Tobias Endres

This paper reconstructs and systematizes Ernst Cassirer’s largely neglected 1929 rectoral address Forms and Transformations of the Philosophical Concept of Truth as a key text for understanding the mature architecture of his philosophy of science and culture. It argues that Cassirer uses the institutional occasion of the rectoral speech to reopen a foundational problem at the heart of modern intellectual life: how philosophy can justify its scientific standing amidst the differentiation of the sciences and the persistent divide between the natural and the cultural sciences. Against reductive unification projects—paradigmatically, the physicalist program associated with logical empiricism—the paper shows that Cassirer defends a methodological and epistemological pluralism grounded in the concept of symbolic form, without collapsing into an alethic pluralism. The central claim is that Cassirer’s “functional ideal of truth” redefines truth not as the homogenous measure of a single privileged domain (God, Reason, or Experience), but as the regulative function that can be symbolically realized in heterogeneous forms of objectification (scientific, historical, linguistic, artistic, religious). On this basis, the paper concludes that the 1929 address should be read as a covert completion of Cassirer’s mature project: it binds the notion of symbol—his fundamental concept—to truth as the philosophical concept par excellence, and thereby reframes philosophy’s task as an immanent participation in the “inner struggles” of the sciences rather than an external tribunal.

The article deals with the role of metaphor in Ernst Cassirer’s thinking and, in particular with a research article by Philipp Stoellger, who interprets Cassirer’s understanding of metaphor as a model of form variance. In this context, metaphoroccupies a place in the structure and construction of the sciences, from which Stoellger derives the criticism that Cassirer thinks of metaphor from the concept of series or function. This would result in systematic problems for the idea of cultural variance. In contrast to Stoellger’s view, the article argues that Cassirer’s understanding of form variance is indeed modeled on mathematical concepts, namely on those of group and invariance, but does not entail a meta series as a series of cultural forms leading to an alleged telos of science.

Wenn Klassiker in der Philosophie die Funktion haben, Medien der Diskussion zu sein, so ist Cassirers Status als philosophischer Klassiker in besonderer Weise gerechtfertigt: Seine Philosophie ist strukturell auf kritische Vermittlung ausgelegt, und zwar sowohl im Sinn eines Theoriemediums, das eine Terminologie und Methode anbietet, wie auch als Mediator im Sinne der Integration unterschiedlicher, teils widerstrebender Positionen als Problemzusammenhänge. Um diese kritisch-kommunikative Bedeutung Cassirers deutlich und zugleich nutzbar zu machen, stellen die Beiträge des Bandes jeweils Aspekte seiner Philosophie in Beziehung zu anderen philosophischen und wissenschaftlichen Projekten. Hierzu gehören analytische Metaphysik, Archäologie des Wissens, neuere psychiatrische und wahrnehmungsphilosophische Ansätze, kritische Theorie, philosophische Anthropologie, Pragmatismus, Leibphänomenologie, die Pittsburgh Schule u.v.m. Der Band versteht sich dabei nicht nur als ein Beitrag zur Cassirer-Forschung, sondern will allgemeiner für die kritisch-kommunikative Haltung eintreten, die sich an Cassirer lernen lässt, um sie in die Praxis der Philosophie insgesamt zu tragen.

Mathilde Tahar’s _Du finalisme en biologie. Bergson et la théorie de l’évolution_ offers a bold reinterpretation of Henri Bergson’s _Creative Evolution_ (1907) in light of contemporary biology. She reconstructs Bergson’s critique of Darwinism, mutationism, orthogenesis, and neo-Lamarckism, arguing that his _Élan vital_ is neither a metaphysical force nor teleological, but a heuristic tool for understanding evolutionary regularities. The book follows a three-stage structure: a historical reconstruction of Bergson’s evolutionary thought, an engagement with modern genetics and the synthetic theory of evolution, and a vision for a future biology that embraces historicity. Tahar advances three key ideas: (a) organisms are agents, (b) evolution follows regularities rather than strict laws, and (c) evolutionary constraints shape norms beyond natural selection. She introduces the metaphor of evolution as a spinning top moving in a spiral, offering a dynamic model of biological development. The book also establishes systematic connections between _Creative Evolution_ and Bergson’s broader philosophical corpus, including his works on time, memory, and society. With its interdisciplinary approach and philosophical depth, Tahar’s study exemplifies how philosophy can not only engage with but also contribute to contemporary scientific debates. It is an essential reading for philosophers and biologists alike.

In his essay, Tobias Endres devotes himself to the theoretical philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, which continues to have a reputation for self-contradiction, albeit an affirmed one. While this problem is increasingly losing importance in recent and most recent Nietzsche research, the study attempts to dispel the accusation of performative self-contradiction and genetic fallacy. In contrast to the readings inspired by analytical philosophy, however, Nietzsche's metaphilosophy is not understood exclusively as a contribution to classical epistemology, but as a variant of philosophical hermeneutics. In 1968, Jürgen Habermas stated that Nietzsche had “nothing contagious left”. However, the history of the reception and impact of Nietzsche's thought has clearly refuted this judgment. The first volume of the Critical Complete Edition had been published just one year earlier. This marked the beginning of a path that led to Nietzsche no longer being read primarily as an outsider, but as a classic of Western philosophy. While this path was previously a rather Franco-German affair, the edition and the Anglo-American reception of the 1990s contributed to the internationalization of Nietzsche research. Today, Nietzsche is read globally and as one of the most influential philosophers of modernity.

This special issue focuses on two related topics in Ernst Cassirer’s thought: objectivity and truth. Through this lens, the guest editors attempt to illuminate (a) the historical and systematic value of Cassirer’s philosophical project, (b) the continuing relevance of his account of the plurality and universality of human understanding in view of the crisis of truth that currently permeates Western culture, and (c) the way Cassirer’s style can inspire contemporary scholars who wish to evade the analytic-continental divide. Tobias Endres and Simon Truwant gathered twelve contributions from more analytic oriented authors from the philosophy of science and more continental oriented authors from the philosophy of culture. By bringing these scholars together on a shared topic, they hope to help bridging this divide that is also reflected within Cassirer scholarship by preoccupation with either his philosophy of science or philosophy of culture. The articles in this special issue are preceded by a ceremonial speech that Cassirer gave on the occasion of his assumption of the rectorate of the University of Hamburg on November 7, 1929 and that was translated into English for the first time by the guest editors.

This special issue focuses on two related topics in Ernst Cassirer’s thought: objectivity and truth. Through this lens, the guest editors attempt to illuminate (a) the historical and systematic value of Cassirer’s philosophical project, (b) the continuing relevance of his account of the plurality and universality of human understanding in view of the crisis of truth that currently permeates Western culture, and (c) the way Cassirer’s style can inspire contemporary scholars who wish to evade the analytic-continental divide. Tobias Endres and Simon Truwant gathered twelve contributions from more analytic oriented authors from the philosophy of science and more continental oriented authors from the philosophy of culture. By bringing these scholars together on a shared topic, they hope to help bridging this divide that is also reflected within Cassirer scholarship by preoccupation with either his philosophy of science or philosophy of culture. The articles in this special issue are preceded by a ceremonial speech that Cassirer gave on the occasion of his assumption of the rectorate of the University of Hamburg on November 7, 1929 and that was translated into English for the first time by the guest editors.

What does it mean to be human? We invite the reader to discuss this most fundamental issue in philosophy and to do so in an intercultural framework. The question of the human was the starting point for a legendary discussion between two German philosophers who met in Davos in 1929. We return to this historical event and re-imagine the debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer from a global perspective. Generating twenty papers from elaborate discussions, our authors contribute to the thought experiment by inviting the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarō from Kyoto and other Japanese thinkers into the debate to overcome the challenge of Eurocentrism inherent to these historic days in Davos.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos: The Philosophical Arguments by Simon TruwantTobias EndresSimon Truwant. Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos: The Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. viii + 266. Hardback, $99.99.Simon Truwant has written a very well-researched study of Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s 1929 encounter in Davos. Because of its historical setting at the origin of the analytic-continental divide, this book is of interest to everyone working in contemporary philosophy. As there is already a considerable mass of secondary literature on this topic, Truwant acknowledges he needs to show that his book sheds new light on it. He does so by stressing his choice to focus exclusively on the philosophical arguments that were at stake in the Cassirer-Heidegger encounter rather than considering its reception and so adding to other scholars’ “non-philosophical assessments” (6). Truwant argues that the “Cassirer-Heidegger dispute” is an exchange that goes well beyond the Davos encounter (15), supposedly extending from 1923 until 1946 (8, 10–11). Its core topics are (a) the Kantian legacy, (b) the conditio humana, and (c) the role of philosophy. Accordingly, the book, which comprises ten chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion, is structured into three parts. In the introduction, Truwant presents his guiding hypothesis and its positioning in the scholarly literature. Against the standard view that Cassirer and Heidegger did not have a genuine debate, Truwant claims that a careful reconstruction of the philosophical content of the Davos encounter shows that “a true philosophical debate” (14) took place between the two thinkers. This reading is accompanied by a critical assessment of most other works on the topic, which, according to Truwant, strive either to give “an exhaustive overview” (8) of the encounter by focusing on a merely chronological reconstruction of the events or to single out just one topic of the debate to the exclusion of all the others.In the first chapter, Truwant presents evidence of a dispute transcending the Davos encounter by pointing the reader to all the occasions where Cassirer and Heidegger were in dialogue, either through their works or in person (15–18). Then, Truwant proceeds, first, to establish the philosophical core of the 1929 debate along lines (a)–(c) listed above (18–36); and, second, to map that brief and, at first sight, failed debate onto the longer dispute between the two thinkers running from 1923 through 1946 (36–44). The first [End Page 515] chapter thus serves to introduce the general structure of what follows by arguing that the Davos debate must be considered against this wider context.The first part of the book, which deals with the Kantian heritage in both Heidegger and Cassirer, includes chapters 2–4. The second part includes chapters 5–7, devoted to the philosophical anthropology of the two thinkers, which Truwant sees as centered on the questions of subjectivity and of selfhood in both Cassirer and Heidegger (73, 112, 126, 151, 167–75). The third and final part of the book includes chapters 8–10. This third part presents first a reconstruction of Cassirer’s normative stance on philosophy as an “ethical task” aimed at “deconstructing ideologies” (195), on the basis of his early writings on the history of ideas (181–86) and the philosophy of culture (186–92). Then, Truwant proceeds to situate Heidegger’s “recovery of the Seinsfrage, the analysis of Dasein, and the reinterpretation of Kant’s thought” (197) within a “hermeneutical conception of philosophy” (219). Finally, he sets Cassirer’s enlightenment view of philosophy (220–32) against Heidegger’s (non-Wittgensteinian) therapeutic conception of philosophy (232–44). In the conclusion, Truwant both sums up the evidence in support of his hypothesis about the philosophical nature of the Davos exchange and argues that Heidegger and Cassirer agree that a correlation between a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem is essential to any philosophical project, although they differ in their determinations of those terms (247).Truwant’s attempt to give a systematic reconstruction of the Cassirer-Heidegger debate is commendable and, for the most part, a thorough success, which adds a significantly new viewpoint to the existing scholarly literature. Nevertheless, one might wonder whether...

In the current philosophy of perception, a debate about whether concepts permeate perceptual states in constituting the perceptual object or not has been widely discussed. Analytic philosophers and phenomenologists participate in this debate likewise, but it is also a debate in Kantian scholarship since the conceptualists’ thesis goes back to Kant’s Criticism and neo-Kantians already discussing such theory against any philosophy of immediate experience long before Wilfrid Sellars had started his attack against the so-called myth of the given. In light of this historical panorama, the article reconstructs Ernst Cassirer’s views on perception in order to systematically reject both Conceptualism and Non-Conceptualism. It can be shown that both positions are uncritical stances which make claims to either the absoluteness of language or perception and that much-discussed arguments such as the fineness of grain argument rely on a category mistake. The proposed solution is a view that upholds the criticism against the myth of the given, but replaces the idea of a conceptual mediation of perceptual experience with a symbolic mediation. As a consequence, perception must perform a paradoxical feat and has thus to be elastic.

Negativity is a crucial term in Classical German Philosophy. Whilst for Fichte the negation of the ‘I’ is constitutive for self-consciousness and Schelling terms transcendental philosophy “negative philosophy,” the full-blown concept of the negative arises in Hegel’s thought. In recent Cassirer scholarship, we witness a new endorsement of Hegelian interpretations of Cassirer’s works that are methodological in the sense of Hegel’s dialectic. Hegel’s impact on Cassirer has been noticed from the first wave of his reception in the US onward and has been investigated in comparison with the impact of Kant more than once throughout the ongoing global “Cassirer-renaissance”. The attempt to actually read Cassirer through the eyes of Hegel is, however, a rather new phenomenon. In Hegel, the concept of the negative is significant in regard to the concept of reality, the concept of (in)finity, the concept of subjectivity and the concept of relatedness. But first and foremost–and this will be decisive in this paper–the negative, in the form of the concept of negation, plays a major role in Hegel’s dialectic method. It is on this point that this paper will question the legitimacy of such strong Hegelian readings of Cassirer’s main works.

This paper defends the idea that Cassirer's methodology is idealistic in regard to validity claims and the structuralist views he holds and at the same time empiric in regard to the facts and genealogy of culture. This perspective is best to be unfolded along Cassirer's model of representation. The author does so by showing that Cassirer's triad of symbolic articulation (expressive, presentational, significative) and the triad of symbolic development (mimetic, analogical, symbolic) form a coherent and exhaustive theory of symbolic formation. In order to defend this view, two main objections from the secondary literature against the consistency of this essential theory piece of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms have to be rejected.

The aim of the paper is to highlight a hidden reception of Ernst Cassirer’s works in the writings of Wilfrid Sellars. To set out such reception, I will begin with defining criteria that allow us to point out a possible influence from one thinker on another. In a second step, I will present several links between the set-out criteria and the constellation Sellars-Cassirer. Finally, the Cassirer Lectures Series at Yale, Sellars’ review of Language and Myth as well as Sellars’ lecture Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man will serve as at the basis for an analysis of historical and systematic connections between Cassirer and Sellars. The conclusion will show that we actually can speak of a hidden influence from Cassirer on Sellars’ thought and that philosophical desiderata remain in this context which are worth to explore even today.

The article examines Cassirer's complete works as well as his posthumous writings with regard to Heinz Paetzold's thesis that Cassirer's philosophy undergoes a transformation to anthropology in his late work as well as Guido Kreis' thesis that such a transformation of the philosophy of symbols is not possible because it cannot guarantee its own ground. The author demonstrates a continuity in Cassirer's thinking with regard to the topic of anthropology, according to which Cassirer has been dealing with the problem of a metaphysics of the symbolic since at least 1921 and already in 1928 makes an initial determination of man as a being capable of form. The resumption of the anthropological question occurs in 1939 and is in clear continuity with the previous works. The reconstruction of the genesis of An Essay on Man (1944) that follows on from this finally reveals a hitherto well-kept secret of Cassirer-research, namely an answer to the question of why history first appears as a symbolic form in Cassirer's last published work.

O artigo examina os trabalhos completos de Cassirer, assim como seus escritos póstumos com relação à tese de Heinz Paetzold de que a filosofia de Cassirer sofre uma transformação em direção à antropologia em seu trabalho tardio, assim como a tese de Guido Kreis de que tal transformação da filosofia dos símbolos não é possível porque não pode garantir seu próprio fundamento. O autor demonstra uma continuidade no pensamento de Cassirer com relação ao tema da antropologia, segundo a qual Cassirer vem lidando com o problema de uma metafísica do simbólico desde pelo menos 1921 e já em 1928 faz uma determinação inicial do homem como um ser capaz de forma. A retomada da questão antropológica ocorre em 1939 e está em clara continuidade com os trabalhos anteriores. A reconstrução da gênese de _Ensaio sobre o homem_ que se segue revela finalmente um segredo até então bem guardado da pesquisa de Cassirer, ou seja, uma resposta à questão de por que a história aparece pela primeira vez como uma forma simbólica na última obra publicada por Cassirer.

Auf die Frage „Was ist Wahrnehmung und welche Rolle spielt sie für die Objektivität der Erfahrung?“ hätte Ernst Cassirer vermutlich schlicht geantwortet: „Wahrnehmung ist eine erste Form objektiver Erfahrung.“ Tobias Endres macht es sich zur Aufgabe, Cassirers „Philosophie der symbolischen Formen“ einer Neu- und Gesamtinterpretation zu unterziehen und sie als eine „Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung“ auszulegen. In Auseinandersetzung mit klassischen und gegenwärtigen Wahrnehmungstheorien wie der Sinnesdatentheorie, dem Disjunktivismus oder dem Enaktivismus gelingt es dem Autor, die Aktualität und Originalität solch einer phänomenologischen Wahrnehmungstheorie aufzuzeigen.

What are the Objects of Perception? Ernst Cassirer’s Response to Analytic Theories of Perception. On the basis of its third volume, the Phenomenology of Knowledge (1929), Cassirer’s principal work, the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923-29), can be read as a phenomenology of perception. That is to say, Cassirer not only starts from the fact of multiple forms of cultural expression to reconstruct their transcendental conditions of objectification, but at once to trace their underlying forms of perceptive subjectivity. Hence, a holistic theory of subjective and objective spirit, to which Cassirer’s philosophy boils down, moves between exactly those two poles of perception and cultural expression. Starting from this interpretation, the article asks for the possibility to contribute to criticism towards recent theories of perception within the tradition of analytic philosophy. At the heart of things is the question: what should we actually conceive as the objects of perception? Inmost of its debates, analytic philosophy finds itself in the stranglehold of an internalism-externalism- dichotomy, that rests upon an unsettled understanding of objectivity. By contrast, Cassirer’s understanding of objectivity as objectification allows us to reformulate the question of the objects of perception, and hence to undermine the above dichotomy. The main points of reference of the critical examination are Peter Strawson’s Perception and its Objects (1979) and Tim Crane’s What is the Problem of Perception (2005). It will be shown that the foundation of Cassirer’s theory of perception, the distinction between perception of things and perception of expression, provides exactly the critical capability to move on from Crane’s contemporary diagnosed unsatisfactory alternative between disjunctivism and intentionalism which amounts to a new version of the controversy between direct realism and sense-data-theories in the twentieth century. Cassirer’s theory enables one to reconcile the directedness of perception with the representational capacities of the human mind.

Das Potenzial der Philosophie Ernst Cassirers ist keinesfalls erschöpft, sondern vielmehr in systematischer, transdisziplinärer und gesellschaftlich relevanter Perspektive anschlussfähig, um Fragestellungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie und der Wissenschaften zu begegnen. Die Cassirer-Rezeption befindet sich in dieser Hinsicht an der Schwelle des Eintritts in eine neue Phase, die im Lichte eines ‚Neulesens‘ sowie einer zunehmend globalen Vernetzung betrachtet werden kann. Von der Wissensforschung und Wahrnehmungstheorie über neue Gebiete symbolischer Formung wie Film, Geld und Virtualität bis zum spannungsreichen Verhältnis zwischen Demokratie und Mythos: Die Beiträge des Bandes verstehen sich als Aktualisierung von Cassirers Philosophie der Kultur- und Wissensformen im 21. Jahrhundert.