Tim Connolly

This article examines how certain transformative experiences – such as becoming a mother, joining the military, or attending college – can function as traps when framed through a rhetoric of individual agency and self-realization that obscures sociomaterial conditions and oppressive structural forces. We analyze three features of contemporary philosophical discourse on transformative experience that contribute to this entrapment: the emphasis on subjective value, the view of transformation as a rupture between old and new selves, and the appeal to higher-order values like authenticity and self-authorship. Our case study on motherhood shows how these conceptual framings can render structural constraints invisible, sever individuals from the resources that might help them navigate the rigid roles into which they are cast, and ultimately isolate them in the aftermath of difficult or harmful outcomes, leaving them solely responsible to bear the burden.

This volume discusses the work of four exemplars of Ru or Confucianism, making the argument that they are philosophers in their own right. They do not simply explicate the meaning of Confucian texts, nor merely commentate on the tradition. What exactly this entails, and how we might think of “beyond comparison” is an exploratory project. Some authors have quite distinct views on this. Tim Connolly expresses his own take: “As I understand the phrase ‘Beyond Comparison,’ it means getting beyond dichotomies that have been prevalent in Anglo-European philosophy.” Because of Anglo-European philosophy’s hegemony in the global arena, these dichotomies have tended to shape encounters with philosophical traditions in the rest of the world.” In his paper Connolly discusses Yang Guorong’s views on cultivation and maturation in comparison with John Searle. Yang’s understandings of ritual and humanization offer an account of social reality that differs greatly from Searle. In this way Connolly builds on Carleo’s essay to demonstrate that not only is Yang’s work “beyond comparison,” but taking it seriously allows us to develop productive philosophical encounters with new frameworks and methodological tools.

According to L. A. Paul, since we cannot know in advance how a transformative experience will reshape our values and preferences, we have no basis for deciding whether or not to have such an experience. How can we know the value we will get out of the experience when what we value itself may change as a result of undergoing it? At the same time, Paul acknowledges that the emphasis on planning out our lives in accordance with our deepest values is unique to affluent Western societies. In this essay, I explore an alternate approach to transformative experience, derived from the classical Chinese text of the _Zhuangzi_ 莊子. The _Zhuangzi_’s philosophy draws our attention to the “transformation of things” (_wuhua_ 物化), and many passages in the text deal with the unforeseen changes that occur in life. Whereas the contemporary discussion has focused on deciding whether or not to undergo a particular transformative experience, the _Zhuangzi_’s account highlights how we can respond to transformations that occur whether we want them or not.

Aspiration, according to Agnes Callard, is the long-term process of learning new values. Confucian self- cultivation as presented in the Analects is also aimed at the reorientation of one’s values, so that instead of being guided by pleasure, comfort, or profit, we become devoted to learning, ritual, and caring for others. According to the text, this process is a long and arduous one that involves a lifelong commitment as well as a total reorganization of one’s daily pursuits. Yet for both Callard and the early Confucians a puzzle arises: how does one aspire toward values that one currently lacks at every level? In this paper, I look at some resources within the Analects for responding to this puzzle.

Early proponents of comparative philosophy believed that the dissemination of comparative methods would lead to step forward in human consciousness and contribute to a more peaceful world. Can comparative philosophy today still aspire to such goals? On the one hand, the aims of the field have narrowed, so that comparative philosophy is seen as a method of interpreting particular thinkers and texts or as a tool for addressing specific philosophical problems. On the other hand, critics argue that comparative philosophy is an outmoded enterprise that should give way to more pluralistic forms of inquiry. In this paper, I examine three contemporary views about the social relevance of comparative philosophy. The first sees comparative philosophy as a means of cultivating liberal citizenship; the second as an ally in decolonial struggle; the third as offering resources to promote human flourishing in the modern world. These approaches offer comparative philosophers a wide range of options for thinking about the social relevance of their field.

In this paper we argue that the approach for teaching non-Western, and specifically Chinese philosophy to undergraduate Western students, does not have to be significantly different than that for teaching philosophies from “Western” traditions. Four areas will be explored. Firstly, we look at debates on teaching non-Western philosophy from the perspective of themes or traditions, suggesting that, as an overarching guideline, it is mote discussion. Secondly, in terms of making generalizations, we argue that no more explanation of the “Chineseness” of Chinese philosophy be offered than the “Germanness” of German philosophy, or “Greekness” of Greek philosophy. Thirdly, that lines of philosophical coherences are not limited to regional or cultural bounds. Finally, that foreign language be used in a way that invites understanding and does not close ideas off to students. In sum, we suggest applying well proven methods of teaching “Western” philosophy to Chinese (and other “Non-Western”) philosophies. After all, value of Chinese and other “Non-Western” philosophies comes not from their being “Chinese” or “Non-Western,” but from being philosophical.

Although there are various studies comparing Greek and Indian philosophy and religion, and Chinese and Western philosophy and religion, Brahman and Dao: Comparatives Studies in Indian and Chinese Philosophy and Religion is a first of its kind that brings together Indian and Chinese philosophies and religions. Brahman and Dao helps close the gap on a much needed examination on the rich history of Buddhist transmission to China, and the many generations of Indian Buddhist missionaries to China and Chinese Buddhist pilgrims to India, including the legendary Bodhidharma, and Faxian and Xuanzang

What is the metaphysical background to early Confucian ethics? Is there a distinctive picture of reality that informs texts such as the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi? Contemporary interpreters disagree on the answer to these questions, a division reflected not just in scholarly debates but in how early Confucian texts are introduced to larger audiences. This article will begin with a discussion of some general methodological issues involved in applying the term “metaphysics” to classical Chinese thought, and then examine a couple of prominent reconstructions of the metaphysical background to early Confucian texts.

A number of recent scholarly works in Chinese philosophy approach Chinese texts and thinkers by incorporating them into longstanding issues and debates in the Western philosophical tradition. While the merits of this approach have received much discussion among those working in Chinese philosophy, it also has the potential to reach those outside the field whose research or teaching focuses on the debates and issues. In this article we look at the issue of using Chinese philosophy in courses on contemporary philosophical topics for non-specialists. We give the justification for this pedagogical approach, put forth a “syllabus” of preparatory readings, and finally, discuss its limitations and possibilities.

Many passages in early Confucian texts such as the Analects and Mengzi are focused on virtue, recommending qualities like humaneness, righteousness, and trustworthiness. Still others emphasize roles: what it means to be a good son, a good ruler, a good friend, a good teacher, or a good student. How are these teachings about virtues and roles related? In the past decade there has been a growing debate between two interpretations of early Confucian ethics, one that sees virtues as fundamental, and the other of which starts from roles. Recently there have been two new contributions to the debate: Virtue Ethics and Confucianism, edited by Stephen C. Angle and Michael Slote, which develops the virtue ethical interpretation, and Henry Rosemont, Jr.’s Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion, which defends the role-based interpretation. This paper lays out the main contours of the debate between Virtue Ethical Confucianism and Confucian Role Ethics, as well as examines the distinctive contributions of these two new works.

This article examines the origins of and philosophical justifications for Aristotelian friendship and early Confucian filial piety.What underlying assumptions about bonds between friends and family members do the philosophies share or uniquely possess? Is the Aristotelian emphasis on relationships between equals incompatible with the Confucian regard for filiality? As I argue, the Aristotelian and early Confucian accounts, while different in focus, share many of the same tensions in the attempt to balance hierarchical and familial associations with those between friends who are on the same footing.

The last two decades have seen a resurgence of interest in the study of classical Chinese texts by means of the subsequent commentaries. New versions of works like the Analects and Mencius that include selected commentaries have begun to appear, making some view about the value of commentaries necessary simply for picking which edition of a text to read. In this paper, I consider the potential role of the 2000-year-old commentarial tradition in the teaching and learning of Chinese philosophy. Given the difficulty of the original works, does the addition of commentaries make things better or worse from a student’s perspective? How far should we go in emphasizing the role of commentary in interacting with the texts?

Critics have argued that comparative philosophy is inherently flawed or even impossible. What standards can we use to describe and evaluate different cultures' philosophies? How do we avoid projecting our own ways of thinking onto others? Can we overcome the vast divergences in history, language, and ways of organizing reality that we find in China, India, Africa, and the West? Doing Philosophy Comparatively is the first comprehensive introduction to the foundations, problems, and methods of comparative philosophy. It is divided into three parts:. A wide-ranging examination of the basic concepts of comparative philosophy, including "philosophy," "comparison," "tradition," and "culture.". A discussion of the central problems that arise in extending philosophy across cultural boundaries: linguistic, justificatory, and evaluative incommensurability; projection and asymmetry; and the validity of cultural generalizations.. A critical look at the dominant contemporary approaches to comparative philosophy. This book offers a basic tool-kit for doing philosophy at the cross-cultural level. Drawing on many examples from the past and present of comparative philosophy, it engages readers in sustained reflection on how to think comparatively.

A perspectivist theory is usually taken to mean that (1) our knowledge of the world is inevitably shaped by our particular perspectives, (2) any one of these perspectives is as good as any other, and (3) any claims to objective or authoritative knowledge are consequently without ground. Recent scholarship on Nietzsche, however, has challenged the prevalent view that the philosopher holds (2) and (3), arguing instead that his perspectivism aims at attaining a greater level of objectivity. In this essay, I attempt a structurally similar reinterpretation of Zhuangzi’s perspectivism. I argue that while the Chinese thinker sees all knowledge as perspective-dependent, he thinks that some perspectives are broader and more accurate than others. He utilizes shifts in perspective precisely in order to attain these superior perspectives, which constitute what he calls da zhi 大知, or “greater knowledge.” Whereas Nietzsche sees his perspectivism as methodologically continuous with the sciences, Zhuangzi’s “greater knowledge” has the goal of ensuring our survival and well-being in the everyday world.