This paper examines the debate between Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion over the nature of givenness. It erupted in 1991 over Marion’s fourth principle of phenomenology, “so much reduction, so much givenness,” and concluded with Marion’s response in 2015, though Henry died thirteen years earlier in 2002. Both conceive of givenness as such, or “primary givenness,” as the invisible but yet have contrary conceptions of it. For Henry, the invisible is the affective self-embrace of life that gives it…
Read moreThis paper examines the debate between Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion over the nature of givenness. It erupted in 1991 over Marion’s fourth principle of phenomenology, “so much reduction, so much givenness,” and concluded with Marion’s response in 2015, though Henry died thirteen years earlier in 2002. Both conceive of givenness as such, or “primary givenness,” as the invisible but yet have contrary conceptions of it. For Henry, the invisible is the affective self-embrace of life that gives itself to itself, while, for Marion, it is the way the given is saturated with an excess of possible ways of giving itself. Following a discussion of each philosopher’s views, this paper unpacks their respective criticisms and, in the final section, argues that life is the superior interpretation of givenness.
