Timothy Schroeder

As topics in the philosophy of emotion, pleasure and displeasure get less than their fair share of attention. On the one hand, there is the fact that pleasure and displeasure are given no role at all in many theories of the emotions, and secondary roles in many others.1 On the other, there is the centrality of pleasure and displeasure to being emotional. A woman who tears up because of a blustery wind, while an ill-advised burrito weighs heavily upon her digestive tract, feels an impressive number of the sensations felt by someone who is gut-wrenchingly sad. Yet, unless she feels bad, the way she feels is only a pale echo of the feeling of sadness. If she feels good in spite of the burrito and the wind, then she does not feel at all the way she would if she were sad. Likewise, a man falling asleep can hardly fail to feel his muscles relax, his heart rate fall, and so on, but unless he feels good his state is only a shadow of feeling content. This paper will begin with a sketch of the nature of pleasure and displeasure, and the relation between them and the feelings that are characteristic of emotions. It will then argue that the capacity to feel pleased and displeased is, quite literally, a sense modality: one allowing us to perceive net change in the satisfaction of our intrinsic desires. As with any sense modality, the capacity to feel pleased and displeased displays substantial modularity. The paper concludes by considering the ways in which the modularity of pleasure and displeasure contributes to effects that might reasonably be called “the modularity of the emotions.”.

Theoretical and practical deliberation are voluntary activities, and like all voluntary activities, they are performed for reasons. To hold that all voluntary activities are performed for reasons in virtue of their relations to past, present, or even merely possible acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that generate the voluntary activities making up ordinary deliberation. These nondeliberative, nonvoluntary processes by means of which we are able to deliberate for reasons are the fundamental processes by means of which we can think or do anything for a reason: once it has been seen that they must exist, it can be recognized that they are ubiquitous. As a result, the usefulness of deliberation to rational belief and action is intermittent, contingent, and modest. Deliberation is a tremendously valuable tool for increasing human capacities to think and act for good reasons in challenging contexts, but in the end it is merely a tool, wielded by people through the same nondeliberative, nonvoluntary capacities to think and act for reasons that they are enhancing the effectiveness of by deliberating

This chapter presents a summary of what is believed about the production of bodily movement by the mind, a summary of how motivation and inhibition get bodies out of bed and engaged in the varied activities of life. The focus is placed on the sources of motivation and inhibition, namely trying, having a prior intention, being rewarded, being pleased and desiring. It considers both what is thought about these phenomena by people of common sense and what neuroscientists have to say about them. Moreover, the book sets out the various advantages and disadvantages presented by the standard theory of desire, the hedonic theory, and the reward theory as theories explaining how desires motivate. It is generally believed that the reward theory of desire emerges as the strongest of the three theories under consideration.

This chapter discusses the motivational theory “the standard theory” of desire. It also briefly deals with the standard theory's main rival, the hedonic theory of desire. Then, it sketches out some of the recent neuroscience that hints at an alternative theory of desire. The standard theory has two central features: it holds that all desires are desires that P, for some proposition P; and they are action-guiding. Moreover, it explains why motivation is not essential to desire and motivation is not sufficient for desiring. It is stated that the standard theory treats the phenomenology as constitutive of a superficial distinction, rather than indicative of a deeper distinction.

This chapter begins with three sections dedicated to the three main fields of knowledge about the psychology of reward and punishment. The findings of common sense, behaviorism, and neuroscience are surveyed in turn, and found to have much in common. Then, these commonalities are used to produce a more unified theory of the nature of reward. A wide variety of organisms, including both rats and people, appear capable of constituting some things as rewards and others as punishments, in a sense that is perfectly unified, and perfectly compatible with common sense. Uncovering this common core of reward is this chapter's task. Moreover, the theories of reward and punishment are examined.

This book provides a full account of the nature of desire. It is a work about a single phenomenon that is more general than passionate yearning, but less general than the whole of the pro attitudes. It is a phenomenon for which everyday usage has at least three labels: ‘desiring’, ‘wanting’, and ‘wishing’. The book is a work on intrinsic desires, wants, and wishes: on desires. It faces a danger shared by other books importing science into philosophy: that it will be understood only by those who have made a special study of both fields.

Pleasure and displeasure are phenomena so familiar that there seems no need for a summary of everyday knowledge of them. This chapter describes the folk psychology of hedonic tone and the evidence on neuroscience of pleasure. In addition, the four incorrect theories of pleasure are shown. It also provides the three brief arguments to defend the thesis that pleasure and displeasure are distinctive types of conscious events rather than behavioral styles. Moreover, a representational theory of pleasure and the objections to the theory are discussed. Lastly, pleasure and theories of desire are explained.

This chapter reports a detailed version of the theory of desire and resolves the long list of questions appropriate to every theory of desire. It begins with a statement of a reward theory of desire. It also presents what is thought the most plausible set of positions available to a reward theorist on the metaphysically inessential, but very important, features of human desires. Specifically discussed are the desire strength, consciousness and desire, acquiring and losing desires, fleeting desires, instrumental desires and direction of fit. Lastly, the controversy of the reward theory on moral motivation is shown.

Here is an apparently straightforward philosophical story about concepts. In the style of Jerry Fodor, a concept is a mental “word” ; it means what it does because of its causal dependencies, and it contributes this meaning to the meanings of the mental “sentences” it helps to form. The mental word OWL means owls because owls have a special causal relationship to OWLs, and when the mental word OWL is combined with other mental words, such as THERE, IS, AN and NEARBY, the meaning of the resulting mental sentence, THERE IS AN OWL NEARBY, is a function of the meaning of the component words, plus the formal structure of the sentence. A cognitive system with these concepts is thereby able to represent the fact that an owl is nearby.

This chapter tries to resolve the lingering questions about the divide between theoretical reduction and elimination, and about the justifications for insisting on placing a single face of desire at the center of a theory of desire. It is shown that by reviewing the points of agreement and disagreement between the reward theory and common sense, the reward theory passes the test. Research on desire has suffered from the incompleteness of the knowledge applied. By putting together all the evidence available and all the theoretical resources available, a theory of desire that is neither particularly scientific nor particularly philosophical have been built.

What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” the interdisciplinary nature of the question has been emphasized by various authors. Going beyond the boundaries of the traditional free will debate, they have attempted to describe the requirements for agent accountability by appeal to theories of personality, rational agency, and ethical choice. The approach has been a breath of fresh air in the often-stagnant free will debate, bringing new considerations to bear and provoking new lines of argument, and it is an approach that we will adopt in this paper. In the following pages, we hope to show that an under-noticed phenomenon of moral psychology, inverse akrasia, exemplified by Huckleberry Finn, has something to contribute to the understanding of agency and accountability. After presenting the phenomenon in section I, we will move in section II to a quick survey of a family of Frankfurt-inspired views and a critique of them based on the phenomenon in sections III and IV. A new theory will be offered in section V, and potential objections addressed in the final section of the paper.

Amanda works in a library, and a patron asks for her help in learning about duty-to- rescue laws in China. She throws herself into the task, spending hours on retrieving documents from governmental and non-governmental sources, getting electronic translations, looking for literature on Scandinavian duty-to-rescue laws that mention Chinese laws for comparison, and so on. Why? She likes to gain this sort of general knowledge of the world; perhaps the reason she works so hard is that she is learning fascinating facts in doing so. She is also a proud librarian; perhaps the reason she works so hard is that a patron needs her assistance. She is a library employee; perhaps her reason for working so hard is that this sort of effort is noted by her employer and gives her career a boost, or perhaps it is just that doing this sort of work is the condition of her continued employment. Perhaps the reason is that the patron is charming.

Some philosophers hold that the neuroscience of action is, in practice or in principle, incapable of touching debates in action theory and moral psychology. The role of desires in action, the existence of basic actions, and the like are topics that must be sorted out by philosophers alone: at least at present, and perhaps by the very nature of the questions. This paper examines both philosophical and empirical arguments against the relevance of neuroscience to such questions and argues that neither succeeds. In practice, there is already a stable body of findings from neuroanatomy and neurophysiology that warrants attention. And as a matter of principle, the ‘causal map’ of action production derivable from these findings requires the study of action theorists and moral psychologists because every such philosopher has commitments to the shape of this causal map: commitments that might be in conflict with reality.

Philosophers often talk about and engage with ideas. Scientists, artists, and historians do, too. But what is an idea? In this paper, we first motivate the desire for an ontology of ideas before discussing what conditions a candidate ontology would have to satisfy to be minimally adequate. We then offer our own account of the ontology of ideas, and consider various strategies for specifying the underlying metaphysics of the account. We conclude with a discussion of potential future work to be done on the ontology of ideas.

There is a familiar if disputed theory of mental representations which holds that to be a mental representation is to be a structure whose states are supposed to stand in correspondence to states of the world . The present work defends this so-called teleosemantic approach to mental representations against Stampian and Fodorian approaches, and develops a novel approach to the normativity underlying mental representation. It is argued that, while appealing to evolutionary functions in attributing normativity to neural structures results in unacceptable theoretical consequences, another source of "natural normativity" may be found in feedback-governed systems. The conclusion is that neural structures, driven by energetic feedback-governed systems into correspondences with distal states of affairs, are supposed to stand in such correspondences, and hence represent