Tim Crane

It is usual to distinguish between two kinds of doxastic attitude: standing or dispositional states, which govern our actions and persist throughout changes in consciousness; and conscious episodes of acknowledging the truth of a proposition. What is the relationship between these two kinds of attitude? Normally, the conscious episodes are in harmony with the underlying dispositions, but sometimes they come apart and we act in a way that is contrary to our explicit conscious judgements. Philosophers have often tried to explain these situations in largely doxastic terms, by identifying one or other of the attitudes as our ‘real’ beliefs. This chapter argues that this is not generally realistic and we should appeal to a wider range of psychological attitudes. Such an account would be best supported by a picture of the unconscious mind which does not sharply separate the doxastic from the conative and the affective.

The Cambridge Companion to Marx Edited by Terrell Carver Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. xiii + 357. ISBN 0–521–36625–9 £40.00 hbk. Paul Ricoeur By Stephen H. Clark Routledge, 1990. Pp. 216. ISBN 0–415–02309–2. £30.00 hbk. £9.99 pbk. The Analysis of Political Structure By David Easton Routledge, 1990. Pp. xv + 336 ISBN 0–415–90310–6. £35.00 hbk. Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism By Owen Flanagan Harvard University Press, 1991. Pp. 393. ISBN 0–674–93218–8. £27.95. God and Greek Philosophy By L. P. Gerson Routledge, 1990. Pp. xi + 340. ISBN 0–415–02219–3. £35.00. Scepticism By Christopher Hookway Routledge, 1990. Pp. xii + 251. ISBN 0–415–03396–9. £35.00 hbk. Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy By Peter Hylton Clarendon Press, 1990. Pp. 420. ISBN 0–19–824626–9. £50 hbk. £15.95 pbk The Poetics of Imagining: from Husserl to Lyotard By Richard Kearney Harper Collins, 1991. Pp. xiii + 234. ISBN 04–445–4503. £30.00. The Language of Art History Edited by Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. 255. ISBN 0–521–35384‐X. £32.50. Newman After a Hundred Years Edited by Ian Ker and Alan G. Hill Clarendon Press, 1990. Pp. xvi + 470. ISBN 0–19–812–8916 £45.00 Inference to the Best Explanation By Peter Lipton Routledge, 1991. Pp. x + 194. ISBN 0–415–05886–4. £35.00 hbk. Dretske and His Critics Edited by Brian McLaughlin Blackwell, 1991. Pp. xvii + 231. ISBN 1–55786–198–6. £40.00. A History and Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel By Giacomo Rinaldi The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992. Pp. 525. $99.95 hbk. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume By Galen Strawson Clarendon Press, 1989 (1992 issued in paperback with corrections). Pp. xiv + 291. ISBN 0–19–824038–4. £14.95 pbk. Analysis and Metaphysics By P. F. Strawson Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. 152. ISBN 0–19–875517–6. £22.50 hbk; £7.95 pbk. Physics and Metaphysics: Theories of Space and Time By Jennifer Trusted Routledge, 1991. Pp. xii + 210. ISBN 0–415–05948–8. £30.00. Political Theory and Postmodernism By Stephen K. White Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. 153. ISBN 0–521–40122–4. £25.00 hbk. ISBN 0–521–40948–9. £9.95 pbk. Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art By Julian Young Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. xiii + 170. ISBN 0–521–51124–6. £27.95.

Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the first is not. And we also occasionally distinguish mental pain (which is normally understood as some kind of emotional distress) from the ‘physical pain’ one feels in one’s body. So what can be meant by saying that pain is a mental state? Of course, it only takes a little reflection shows that this naive view is mistaken. Pain is a state of consciousness, or an event in consciousness, and whether or not all states of mind are conscious, it is indisputable that only minds, or states of mind, are conscious.2 But does the naive view tell us anything about the concept of pain, or the concept of mind? I think it does. In this paper, I shall give reasons for thinking that consciousness is a form of intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’. I shall claim that the consciousness involved in bodily sensations like pain is constituted by the mind’s direction upon the part or region of the body where the sensation feels to be. Given this, it is less surprising that the naive view of pain says what it does: the apparent ‘physicality’ of pain is a consequence of confusing the object of the intentional state—the part of the body in which the pain is felt—with the state of being in pain.

It is a widespread assumption in contemporary philosophy of mind that a naturalistic explanation of intentionality must answer to what I will call the ‘question of aboutness’: what makes it the case that any intentional mental state is about something? Furthermore, it is assumed that an adequate answer to this question must not employ any intentional notions, and that it should apply in broadly the same way to all the various kinds of intentional phenomena (perception, desire, intention etc). The aim of this paper is to dispute this popular conception of what a naturalistic explanation of intentionality must involve. Not only does the question of aboutness lack a general motivation, but the accompanying assumptions are not compulsory for a naturalistic explanation. The outlines of an alternative naturalistic picture are sketched.

Art is one thing, the aesthetic another. Things can be appreciated aesthetically – for instance, in terms of the traditional category of the beautiful – without being works of art. A landscape can be appreciated as beautiful; so can a man or a woman. Appreciation of such natural objects in terms of their beauty certainly counts as aesthetic appreciation, if anything does. This is not simply because landscapes and people are not artefacts; for there are also artefacts which are assessable aesthetically without being works of art (e.g. an elegant car or a mathematical proof)...

Philosophy in the 20th century began and ended with an obsession with the problems of consciousness. But the specific problems discussed at each end of the century were very different, and reflection on how these differences developed will illuminate not just our understanding of the history of philosophy of consciousness, but also our understanding of consciousness itself. An interest in the problems of consciousness can be found in at least three movements in early 20th century philosophy: in the discussions of perception and realism by G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell; in the related discussions of realism and pragmatism in America, in the period between William James and C.I. Lewis; and in the phenomenological movement started by Edmund Husserl. Two common themes in all these movements are: (i) that consciousness is a central or defining feature of the mind, and (ii) consciousness and thought (or intentionality) are interrelated phenomena not to be discussed in isolation from one another. The problem of consciousness in those days was the problem of the nature of our access to the mind-independent world.

We call our thoughts conscious, and we also say the same of our bodily sensations, perceptions and other sensory experiences. But thoughts and sensory experiences are very different phenomena, both from the point of view of their subject and in their functional or cognitive role. Does this mean, then, that there are very different kinds or varieties of consciousness? Philosophers do often talk about different kinds of consciousness: Christopher Hill, for example, claims that ‘it is customary to distinguish five forms of consciousness’ (Hill 2009: 1). These are: agent consciousness, propositional consciousness, introspective consciousness, relational consciousness and phenomenal consciousness; to which Hill adds experiential consciousness, making six in total.

I am very sympathetic to Dan Hutto’s view that in our experience of the emotions of others “we do not neutrally observe the outward behaviour of another and infer coldly, but on less than certain grounds, that they are in such and such an inner state, as justified by analogy with our own case. Rather we react and feel as we do because it is natural for us to see and be moved by specific expressions of emotion in others” (Hutto section 4). is seems to me to be a good starting point for any account of the ascription and epistemology of emotions, an excellent description of data that any theory of the emotions has to take into account. What I find puzzling is that Hutto seems to believe that this view is in opposition to certain widely accepted...

This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there are good reasons for allowing that some of these are determinable properties. On the other hand, there are strong arguments in the metaphysics of properties to treat properties as sparse in David Lewis’s (1983) sense. But then it seems that we only need to believe in the most determinate properties: particular shades of colour, specific masses, lengths and so on. And if we also agree with Lewis that sparse properties are ‘the ones relevant to causal powers’ (1983: 13) it seems we must conclude that if properties are relevant to causation at all, then all of these are determinate properties. I call this ‘the antinomy of determinable causation’. On the one hand, we have a good argument for the claim that determinable properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Thesis. But on the other hand, we have a good argument for the claim that only the most determinate properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Antithesis. Clearly, we need to reject either the Thesis or the..

The nature of perception has long been a central question in philosophy. It is of crucial importance not just in the philosophy of mind, but also in epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of science. The essays in this 1992 volume not only offer fresh answers to some of the traditional problems of perception, but also examine the subject in light of contemporary research on mental content. A substantial introduction locates the essays within the recent history of the subject, and demonstrates the links between them. The Contents of Experience brings together some prominent philosophers in the field, and offers a major statement on a problem central to current philosophical thinking. Notable contributors include Christopher Peacocke, Brian O'Shaughnessy and Michael Tye.

There appears to be a bewildering variety of phenomena that the study of the mind classifies as unconscious, but does anything unite all these phenomena? Does the unconscious have an essence? Can there be a general theoretical account of unconscious mentality? We proceed in this chapter with three aims. The first is to dispute the standard view of the relationship between conscious and unconscious mentality, and with it, the standard view of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality. The second is to lay out several options for replacing the standard view, ones that allow for substantive differences between conscious and unconscious mentality. The third is to sketch the foundations of a unifying conception of the unconscious across the various disciplines that study the mind. Along the way, we apply these conjectures to examples of implicit cognition.

An important theme running through D.H. Mellor’s work is his realism, or as I shall call it, his objectivism: the idea that reality as such is how it is, regardless of the way we represent it, and that philosophical error often arises from confusing aspects of our subjective representation of the world with aspects of the world itself. Thus central to Mellor’s work on time has been the claim that the temporal A-series is unreal while the B-series is real. The A-series is something which is a product of our representation of the world, but not a feature of reality itself. And in other, less central, areas of his work, this kind of theme has been repeated: ‘Objective decision making’ argues that the right way to understand decision theory is as a theory of what is the objectively correct decision, the one that will actually as a matter of fact achieve your intended goal, rather than the one that is justified purely in terms of what you believe, regardless of whether the belief is true or false. ‘I and now’ argues against a substantial subjective conception of the self, using analogies between subjective and objective ways of thinking about time and subjective and objective ways of thinking about the self. And in the paper which shall be the focus of my attention here, ‘Nothing like experience’, Mellor.