•  56
    Review of: Adams, Robert Merrihew, What It Is, and What It Is in Itself: A Systematic Ontology (review)
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (4): 309-313. 2023.
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  •  108
    Identity and Purity
    Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2): 492-508. 2023.
    Recently, a number of metaphysicians have been working on the issue of the metaphysical grounds of identity facts. In this paper, I will survey a variety of accounts of identity facts through a particular lens. These accounts will be examined in light of the so-called ‘purity’ principle, a principle intriguing many discussions on metaphysical grounding in recent literature. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I will indicate what sorts of accounts of identity facts the purity principle rule…Read more
  •  59
    Against the Humean Argument for Extended Simples
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3): 551-563. 2023.
    Is it possible that there are extended simples—material objects extended in space or spacetime that have no proper parts? The most commonly cited argument for this possibility is based on a version of the Humean principle: namely (and with some qualifications), any pattern of instantiation of a fundamental relation is possible. In this paper, we make the Humean argument fully explicit, and criticise it from three aspects—the Disjunction problem, the Pluralist problem, and the Accidentality probl…Read more
  •  76
    In defense of fact-only grounding
    Philosophical Studies 179 (9): 2891-2899. 2022.
    This paper will examine a novel argument in favour of entity grounding over fact-only grounding. The idea of this argument, roughly speaking, is that the proponents of fact-only grounding cannot provide a unified account of grounds of identity, whereas the proponents of entity grounding can. In this paper, I will give a response to this argument. Specifically, I will argue that the problem which this argument raises to the proponents of fact-only grounding is also a problem with which the propon…Read more
  •  36
    F-Duplicates and Trivialization: A Reply to Speaks
    Faith and Philosophy 37 (4): 500-515. 2020.
    In this paper, I will defend a strategy for employing perfect being theology that Jeff Speaks calls “restriction strategy.” In Section I, I will outline what the restriction strategy is and explicate Speaks’s objection to it. In Section II, I will propose a response to Speaks’s objection. In Section III, the response will be refined to avoid objections. My contention will be that this refined version of perfect being theology avoids Speaks’s objection, and therefore can help theists find what di…Read more
  •  168
    The gap problem made easy?
    Analysis 80 (3): 486-492. 2020.
    Byerly recently developed a new solution to the gap problem for cosmological arguments. His idea is that the best explanation for why the necessary being is found to have necessary existence is that it is a perfect being. I raise an objection to Byerly’s solution on the ground that there is some rival naturalistic explanation that is as good as Byerly s theistic explanation.