•  9
    Die subtile Kunst des Ist-mir-nicht-egal (review)
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (6): 977-982. 2020.
  •  109
    Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4): 269-295. 2015.
    What is the role of sceptical scenarios—dreams, evil demons, brains in a vat—in scep- tical arguments? According to the error view, sceptical scenarios illustrate the possibil- ity of massive falsity in one’s beliefs, whereas according to the ignorance view, they illustrate the possibility of massive ignorance not necessarily due to falsity. In this paper, the ignorance view is defended by surveying the arguments in favour of it and by replying to two pressing objections against it. According to…Read more
  •  66
    Sceptical Scenarios Are Not Error-Possibilities
    Erkenntnis 78 (1): 59-72. 2013.
    On a common view of scenario-based sceptical arguments sceptical scenarios are error-possibilities, i.e. their point is to introduce the possibility of having only false beliefs. However, global error is impossible for purely logical/conceptual reasons: Even if one’s beliefs are consistent, the negations of one’s beliefs need not be consistent as well. My paper deals with the question of what the consequences of this result are. Two attempts at repairing scenario-based sceptical arguments within…Read more
  •  99
    Epistemological disjunctivism, as defended by, for example, McDowell, Neta and Pritchard, is the view that epistemic justification can be – and in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge actually is – both factive and reflectively accessible. One major problem for this view is the access problem: apparently, epistemological disjunctivism entails that ordinary external world propositions can be known by reflection alone. According to epistemological disjunctivism, seeing that the sun is shinin…Read more
  •  46
    Transmission arguments against closure of knowledge base the case against closure on the premise that a necessary condition for knowledge is not closed. Warfield argues that this kind of argument is fallacious whereas Brueckner, Murphy and Yan try to rescue it. According to them, the transmission argument is no longer fallacious once an implicit assumption is made explicit. I defend Warfield’s objection by arguing that the various proposals for the unstated assumption either do not avoid the fal…Read more
  •  29
    Warum Wissen nicht der allgemeinste faktive mentale Zustand ist
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1): 33-65. 2011.
    In Knowledge and its Limits (2000) Williamson defends not only the negative claim that knowledge cannot be analysed, but also the positive claim that knowledge is the most general factive mental state. In this paper two objections to the positive claim are presented: First, knowledge is not more general than e. g. seeing. After discussing several alleged examples of seeing without knowing a new example is offered. Although both seeing and knowing are incompatible with luck, they are incompatible…Read more
  •  29
    How to Read the Tractatus Sequentially
    Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (2): 91-124. 2016.
    One of the unconventional features of Wittgenstein’s _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ is its use of an elaborated and detailed numbering system. Recently, Bazzocchi, Hacker und Kuusela have argued that the numbering system means that the _Tractatus_ must be read and interpreted not as a sequentially ordered book, but as a text with a two-dimensional, tree-like structure. Apart from being able to explain how the _Tractatus_ was composed, the tree reading allegedly solves exegetical issues both on…Read more
  •  15
    Buchkritik: Überzeugung und Wahrheit (review)
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (5): 821-825. 2012.
    Jochen Briesen: Skeptische Paradoxa. Die philosophische Skepsis, kognitive Projekte und der epistemische Konsequentialismus. Mentis Verlag, Paderborn 2012, 341 S
  •  959
    Scepticism, Infallibilism, Fallibilism
    Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2): 49-70. 2012.
    The relation of scepticism to infallibilism and fallibilism is a contested issue. In this paper I argue that Cartesian sceptical arguments, i.e. sceptical arguments resting on sceptical scenarios, are neither tied to infallibilism nor collapse into fallibilism. I interpret the distinction between scepticism and fallibilism as a scope distinction. According to fallibilism, each belief could be false, but according to scepticism all beliefs could be false at the same time. However, to put this dis…Read more