According to (one version of) the Procreation Asymmetry, it is wrong to create people with bad lives, but we are not morally required to create people with good lives. While many philosophers are attracted to the Asymmetry, it has proved notoriously difficult to formulate a plausible moral theory that incorporates and explains it. It has also seemed difficult to square the Asymmetry with standard views in population axiology, on which adding sufficiently happy people to the world is a good thing…
Read moreAccording to (one version of) the Procreation Asymmetry, it is wrong to create people with bad lives, but we are not morally required to create people with good lives. While many philosophers are attracted to the Asymmetry, it has proved notoriously difficult to formulate a plausible moral theory that incorporates and explains it. It has also seemed difficult to square the Asymmetry with standard views in population axiology, on which adding sufficiently happy people to the world is a good thing, not merely “neutral.” This paper is about a more fundamental problem: the Asymmetry is inconsistent with seemingly plausible principles about what we are morally permitted or required to do. I develop some puzzles along these lines, inspired by Parfit’s Mere Addition Paradox, using minimal assumptions. I use these puzzles to motivate a view that incorporates the Asymmetry and which is not only consistent with the goodness of creating happy people, but which appeals to that goodness in resolving the puzzles. Finally, I take up some further puzzles, involving principles of sequential choice, that challenge both this view and the Asymmetry more generally.