Timothy Campbell

Institute for Futures Studies
  • The Asymmetry in population ethics holds that creating a miserable person is morally impermissible, while not creating a happy person is morally permissible, all else being equal. Harm-avoidance theories explain the Asymmetry by claiming that, in certain contexts, only actions resulting in harm are impermissible. Two problems threaten these theories: (i) The Problem of Improvable Life Avoidance—requiring agents to avoid creating improvable good lives—and (ii) requiring dominated options. Sophist…Read more
  • According to the asymmetry, creating a miserable person is morally impermissible but failing to create a happy person is morally permissible, other things being equal. Some attempt to underwrite the asymmetry by appealing to a choice-dependent moral theory according to which the deontic status of an act depends on whether the agent performs it. We show that all choice-dependent moral theories in the literature are vulnerable to what we call ‘The Parent Trap’. These theories imply that the presen…Read more
  • Frick’s Defense of the Procreation Asymmetry
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 22 (1-2): 125-150. 2025.
    The Procreation Asymmetry, in strongest form, states (roughly) that while we have no reason to create happy people, we do have reason not to create unhappy people. Despite its popularity among non-utilitarian philosophers, it has been surprisingly difficult to give an adequate theoretical defense of this asymmetry. However, in a recent paper, Johann Frick attempts to provide a unified account of the asymmetry that avoids the problems with previous attempts. One of Frick’s novel claims is that a …Read more