Thora Bayer

Introduction : interpreting The new science -- Synopsis of universal law -- The true and the certain : from On the one principle and one end of universal law -- A new science is essayed : from On the constancy of the jurisprudent -- On Homer and his two poems : from the dissertations -- Vico's address to his readers from a lost manuscript on jurisprudence -- Vico's reply to the false book notice : the Vici vindiciae -- Vico's "ignota latebat" : on the impresa and the dipintura -- Vico's addition to the tree of the poetic sciences and his use of the muses -- Vico's reprehension of the metaphysics of René Descartes, Benedict Spinoza, and John Locke -- Appendix : Vico's writings in English translation.

Moral Philosophy and Moral Education considers the interconnections of ethics, education, and the philosophy of culture as related to the human concern with self-knowledge. The individual self finds its inner life writ large in the forms of culture such as religion, art, and history. Such forms of cultural life represent and embody normative ideals that can provide the necessary content to shape the character and the conduct of civic life. Thora Ilin Bayer draws upon the ancient Greek view of education as paideia and the conception of Bildung of the German idealist philosophers. These two ideas of education aim at the development of the whole person as distinct from training in a particular skill, subject matter, technique, or occupation. The education of the whole person aims at the production in the individual of a broad mental outlook harmoniously joined with a knowledge of the great perspectives and principles of human culture as it takes its various shapes within the history of humanity. Moral philosophy requires both culture and the individual as its terms of inquiry, and moral education requires a vision of how to have these two terms interact to form a whole.

In the study of the history of philosophy, there is a long-standing question as to whether works produced between the mid-fourteenth century and the end of the sixteenth century, the Renaissance, can be rightly understood as philosophy or as primarily literary and rhetorical in character. The latter view is prominently held by Paul Oskar Kristeller but has precedent in Hegel’s treatment of this period in his History of Philosophy. That the works of major figures of this period are essentially philosophical is a view held, in quite different ways, by Ernst Cassirer and Ernesto Grassi. This essay examines the origin and nature of these views and advances a general perspective through which they may be brought together.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 51-64 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Art as Symbolic Form: Cassirer on the Educational Value of ArtThora Ilin BayerIntroductionAmong the papers that Ernst Cassirer left at his death in 1945 is a fully written out lecture labeled "Seminar of Education, March 10th, 1943," which also bears the title "The Educational Value of Art." It may have been prepared for a session of Cassirer's seminar at Yale for that spring on Aesthetics: Symbolic Forms, the second half of a yearlong course. 1 The text begins with discussion of the Platonic quarrel with the poets and moves through views of various thinkers, especially Croce and Collingwood. Cassirer had planned to have a volume on art included in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, in addition to those on Language,Mythical Thought, and The Phenomenology of Knowledge. 2 In these three volumes he often mentions the triad of language, myth, and art, but he says little of art as such.In May 1942 in a letter to Paul Schilpp, the American philosopher and editor of the volume of critical essays on Cassirer's work in the Library of Living Philosophers series, Cassirer wrote that he had intended to produce a volume on art but the disfavor (Ungunst) of the times caused him to put it off again and again. 3 The principal sources of Cassirer's aesthetics are his chapter on art in An Essay on Man 4 and two lectures on the educational value of art called "Language and Art I & II," 5 which parallel his earlier small study, Language and Myth. 6 Cassirer's conception of art as a symbolic form is derived from his conception of human culture as a systematic structure of symbolic forms that has as its main components myth and religion, language, art, history, and science (the chapter titles of the second part of An Essay on Man). In addition to these forms of culture there is a "metaphysics of symbolic forms," the subject of a fourth volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, left in manuscript at his death. 7 [End Page 51]I wish to raise two questions: (1) How does Cassirer conceive of art as a symbolic form? and (2) What are the implications of his conception for a conception of the ideals of aesthetic education? My aim in pursuing these questions is not to argue for the correctness of Cassirer's views but to attempt to establish what his views in fact are. Little has been written directly on Cassirer's conception of art relative to the frequency with which his name is mentioned in general discussions of aesthetics. 8 Cassirer's conception of education is a nearly unexamined subject. 9The Platonic Quarrel: MimesisCassirer says: "Of all the problems that we have to study in a philosophy of education, the problem of the educational value of art is one of the most difficult ones." 10 He claims that this problem goes back to the beginning of philosophy itself and that at present we are still very far from a generally accepted solution. Plato's famous quarrel with the poets in the tenth book of the Republic is important not simply for an understanding of ancient aesthetics but also for philosophy's conception of itself.The basic tenets of this quarrel are well known. I wish to review them here toward the goal of suggesting an original view of it that is derivable from Cassirer's approach. The issue is whether poetry or philosophy is the means to truth. The works of Homer had scriptural status for the Greeks and were thought to contain all that was necessary for civil wisdom. Poiein is to make and compose poetry. The ancient poet is a maker of truth claims through language. The quarrel rests on the fact that the philosopher is also a maker of truth claims formulated in words. Is the relatively new figure in Plato's time of the philosophos, the friend or lover...

Thora Ilin Bayer - G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1825-26. Volume II: Greek Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.4 664-665 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Thora Ilin Bayer Xavier University of Louisiana Robert F. Brown, editor and translator. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1825–26. Volume II: Greek Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Pp. xiv + 375. Cloth, $160.00. Hegel delivered his lectures on the history of philosophy nine times during his career, giving them for the first time in Winter 1805–06 in Jena prior to his publication of the Phenomenology of Spirit in 1807. He began to give them for a tenth time before his death in Berlin in 1831. Hegel..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 451-453 [Access article in PDF] Ernst Cassirer. The Logic of the Cultural Sciences: Five Studies. Translated by S. G. Lofts. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. xliii + 134. Cloth, $30.00. Paper, $15.00. This is a new translation of Cassirer's Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften: Fünf Studien. It replaces the earlier one by Clarence Smith Howe with the title The Logic of the Humanities (Yale University Press, 1961) that has been out of print for many years. Howe's volume includes a translation of Cassirer's essay "Naturalistic and Humanistic Philosophies of Culture" which does not appear in the new volume.Considered as part of his system of symbolic forms, this volume is the counterpart to Cassirer's conception of mathematical and scientific thought of the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. The pivotal study in Cassirer's five closely related analyses of the cultural sciences is that concerning "Naturbegriffe und Kulturbegriffe." [End Page 451] Cassirer contrasts the way in which concepts function in natural scientific thought with the way in which concepts function in cultural thought. In the natural sciences all of the individual "properties" of a thing can be reduced to numerical determinations. The particular can be subordinated to the universal. Thus gold as a specific metal is gold if and only if it exhibits specific numerically expressed properties, e.g., possesses a specific weight, electrical conductivity, coefficient of expansion, etc.Cultural concepts do not subordinate the particular to the universal in this determinate manner. Rather, they coordinate the particular with the universal. Thus it is possible to arrange the various figures of the Renaissance such as Leonardo da Vinci, Machiavelli, Michelangelo, and Cesare Borgia under Jakob Burckhardt's conception of "Man of the Renaissance," but each only approximates this standard. Although each is not given a determinate place in relation to the others, they all can be comprehended in a meaningful set of interrelationships.There is a problem of how to render Cassirer's key terms, Naturbegriffe and Kulturbegriffe. Howe expresses them literally as "nature-concepts" and "culture-concepts." Lofts states them as "concepts of nature" and "concepts of culture." Lofts's rendering has the difficulty of suggesting that Cassirer's discussion concerns a comparison or criticism of various concepts of nature and culture rather than a theory of concept-formation showing the type of thinking distinctive to the natural sciences in contrast to the cultural sciences.The last study in the volume concerns "The Tragedy of Culture" in which Cassirer criticizes Georg Simmel's conception of culture as alienation of the human spirit from itself. Against Simmel's negative view, Cassirer advances his view of culture as a positive achievement of the development of spirit (Geist) from life (Leben). Cassirer's position in this study forecasts his view as developed later in An Essay on Man (1944) that human culture as it arises through its various symbolic forms of myth and religion, language, art, history, and science is a process of "progressive self-liberation." Culture for Cassirer is not alienation, but self-knowledge.Central to this last study is Cassirer's discussion of how the "I" does not originally exist in a fixed state of separation between "I" and "world" and between "I" and other human beings. The Ich, Cassirer says, develops itself in relation to the Du in the formation of culture. The difference between the two is not simply given. Lofts follows Howe in translating Ich and Du as "I" and "you" (Howe, 188-90; Lofts, 107-8). Cassirer's use of the second person familiar (Du) is intended to emphasize the "I-thou" relationship, the sense in which the other in this development of the self is originally an alter ego, not an impersonal other (Sie). Cassirer's discussion here echoes his discussion of the "thou" in the chapter on the "Phenomenon of Expression" (Ausdrucksphänomen) in the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. The translation of Du as "you" rather than "thou" which reflects the...

This is the first full-length, systematic study of Ernst Cassirer's fourth volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, which was published in the German edition in 1995 and in the American edition in 1996 from Cassirer's Nachlass. Prior to the appearance of this volume it was generally held that Cassirer had little interest in a metaphysics of symbolic forms and had not formulated such. ;This study considers the nature of the basic elements of Cassirer's metaphysics as they appear in this fourth volume and as they are connected to comments in other of his works. It also considers to what extent Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms requires a metaphysical grounding in a traditional sense. ;Part I is an analysis of Cassirer's writings of the 1920s concerning his distinction between life and spirit , their dialectical relationship and their connection to the conception of symbolic form. Highly significant is Cassirer's assertion in a fragment from this period that philosophy is not itself a symbolic form. ;Part II is an analysis of Cassirer's writings of the 1940s concerning his conception of three "basis phenomena" --the life-process and the I, action and the Other, and the sphere of work . Of particular importance is Cassirer's final description of the philosophy of symbolic forms as a Socratic philosophy grounded in the basis phenomenon of work. ;The study contains an appendix showing an analytic scheme of the volume and a comprehensive bibliography of Cassirer's works and critical literature relevant to the interpretation of his systematic philosophy

For any reader with knowledge of the works of Ernst Cassirer, the question that will come to mind on approaching Raji C. Steineck’s Kritik der symbolischen Formen I: Symbolische Form und Funktion is: Why Japan? Cassirer’s great range of writings on the history of thought, culture, and symbol involves no sustained attention to Japanese culture. Cassirer also never addresses problems of East-West philosophy, nor did he, unlike some other German thinkers in the twentieth century, engage in correspondence with Japanese thinkers. In the first volume of Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Cassirer does make reference in several places to the Japanese language based on Johann Joseph Hoffmann’s Japanische Sprachlehre...

Elio Gianturco said, of De mente heroica (On the Heroic Mind) “it is one of the most inspired ‘invitations to learning’ ever penned. . . . The eros of learning has seldom been expressed in more electrifying terms.”Vico advocates the humanist ideal that the goal of education is the realization of the natural bond between eloquence and wisdom. The educated person has the goal of becoming “wisdom speaking” (la sapienza che parla). The aim of the individual in any system of education should be to grasp all the branches of knowledge in their connections to each other, to see thought as forming a whole.On Vico’s view, the individual should acquire the power of wisdom speaking for the common good. The ideal to instill in students is a sense of heroic mind. This form of heroism is the cultivation of the virtues to seek not just honor and gain but to act for the social good. These are ancient ideals that carry with them their own power. On Vico’s view, they require constant and eloquent restatement by the teacher and should occupy a central place in the educational institution

What might broadly be called the “humanist interpretation” of Vico, ranging from Leon Pompa’s rationalistic reading of the New Science to Andrea Battistini’s, Michael Mooney’s, and Donald Phillip Verene’s emphasis on its roots in rhetoric and poetic, contrasts with what might be called the “religious interpretation” of Vico. The main exponent of the religious interpretation has been John Milbank. To this approach can now be added the work of Robert Miner. Milbank’s endorsement of Miner’s book that appears on the jacket concludes: “This book is a winner.” In the Italian literature there has long been a Catholic interpretation of Vico that has stood alongside Marxist, Existentialist, Idealist, and other interpretations. Miner has brought the interpretation of Vico as an orthodox Catholic thinker forward into the English-language interpretation of Vico. The uniqueness of his approach is captured in the two terms of his subtitle.

Cassirer counts history as a symbolic form in his list that includes myth, religion, language, art, and science, but his discussion of history is confined to a chapter in An Essay on Man. A more complete understanding requires attention to a year-long seminar he taught at Yale on “The Philosophy of History” in 1941–1942. The partially unpublished texts of this seminar are the most extended exposition of Cassirer’s conception of history as a symbolic form. The key source for Cassirer’s philosophy of history is Vico. Cassirer holds that “historical consciousness” is a very late product of human civilization not found before the Greeks and even with the Greeks history is not analyzed as a particular form of thought. Cassirer claims that such analysis did not appear until the eighteenth century in the work of Vico and Herder.

This volume is part of the multi-volume edition of Cassirer's Nachlass, the first volume of which, Zur Metaphysik der Symbolichen Formen, appeared in 1995 (English tr.: The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 4, The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, ed. J. M. Krois and D. P. Verene [Yale University Press, 1996]). This volume of Cassirer's correspondence contains 186 letters to and from Cassirer spanning the length of his career, beginning with a letter of 1893 prior to his arrival in Marburg in 1896 to study with the founders of the Marburg Neo-Kantian School, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, and ending with an exchange of letters with Hans Reichenbach regarding an offer of an appointment at UCLA a few days before his ..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 51-64 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Art as Symbolic Form: Cassirer on the Educational Value of ArtThora Ilin BayerIntroductionAmong the papers that Ernst Cassirer left at his death in 1945 is a fully written out lecture labeled "Seminar of Education, March 10th, 1943," which also bears the title "The Educational Value of Art." It may have been prepared for a session of Cassirer's seminar at Yale for that spring on Aesthetics: Symbolic Forms, the second half of a yearlong course. 1 The text begins with discussion of the Platonic quarrel with the poets and moves through views of various thinkers, especially Croce and Collingwood. Cassirer had planned to have a volume on art included in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, in addition to those on Language,Mythical Thought, and The Phenomenology of Knowledge. 2 In these three volumes he often mentions the triad of language, myth, and art, but he says little of art as such.In May 1942 in a letter to Paul Schilpp, the American philosopher and editor of the volume of critical essays on Cassirer's work in the Library of Living Philosophers series, Cassirer wrote that he had intended to produce a volume on art but the disfavor (Ungunst) of the times caused him to put it off again and again. 3 The principal sources of Cassirer's aesthetics are his chapter on art in An Essay on Man 4 and two lectures on the educational value of art called "Language and Art I & II," 5 which parallel his earlier small study, Language and Myth. 6 Cassirer's conception of art as a symbolic form is derived from his conception of human culture as a systematic structure of symbolic forms that has as its main components myth and religion, language, art, history, and science (the chapter titles of the second part of An Essay on Man). In addition to these forms of culture there is a "metaphysics of symbolic forms," the subject of a fourth volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, left in manuscript at his death. 7 [End Page 51]I wish to raise two questions: (1) How does Cassirer conceive of art as a symbolic form? and (2) What are the implications of his conception for a conception of the ideals of aesthetic education? My aim in pursuing these questions is not to argue for the correctness of Cassirer's views but to attempt to establish what his views in fact are. Little has been written directly on Cassirer's conception of art relative to the frequency with which his name is mentioned in general discussions of aesthetics. 8 Cassirer's conception of education is a nearly unexamined subject. 9The Platonic Quarrel: MimesisCassirer says: "Of all the problems that we have to study in a philosophy of education, the problem of the educational value of art is one of the most difficult ones." 10 He claims that this problem goes back to the beginning of philosophy itself and that at present we are still very far from a generally accepted solution. Plato's famous quarrel with the poets in the tenth book of the Republic is important not simply for an understanding of ancient aesthetics but also for philosophy's conception of itself.The basic tenets of this quarrel are well known. I wish to review them here toward the goal of suggesting an original view of it that is derivable from Cassirer's approach. The issue is whether poetry or philosophy is the means to truth. The works of Homer had scriptural status for the Greeks and were thought to contain all that was necessary for civil wisdom. Poiein is to make and compose poetry. The ancient poet is a maker of truth claims through language. The quarrel rests on the fact that the philosopher is also a maker of truth claims formulated in words. Is the relatively new figure in Plato's time of the philosophos, the friend or lover...

Elio Gianturco said, of De mente heroica “it is one of the most inspired ‘invitations to learning’ ever penned.... The eros of learning has seldom been expressed in more electrifying terms.”Vico advocates the humanist ideal that the goal of education is the realization of the natural bond between eloquence and wisdom. The educated person has the goal of becoming “wisdom speaking”. The aim of the individual in any system of education should be to grasp all the branches of knowledge in their connections to each other, to see thought as forming a whole.On Vico’s view, the individual should acquire the power of wisdom speaking for the common good. The ideal to instill in students is a sense of heroic mind. This form of heroism is the cultivation of the virtues to seek not just honor and gain but to act for the social good. These are ancient ideals that carry with them their own power. On Vico’s view, they require constant and eloquent restatement by the teacher and should occupy a central place in the educational institution.

This work concerns the development of the thought of Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) during approximately the first half of his career at the University of Naples, from his appointment as Professor of Rhetoric in 1699 to the appearance of his First New Science in 1725. It concentrates on Vico’s short history of the failed coup against Spanish rule in Naples, his series of inaugural university orations on pedagogy, and the three books of his work on universal law, the Diritto universale. Professor Naddeo’s work concludes with a few pages of remarks on the New Science of 1725 but excludes any discussion of the text for which Vico is most known and that accounts for his designation as the founder of the philosophy of ..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hegelian RhetoricThora Ilin BayerIntroduction: Rhetoric and DialecticAristotle in the famous first line of his Rhetoric defines the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic: "Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic" (1354a). Both rhetoric and dialectic belong to no definitive science. They treat those things that come within the purview of all human beings. As an antistrophes to dialectic, rhetoric concerns particular cases and "may be defined as the faculty [dynamis] of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (1355b). Dialectic concerns reasoning on general issues and in its generality it is like deduction. But unlike deductive demonstration, dialectic, as Aristotle says in Topics, "reasons from reputable opinions," rather than from premises that are true and primitive (100a).Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason takes a more extreme view of dialectic than Aristotle. Kant regards dialectic as a logic of illusion (Schein) that occurs when reason takes its powers beyond experience to make claims concerning the nature of the soul, world, and God. When reason attempts to determine the nature of what the soul is in itself, its assertions end in paralogisms; when it does so about the world its claims end in antinomies; and when it does so about God its efforts end in the impossibilities of the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments. Kant regards rhetoric as having no role in the philosophical pursuit of truth. In the Critique of Judgment Kant classifies rhetoric (Beredsamkeit) as belonging [End Page 203] to fine art. He regards ars oratoria as an art of manipulation and deception that achieves its end by a beautiful show (Schein) of speech that plays upon human weaknesses. He says oratory deserves no respect whatsoever—"ist gar keiner Achtung würdig" (1951, 172n50; 1974, 185n).1 Kant's exclusion of rhetoric from Kritik (with which he identifies philosophy) establishes the general exclusion of rhetoric in the development of philosophical idealism.Hegel interpretation for a century and a half presumed that rhetoric was irrelevant to understanding Hegel's thought. It considered Hegel's dialectic as a method independent of any connection to rhetoric. The first book on Hegel in English, James Hutchinson Stirling's The Secret of Hegel, published in 1863, regards the key to Hegel's system as his formulation of the concrete universal (Begriff). He makes no reference to rhetoric as an element in Hegel's thought (1887, xxii). In his preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel mentions Plato's Parmenides as "surely the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic," but he makes no mention of rhetoric (1952, 57; 1977, 44). A ground for ignoring rhetoric as important for Hegel's philosophy is the fact that Hegel himself ignores it. There is no discussion of rhetoric (Redekunst) in his whole corpus beyond a few pages concerning the differences between poetry and prose in his Lectures on Fine Art (1986, 15:257–68; 1998, 2:986–95).All of the approaches to Hegel in nonrhetorical terms changed with the appearance of Donald Phillip Verene's Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the "Phenomenology of Spirit" (1985) followed by John H. Smith's The Spirit and Its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel's Philosophy of "Bildung" (1988).2 Verene's work showed that there is a dialectic between image (Bild) and concept (Begriff) within Hegel's mode of expression that provides the reader with a necessary means of access to the work. Smith's study showed not only that Hegel employs rhetorical principles in the composition of the Phenomenology but that Hegel in his early years studied rhetoric closely and was concerned to master it. Smith's work, although developed independently of Verene's, joined with it to present a new reading of Hegel. This poetical and rhetorical grasp of Hegel's thought has been recently restated in Verene's Hegel's Absolute (2007).My views that follow begin where Verene's and Smith's accounts leave off. I wish to consider two questions that extend what has been broached in their readings of Hegel. (1) In what sense does Hegel's Phenomenology embody a transformation of the Aristotelian conception of rhetoric as an antistrophes to dialectic? (2) To...