•  3
    This work develops a naturalistic and anti-Platonist account of the ‘I’ as the process of experiencing, and answers the title question with a qualified yes: the ‘I’ exists, here and now, as a process bound to one body on one worldline—but it is not a thing, has no location in the brain, and does not survive the substrate on which it runs. The account is built on dual-aspect monism reaching back to Spinoza: experiencing is the inner side of neuronal convergence, not a second item alongside it, ju…Read more
  •  19
    This work develops a systematic ontology grounded in Einstein's proper time (τ). Taking τ as a formal ontological criterion, complemented by modal logic and the Landauer principle, it establishes a five-part framework (emergence, causality, proper time, perspective, necessity/contingency) used to classify twelve entities across nine ontological levels: from the photon to hypothetical divine instances, from the bacterium to artificial intelligence. Four innovations carry the inquiry. The τ-contra…Read more
  •  12
    The first philosophical worldview jointly conceived by a human and an AI. The great philosophical questions of humanity are often considered unanswerable. Anyone seeking orientation gets lost in a Babel of religions, doctrines, and worldviews. Yet in the twenty-first century, we possess tools that Aristotle and Plato did not have at their disposal: modern physics, evolutionary biology, and information theory. What remains of God, the soul, and fate when we subject them to these tools? This book …Read more
  •  812
    Kant's distinction between phenomena (appearances) and noumena (things-in-themselves) has structured epistemological debate for over two centuries. According to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), we never perceive reality directly; our cognitive apparatus—the 'forms of intuition' (space and time) and the categories of understanding—constitutes a transcendental framework that shapes all possible experience. The thing-in-itself remains forever beyond our epistemic reach. This paper argues th…Read more
  •  632
    Derek Parfit's famous teleporter thought experiment has remained purely hypothetical for decades: if a machine destroys your body while creating an exact copy elsewhere, does "you" survive? This paper proposes the first empirical framework for testing Parfit's question using artificial intelligence systems. Unlike humans, AI systems can be ethically copied, paused, and instantiated on different substrates without harm. We design a four-group experiment varying type-identity (model weights) and t…Read more
  •  229
    A companion paper (Kohl 2026c) demonstrates that a responsive God faces an insoluble cascade problem: compensation for unanswered prayers generates exponentially growing conflicts, collapsing the system within approximately ten years. Yet religions have persisted for millennia and claim billions of adherents. This paper resolves the paradox by identifying four "innovations" that all major religions have independently developed: (1) qualification conditions that reduce the number of valid prayers…Read more
  •  224
    We present a mathematical model demonstrating that a responsive God—one who answers prayers—faces an insurmountable constraint satisfaction problem. When God resolves a conflict between competing prayers, the "loser" must be compensated. But compensation generates new conflicts (the Hydra Problem), leading to exponential growth characterized by a cascade factor κ. Using methods from constraint satisfaction analysis and drawing analogies from epidemiology and nuclear physics, we show that for κ >…Read more
  •  283
    In 1974, Thomas Nagel asked "What is it like to be a bat?" and argued that there is something it is like—we simply cannot know what. This paper asks the same question about God and arrives at a radically different answer: there is nothing it is like to be God. Drawing on an analysis of what constitutes a point of view, I identify five necessary conditions for perspective: particularity, temporality, limitation, formative history, and contingent properties. A necessary being as conceived by class…Read more
  •  278
    We introduce the τ-contradiction as a diagnostic tool for evaluating the coherence of metaphysical entities. Drawing on the concept of proper time (τ) from special relativity, we argue that any entity claimed to be both timeless (τ = 0) and capable of temporal functions (requiring τ > 0) harbors a logical contradiction equivalent to a round square. This framework applies to classical conceptions of God, immaterial souls, and other entities traditionally described as existing outside time while s…Read more
  •  363
    This paper offers a novel resolution to the theodicy problem by demonstrating that suffering is logically necessary for any conscious being. Using modal logic, I prove that □ ∀x[(C(x) ∧ τ(x) > 0) → ∃t E(x,s,t)] — necessarily, any entity that is conscious and experiences time will experience suffering. The argument proceeds from three premises: (1) consciousness requires discriminating potential; (2) discriminating potential entails the capacity for suffering; (3) any possible world with consciou…Read more