•  1986
    From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries
    Philosophical Review 124 (2): 169-206. 2015.
    Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good. This article defends skepticism about the Lottery Requirement. It distinguishes three broad strategies of defending such a requirement: the surrogate satisfaction account, the procedural account, and the ideal consen…Read more
  •  222
    Moral Realism and Two-Dimensional Semantics
    Ethics 121 (4): 717-748. 2011.
    Moral realists can, and should, allow that the truth-conditional content of moral judgments is in part attitudinal. I develop a two-dimensional semantics that embraces attitudinal content while preserving realist convictions about the independence of moral facts from our attitudes. Relative to worlds “considered as counterfactual,” moral terms rigidly track objective, response-independent properties. But relative to different ways the actual world turns out to be, they nonrigidly track whatever …Read more
  •  139
    An Epistemic Modal Norm of Practical Reasoning
    Synthese 1-22. forthcoming.
    When are you in a position to rely on p in practical reasoning? Existing accounts say that you must know that p, or be in a position to know that p, or be justified in believing that p, or be in a position to justifiably believe it, and so on. This paper argues that all of these proposals face important problems, which I call the Problems of Negative Bootstrapping and of Level Confusions. I offer a diagnosis of these problems, and I argue that an adequate epistemic norm must be transparent in th…Read more
  •  129
    Normative Reasons Contextualism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3): 593-624. 2014.
    This article argues for the view that statements about normative reasons are context-sensitive. Specifically, they are sensitive to a contextual parameter specifying a relevant person's or group's body of information. The argument for normative reasons contextualism starts from the context-sensitivity of the normative “ought” and the further premise that reasons must be aligned with oughts. It is incoherent, I maintain, to suppose that someone normatively ought to φ but has most reason not to φ.…Read more
  •  121
    Why be yourself? Kantian respect and Frankfurtian identification
    Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245): 725-745. 2011.
    Harry Frankfurt has claimed that some of our desires are ‘internal’, i.e., our own in a special sense. I defend the idea that a desire's being internal matters in a normative, reasons-involving sense, and offer an explanation for this fact. The explanation is Kantian in spirit. We have reason to respect the desires of persons in so far as respecting them is a way to respect the persons who have them (in some cases, ourselves). But if desires matter normatively in so far as they belong to persons…Read more
  •  76
    Kant und die Logik des "Ich denke"
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (3): 331-356. 2010.
    This paper explores Kant’s views about the logical form of “I think”-judgments. It is shown that according to Kant, in an important class of cases the prefix “I think” does not contribute to the assertoric, truth-conditional content of judgments of the form “I think that P.” Thus, judgments of this type are often merely judgments that P. The prefix “I think” does mention the subject and his thought, but it does not make the complex judgment a judgment about the subject and his or her thought. Ka…Read more
  •  72
    This volume brings together recent work by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of virtue epistemology. The prospects of virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge depend crucially on our ability to give some independent account of what epistemic virtues are and what they are _for_. The contributions here ask how epistemic virtues matter apart from any narrow concern with defining knowledge; they show how epistemic virtues figure in accounts of various aspects of our lives, with a spe…Read more
  •  65
    Definition of the problem The creation and selection of children as tissue donors is ethically controversial. Critics often appeal to Kant’s Formula of Humanity, i.e. the requirement that people be treated not merely as means but as ends in themselves. As many defenders of the procedure point out, these appeals usually do not explain the sense of the requirement and hence remain obscure. Arguments This article proposes an interpretation of Kant’s principle, and it proposes that two different ins…Read more
  •  48
    Radikale Interpretation und moralische Wirklichkeit
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (4): 590-596. 2010.
  •  46
    From A Rational Point Of View
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    When we discuss normative reasons, oughts, requirements of rationality, hypothetical imperatives (or “anankastic conditionals”), motivating reasons and so on, we often use verbs like “believe” and “want” to capture a relevant subject’s perspective. According to the received view about sentences involving these verbs, what they do is describe the subject’s mental states. Many puzzles concerning normative discourse have to do with the role that mental states consequently appear to play in this dis…Read more
  •  40
    Strukturelle Entfremdung als Kategorie der Wirtschaftsethik
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (2): 213-226. 2012.
    This paper argues that a certain kind of alienation from labour can be analyzed and explained in the theoretical framework that is dominant in current economics. Given a neoclassical model of a labour market, the intrinsic value that different kinds of labour may have for people can be represented as a source of utility (in the technical sense). It can then be shown that in capitalist economies, basing one’s supply decisions on this intrinsic value is predictably costly. So in the long run, rati…Read more
  •  39
    This monograph develops an argument for the following view: In leading an autonomous life, persons make choices and adopt attitudes of a distinctive kind. To justify these choices and attitudes, they need to draw on knowledge about their biographies. More specifically, their biographies are a source of a distinctive type of practical reasons. These reasons are typically such that their adequate articulation will have a narrative structure. Along the way, the book develops what has been called "t…Read more
  •  17
    Review of A. W. price, Contextuality in Practical Reason (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (9). 2008.
  •  15
    Personale Lebensgeschichte und Kritische Theorie
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (3): 377-393. 2010.
    This paper discusses an autobiographical approach to Critical Theory, an approach which, as I argue, can be found in Walter Benjamin′s work. The core idea is that remembering one′s own life within a certain culture provides a productive method for a differentiated critique of this culture. In order to explain and defend this I idea, I draw on resources from both analytic philosophy and Benjamin′s work. Along the way, I describe Benjamin′s distinctive mode of ideology critique, a mode of critique…Read more
  •  9
    Geschichte wird gemacht
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (1): 158-162. 2013.
  •  8
    Verteilungskonflikte, Gleichachtung und Zufallsverfahren
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 70 (2): 262-268. 2016.
  •  7
    Sind wir allein in unserem Körper?
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2): 333-336. 2010.
  •  7
    Moralischer Partikularismus und die moralischen Grundsätze Kants und Scanlons
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 69 (1): 84-90. 2015.
  •  7
    Entfremdung und ökonomische Rationalität
    In Daniel Loick & Rahel Jaeggi (eds.), Karl Marx - Perspektiven der Gesellschaftskritik, De Gruyter. pp. 145-158. 2013.
  •  5
    On What Matters, 2 Bände by Derek Parfit (review)
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 66 (2): 335-339. 2012.
  •  3
    Strukturelle Rationalität, Gründe und Irrtumsszenarien (review)
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (3): 472-480. 2020.