. The first part of the paper tackles “the creativity narrative” according to three paradigmatic readings brought forward by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, Maurizio Lazzarato, and most recently Andreas Reckwitz. Despite the insightful accounts that those readings provide concerning the entanglement of creativity to capitalist ways of production, the practical consequences they offer regarding how to contest this entanglement are debatable. Therefore, in the second part of the article a fourth understanding of creativity is invoked that was proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis. As argued, the radicality of this concept lies in defining creativity as a mode of production of the subject’s psyche as a collective co-existence from which broader, necessarily collective practices can be derived.Après sa prolifération en tant que notion psychologique dans la littérature des années 1960, la créativité est aussi devenue une notion fondamentale pour la sociologie. La première partie de l’article aborde le « récit de la créativité » à partir des trois lectures paradigmatiques proposées par Luc Boltanski et Ève Chiapello, Maurizio Lazzarato et, plus récemment, par Andreas Reckwitz. Malgré le fait qu’elles éclairent de manière signi????icative l’enchevêtrement de la créativité aux modes capitalistes de production, les conséquences pratiques que ces lectures tirent sur les contestations possibles de cet enchevêtrement sont sujettes au débat. C’est pourquoi, dans la deuxième partie de ce texte, une quatrième compréhension de la créativité est proposée à partir de Cornelius Castoriadis. La radicalité de ce concept repose sur sa dé????inition en tant que mode de production du psychisme du sujet compris en tant que co-existence collective, à partir de laquelle des pratiques plus larges et nécessairement collectives peuvent découler.

This volume aims to commemorate, criticize, scrutinize and assess the undoubted significance of the Russian Revolution both retrospectively and prospectively in three parts. Part I consists of a palimpsest of the different representations that the Russian Revolution underwent through its turbulent history, going back to its actors, agents, theorists and propagandists to consider whether it is at all possible to revisit the Russian Revolution as an event. With this problematic as a backbone, the chapters of this section scrutinize the ambivalences of revolution in four distinctive phenomena that pertain to the revolution’s historicity. Part II concentrates on how the revolution was retold in the aftermath of its accomplishment not only by its sympathizers but also its opponents. These chapters not only bring to light the ways in which the revolution triggered critical theorists to pave new paths of radical thinking that were conceived as methods to overcome the revolution’s failures and impasses, but also how the Revolution was subverted in order to inspire reactionary politics and legitimize conservative theoretical undertakings. Even commemorating the Russian Revolution, then, still poses a threat to every well-established political order. In Part III, this volume interprets how the Russian Revolution can spur a rethinking of the idea of revolution. Acknowledging the suffocating burden that the notion of revolution as such entails, the final chapters of this book ultimately address the content and form of future revolution. It is therein, in such critical political thought and such radical form of action, where the Russian Revolution’s legacy ought to be sought and can still be found.