Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet

This article examines the reception of Kant’s theoretical philosophy at the Berlin Academy during the 1790s, with particular attention to two central themes: philosophical method and the status of metaphysics. I argue that Kant’s ideas were received at a moment when academic philosophy had already emerged as an autonomous current within the late German Enlightenment. The philosophers of the Academy actively engaged with his writings, using them as a catalyst to refine and radicalize their own views on the practice of philosophy and the role of metaphysics. The analysis focuses on the memoirs of J.-B. Merian (1723–1807) and L. F. Ancillon (1740–1814), who sought to counter what they perceived as Kant’s dismantling of metaphysics. I contend that, despite earlier opposition to Wolff’s system within the Academy, the members of the speculative philosophy class strove to reassert the value of metaphysics, gravitating toward a more Wolffian perspective. Thus, by the end of the 1790s, earlier pluralistic conceptions of metaphysics had largely given way to a foundational approach aimed at countering Kant’s critique.

L'interprétation métaphysique de la philosopie de Kant est un mouvement exégétique majeur du XXe siècle. Cet ouvrage met au jour ses prémisses philosophiques et philologiques, qui remontent aux dernières décennies du XIXe siècle et permettent de comprendre son affirmation retentissante en 1924. Contre le néokantisme régnant, ses représentants démontrent alors- sources et convictions à l'appui- que la métaphysique joue un rôle central dans la pensée kantienne, tant précritique que critique. Ce livre examine également le développement de cette interprétation novatrice, ainsi que son influence déterminante, non seulement sur les études kantiennes jusqu'à aujourd'hui, mais aussi sur les penseurs de l'époque, tel Heidegger."--Page 4 of cover.

This collection brings together a series of cutting-edge studies on the most significant controversies and prize essay contests of the German Enlightenment. Chapters address questions such as the condition of possibility of the debates, their institutional support and their aims, and introduce relatively unknown but key figures of the period. Set out into four parts, the essays provide new material on areas such as anthropology, the problem of language, colonialism and the origins of aesthetics for the wider study of 18th-century intellectual and philosophical life.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction: Emancipation from Metaphysics? Natural History, Natural Philosophy and the Study of Nature from the Late Renaissance to the EnlightenmentTinca Prunea-Bretonnet and Oana MateiThis special issue is devoted to the analysis of the relationship between natural history, natural philosophy, and the metaphysics of nature in the early modern period up to the mid-eighteenth century. It considers the evolving dynamics among these disciplines as well as the role played by natural history in modern hermeneutics and aesthetics. The collected papers examine how early modern natural history acquires a growing importance in the study of nature, while observation and experiment gain epistemic priority among experimental philosophers. In the early modern and modern periods the critique of systems of natural philosophy and of Cartesian metaphysics goes hand-in-hand with the prioritization of experimental facts and collected data. The latter become the first, indispensable step in the process of knowledge acquisition. This is the case for Francis Bacon and his followers, who establish natural and experimental history as [End Page 549] the preliminary step and the foundation for natural philosophy. Baconian natural history consists of a vast collection of observations and experiments from which, by induction, the experimenter is able to provide axioms and general rules of nature. These axioms and general rules constitute the foundation on which natural philosophy would be built. According to this approach, theoretical claims must be supported by experimental evidence, while natural philosophical theories, alert to the dangers of speculation, are inferred, by induction, from natural and experimental history (Anstey 2005, pp. 215–42; Anstey 2020; Anstey and Jalobeanu 2022, pp. 222–37; Anstey and Vanzo 2012, pp. 499–518; Corneanu et al. 2012; Jalobeanu 2015; Serjeantson 2014, pp. 681–705). Laws and principles are thus to be admitted in the study of nature, but only if founded on experimentally verified facts. This perspective seems to reject speculation and abstract systems and to contest their role in natural philosophy altogether. However, in spite of its influence on eighteenth-century thinkers, this approach to natural history would not go uncontested.In the eighteenth century these transformations were accompanied by a new emphasis on metaphysics in the study of nature. While natural history was still largely regarded as preliminary to natural philosophy and continued to play a significant role in knowledge acquisition, Enlightenment philosophers elaborated new methods which rehabilitated metaphysical principles in the study of nature and promoted competing perspectives reassessing their pre-eminence (Anstey 2020). Two rival perspectives seem to compete on the philosophical scene: on the one hand, experimental thinkers justifying the theoretical autonomy of natural philosophy and emphasizing the prevalence of mathematical and empirically-oriented methodologies; on the other hand, novel approaches to the theory of principles arguing for the foundational role of metaphysical (a priori) principles and of speculative disciplines, such as metaphysical cosmology. This special issue explores the tension between the new role conferred to metaphysical disciplines and the study of nature, including a particular focus on the writings of Maupertuis, d’Alembert, and Kant. Our aim is to nuance the familiar narrative that inscribes Kant in the metaphysical tradition of Descartes and Wolff and opposes the latter to an experimental lineage comprising post-Newtonian thinkers such as Condillac, d’Alembert, and Maupertuis (Leduc 2015, pp. 11–30; contrast with Anstey 2018, pp. 131–50).In order to shed new light on these transformations and tensions, the collected papers address the complex interplay between natural history, natural philosophy, and the metaphysics of nature. Particular attention is devoted to the different methodologies in use starting with the late Renaissance and leading up to the mid-eighteenth century. We examine not only conceptions arguing for a decisive role played by observation [End Page 550] and experiment, but also more speculative treatments of the study of nature, where principles and metaphysical standpoints reclaim a foundational function, albeit through a revised definition of metaphysics and a novel understanding of the role of speculative disciplines, such as cosmology.Andreas Blank’s paper, “Protestant Hermeneutics and the Persistence of Moral Meanings in Early Modern Natural Histories,” examines the divergences in the symbolic interpretations of animals proposed in hermeneutics and in natural histories of the sixteenth and seventeenth...

Cet article analyse le rôle des principes premiers dans les Institutions de physique d’Émilie du Châtelet et le rapport de sa conception au projet métaphysique de Christian Wolff, en étudiant la fonction architectonique que revêt la métaphysique générale ou l’ontologie grâce à ce que Wolff appelle les « notions directrices » ou « fondamentales ». J’examine d’abord la doctrine wolffienne telle qu’elle est détaillée dans la dissertation « Des notions directrices et du véritable usage de la philosophie première » de 1729. Ensuite, je regarde de plus près les développements dédiés aux principes premiers dans les Institutions, afin de mettre en lumière leur rôle fondateur en physique. Je souhaite montrer que du Châtelet élabore une conception où les principes métaphysiques – au sens fort conféré au terme de principe ontologique par Wolff – rendent possible l’acquisition de la connaissance et l’accès à la certitude, en assurant l’intelligibilité et le fondement de toutes les sciences. Enfin, je discuterai l’inscription de cette perspective dans la théorie des principes des Lumières, notamment en rapport avec les conceptions sur la métaphysique et le principe premier de Maupertuis et d’Alembert.

This paper analyzes the teleological perspective articulated by Émilie du Châtelet in her Institutions de physique (1740). I argue for the decisive influence of Christian Wolff on the metaphysical conception advanced by du Châtelet in the first chapters of this work aimed at providing a consistent metaphysical foundation to the new physics. I further claim that the principle of sufficient reason plays a crucial role in this endeavor. I then show that du Châtelet initiates a significant shift in teleology: she moves away from the ‘idiographic’ standpoint focused on details and singularities, and advances a new, ‘nomothetic’ teleological perspective based on the regularity of the laws of nature.

This collection sheds new light on the nature, role and practice of philosophy and science in the renewed Berlin Academy from the mid-1740s to the 1790s, and in so doing provides a robust new instalment of materials for the broader task of constructing a historiography of philosophy at this important Enlightenment institution. The collection ranges from discussions of the roles of philosophy and natural philosophy in the formation of the reinvigorated Academy in the mid-1740s, to conceptions of the correct philosophical methodology to be deployed by the Academy. It provides the first ever study of the nature and arrangement of the new classes of the Academy, and a fresh appraisal of the Academy's methodological eclecticism. One recurring theme is the status of metaphysics: there are studies of both special metaphysics, including the study of the soul; general metaphysics, that is, the study of being in general; and foundational metaphysical principles and concepts, such as Maupertuis's Principle of least action, Euler's concept of space and Lambert's notion of an experimental metaphysics. The collection also takes the study of the Academy in new directions through focused studies of important figures whose writings deserve to be better understood, such as Jean Bernard Merian, Louis de Beausobre, Jean Henri Samuel Formey and Johann Georg Sulzer.

"Recent years have seen a growing interest among scholars of 18th-century German philosophy in the period between Wolff and Kant. This book challenges traditional interpretations of this period that focus largely on post-Leibnizian rationalism and, accordingly, on a depreciation of the contribution of the senses to knowledge about the world and the self. It addresses the divergent ways in which eighteenth-century German philosophers reconceived the notion and role of experience in their efforts to identify, defend, and contest the contribution of foundational a priori principles and empirical data to the various branches of metaphysics, the natural sciences, and emerging disciplines such as psychology and aesthetics. The chapters are organized according to the four major schools that defined the various phases of German Enlightenment philosophy: Wolff and Wolffianism, Eclecticism and Populärphilosophie, the Berlin Academy, and Kant. Each chapter is devoted to one or more philosophers, several of whom are seriously under investigated or even unknown outside small circles of specialists. By framing the period in terms of the notion of experience, this book presents a more nuanced understanding of the German reception of British and French ideas and theories, dismisses the prevailing view that German philosophy was largely isolated from European debates, introduces a number of relatively unknown, but highly relevant philosophers and developments to non-specialized scholars, and contributes to a better understanding of the richness and complexity of the German Enlightenment"--

This article aims to discuss the role played by Crusius’ thought in the genesis and the structure of Kant’s Preisschrift of 1762. Definitely opposed to Wolffian philosophy, Kant argues for the analythical method as the only method capable of ensuring a scientific status for philosophy. Simultaneously embracing and criticizing some central Crusian principles, he intends to demonstrate the possibility of a “sure” and “complete” metaphysical certainty, which would be as sufficient for conviction as the mathematical certainty. Kant refuses, however, to base metaphysical certainty on a simply subjective conviction, as Crusius suggests. That is why he ultimately rejects his predecessor’s philosophy, although not without making some fundamental Crusian elements part of his own doctrine.

This review-article aims to present the inner structure of J.-L. Marion’s book of 2003, Le phénomène érotique. Although closely related to the former development of the phenomenology of donation, his analysis of the concept of love discloses significantly new philosophical elements as it shows the pre-eminence, own rationality and univocity of this concept. My paper basically takes into account the question of the individuation of the other and of the self within the saturated phenomenon of love. I discuss the coherence and conceptual consistency of its “figures” and description. I also try to suggest the possibility to question further in the direction of God as “the third” who grants or attests the individuation of the lovers in a unique common erotic phenomenon. Eventually, I claim that his overwhelming importance might affect the “two-entrance” phenomenon of love and the definition of the lover whose figure he is supposed to assume in his manifestation

L'influence decisive de Christian Wolff sur la pensee du XVIIIe siecle ne saurait plus etre mise en question aujourd'hui. Toutefois, les commentateurs ont longtemps pris a la lettre la critique kantienne du wolffianisme, assimilant la doctrine de Wolff a celle de ses disciples et mettant l'accent presque exclusivement sur la rupture accomplie par l'oeuvre de Kant. Cela a contribue a sous-estimer le role considerable joue par Wolff dans la constitution du criticisme. Les etudes rassemblees dans ce volume se proposent d'interroger les multiples formes sous lesquelles la conception wolffienne a determine le Denkweg kantien et de preciser comment la philosophie de Kant s'articule a celle de Wolff. Ni simple opposition, ni continuite sans heurt, le rapport de Kant a Wolff est complexe et passionnant, et demande, aujourd'hui encore, des analyses prenant en compte l'ensemble des disciplines philosophiques.

Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet | : Cet article se propose d’analyser les courants et les doctrines méthodologiques représentés à l’Académie de Berlin entre 1746 et 1761 en prenant en compte les deux orientations principales qui s’y affrontent : d’une part, le wolffianisme soutenu en premier lieu par Formey, qui argumente l’emploi d’une méthode d’inspiration mathématique en philosophie, et, de l’autre, le camp newtonien et anti-wolffien, représenté notamment Maupertuis et Béguelin, qui affirme l’hétérogénéité de la mathématique et de la philosophie et la nécessité d’en tenir compte sur le plan méthodologique. Ce débat est intimement dépendant des prises de position de Crusius et de Wolff et leur analyse s’avère indispensable. Il formule également le cadre conceptuel de la Preisaufgabe pour l’année 1763, jouant un rôle déterminant dans l’élaboration des réponses, ainsi qu’en témoignent les mémoires de Mendelssohn et de Kant, discutés dans la dernière partie du texte. L’Académie de Berlin apparaît ainsi comme un acteur décisif dans les controverses philosophiques de l’époque et dans la redéfinition méthodologique amorcée. | : This paper aims to analyze the methodological doctrines articulated and promoted at the Berlin Academy between 1746 and 1761 by taking into account the two major opposing positions : on the one hand, Wolffianism, endorsed by Formey who argues in favor of the use of a mathematics-inspired method in philosophy, and, on the other hand, the Newtonian and anti-Wolffian faction, represented principally by Maupertuis and Béguelin, which asserts the heterogeneity of mathematics and philosophy and the necessity to mirror this heterogeneity on the methodological level. This debate is closely related to Wolff’s and Crusius’ conceptions and their analysis hence appears as crucial. It also offers the conceptual frame of the Preisaufgabe for 1763 and plays an essential role in the composition of the answers, as shown in Mendelssohn’s and Kant’s essays discussed in the last part of the article. The Berlin Academy thus emerges as a decisive actor in the philosophical controversies and the meditations on methodology of the time