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139Is the wandering mind a planning mind?Mind and Language. forthcoming.Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excess…Read more
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35On Hedden's proof that machine learning fairness metrics are flawedInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.1. Fairness is about the just distribution of society's resources, and in ML, the main resource being distributed is model performance, e.g. the translation quality produced by machine translation...
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73Transparency and the Mindfulness Opacity HypothesisPhilosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.Many philosophers endorse the Transparency Thesis, the claim that by introspection one cannot become aware of one's experience. Recently, some authors have suggested that the Transparency Thesis is challenged by introspective states reached under mindfulness. We label this the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis. The present paper develops the hypothesis in important new ways. First, we motivate the hypothesis by drawing on recent clinical psychology and cognitive science of mindfulness. Secondly, we…Read more
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101The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (edited book)John Benjamins. 2004.This volume presents essays on self-consciousness by prominent psychologists, cognitive neurologists, and philosophers.
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74Varieties of self-awarenessIn K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry, Oxford University Press. pp. 221. 2013.This chapter argues that explicit self-conscious thinking is founded on an implicit form of self-awareness built into the very structure of phenomenal consciousness. In broad strokes, the argument is that a theory denying the existence of pre-reflective or minimal self-awareness has difficulties explaining a number of essential features of explicit first-person self-reference, and that this will impede a proper understanding of certain types of psychopathology. The chapter proceeds by discussion…Read more
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471Dimensions of bodily subjectivityPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3): 279-283. 2009.
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53Measurement Scepticism, Construct Validation, and Methodology of Well-Being TheorisingErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (n/a). 2023.Precise measurements of well-being would be of profound societal importance. Yet, the sceptical worry that we cannot use social science instruments and tests to measure well-being is widely discussed by philosophers and scientists. A recent and interesting philosophical argument has pointed to the psychometric procedures of construct validation to address this sceptical worry. The argument has proposed that these procedures could warrant confidence in our ability to measure well-being. The prese…Read more
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70Responsibility for Forgetting To DoErkenntnis 89 (2): 755-776. 2024.Assuming that an agent can be morally responsible for her forgetting to do something, we can use recent psychological research on prospective memory to assess the psychological assumptions made by normative accounts of the moral responsibility for forgetting. Two accounts of moral responsibility (control accounts and valuative accounts) have been prominent in recent debates about the degree to which agents are blameworthy for their unwitting omissions. This paper highlights the psychological ass…Read more
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53A new cognitive model of long-term memory for intentionsCognition 215 (C): 104817. 2021.In this paper, we propose a new mathematical model of retrieval of intentions from long-term memory. We model retrieval as a stochastic race between a plurality of potentially relevant intentions stored in long-term memory. Psychological theories are dominated by two opposing conceptions of the role of memory in temporally extended agency – as when a person has to remember to make a phone call in the afternoon because, in the morning, she promised she would do so. According to the Working Memory…Read more
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37Measures of AgencyNeuroscience of Consciousness 2020 (1). 2020.The sense of agency is typically defined as the experience of controlling one’s own actions, and through them, changes in the external environment. It is often assumed that this experience is a single, unified construct that can be experimentally manipulated and measured in a variety of ways. In this article, we challenge this assumption. We argue that we should acknowledge four possible agency-related psychological constructs. Having a clear grasp of the possible constructs is important since e…Read more
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51Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2): 385-404. 2020.When a person decides to do something in the future, she forms an intention and her intention persists. Philosophers have thought about the rational requirement that an agent’s intention persists until its execution. But philosophers have neglected to think about the causal memory mechanisms that could enable this kind of persistence and its role in rational long-term agency. Our aim of this paper is to fill this gap by arguing that memory for intention is a specific kind of memory. We do this b…Read more
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42Transparent Minds. A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Fernández, Jordi: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, xxi + 245, £42 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2): 413-413. 2014.No abstract
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41Sensation of MovementRoutledge. 2017.Sensation of Movement explores the role of sensation in motor control, bodily self-recognition and sense of agency. The sensation of movement is dependent on a range of information received by the brain, from signalling in the peripheral sensory organs to the establishment of higher order goals. Through the integration of neuroscientific knowledge with psychological and philosophical perspectives, this book questions whether one type of information is more relevant for the ability to sense and c…Read more
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57The two visual systems hypothesis and contrastive underdeterminationSynthese 198 (Suppl 17): 4045-4068. 2021.This paper concerns local yet systematic problems of contrastive underdetermination of model choice in cognitive neuroscience debates about the so-called two visual systems hypothesis. The underdetermination problem is systematically generated by the way certain assumptions about the representationalist nature of computation are translated into experimental practice. The problem is that behavioural data underdetermine the choice between competing representational models. In this paper, I diagnos…Read more
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45Sense of agency for movementsConsciousness and Cognition 65 27-47. 2018.In this paper, we argue that the comparator model is not a satisfactory model of sense of agency (SoA). We present a theoretical argument and experimental studies. We show (1) most studies of SoA neglect a distinction between SoA associated with movements (narrow SoA) and SoA associated with environmental events (broad SoA); (2) the comparator model emerges from experimental studies of sensory consequences narrowly associated with movements; (3) narrow SoA can be explained by a comparator model,…Read more
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148The body in actionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2): 243-261. 2008.This article is about how to describe an agent’s awareness of her bodily movements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against current orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent’s experience of moving has an epistemic place in the agent’s awareness of her own intentional action. In “The problem,” I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In “Motives for denying epistemic role,” I state some of the main motives for denying that bodily awareness has any …Read more
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20R. Ingarden's theory of schematized profi les: A dynamic versionNordic Journal of Aesthetics 17 (32). 2005.
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145Trying and the arguments from total failurePhilosophia 36 (1): 67-86. 2008.New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are inco…Read more
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94Commonsense psychology, dual visual streams, and the individuation of actionPhilosophical Psychology 25 (1). 2012.Psychologists and philosophers are often tempted to make general claims about the importance of certain experimental results for our commonsense notions of intentional agency, moral responsibility, and free will. It is a strong intuition that if the agent does not intentionally control her own behavior, her behavior will not be an expression of agency, she will not be morally responsible for its consequences, and she will not be acting as a free agent. It therefore seems natural that the interes…Read more
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55Consciousness and modality: On the possible preserved visual consciousness in blindsight subjectsConsciousness and Cognition 20 (4): 1855-1859. 2011.In a recent paper, Brogaard presents counter-arguments to the conclusions of an experiment with blindsight subject GR. She argues that contrary to the apparent findings that GR’s preserved visual abilities relate to degraded visual experiences, she is in fact fully unconscious of the stimuli she correctly identifies. In this paper, we present arguments and evidence why Brogaard’s argument does not succeed in its purpose. We suggest that not only is relevant empirical evidence in opposition to Br…Read more
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105The Perception‐Action Model: Counting Computational MechanismsMind and Language 32 (4): 416-445. 2017.Milner and Goodale's Two Visual Systems Hypothesis is regarded as common ground in recent discussions of visual consciousness. A central part of TVSH is a functional model of vision and action. In this paper, I provide a brief overview of these current discussions and argue that there is ambiguity between a strong and a weak version of PAM. I argue that, given a standard way of individuating computational mechanisms, the available evidence cannot be used to distinguish between these versions. Th…Read more
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107The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critiqueSynthese 192 (10): 3313-3337. 2015.A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency . An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology . In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not…Read more
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88First Person and Minimal Self-ConsciousnessIn Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity, Ontos Verlag. pp. 273-296. 2012.In this paper, I present one possible way of arguing for the theory of minimal self-consciousness, namely, by an argument by elimination. Central to the argument are the following two claims: a) If a theory of consciousness cannot explain first-person self-reference, then the theory is false, and b) An anonymity theory cannot explain first-person self-reference. Consequently, the anonymity theory is false.
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53Cognitive and non-cognitive conceptions of consciousnessTrends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (3): 137. 2012.
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21Sensory imagination and narrative perspective: Explaining perceptual focalizationSemiotica 2013 (194): 111-136. 2013.
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225Anscombe and Practical Knowledge of What Is HappeningGrazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1): 41-67. 2009.On the face of it, conflicting constraints are placed on agents' knowledge of their own action: it is demanded that that which is known is an event happening in the “outside world”, but that the way in which it is known is “from the inside”. I propose to look at the way in which Anscombe sets up this epistemological puzzle and attempts to solve it. I discuss two ways in which Anscombe proposes to dissolve the paradox of agents' knowledge, whereof the first one is rejected. Finally, I discuss dif…Read more
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170Perception and non-inferential knowledge of actionPhilosophical Explorations 14 (2). 2011.I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her act…Read more
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111Seeing what I am DoingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2): 295-318. 2012.I argue against the view that an agent’s knowledge of her own current action cannot in any way rely on perception for its justification. Instead, I argue that when it comes to an agent’s knowledge of her own object-oriented intentional action, the agent’s belief about what she is doing is partly justified by her perception of the object of action. I proceed by first proposing an account of such actions according to which the agent’s knowledge is partly justified by her perception. I then discuss…Read more